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Abstract 
In 2010, the British Coalition government came to power explicitly promising 
spending cuts as part of a wider fiscal consolidation programme to resolve a debt 
crisis. Despite this promise to reduce public services, the British public seemed to 
reluctantly accept as necessary the imperatives of this debt crisis. Why? Through the 
analysis of data from focus groups conducted around Birmingham, this thesis tackles 
this puzzle of austerity acquiescence by answering a double-edged central research 
question: how do everyday actors make sense of austerity, and what do these 
processes tell us about the legitimation of austerity and the wider politics of 
crisis? The central argument is that while austerity is a vague and highly moral idea, it 
is simultaneously powerful and 'successful' inasmuch that it resonates with the 'mood 
of the times'. In other words, fiscal consolidation has been conferred a degree of 
legitimacy since it can be justified in line with some of the intersubjective beliefs and 
experiences of the public. Through this argument, this thesis primarily contributes to 
the discipline of political economy through a novel empirical account of austerity 
acquiescence and a constructivist framework for exploring how crises and narratives 
are conferred legitimacy through resonating with the mood of the times.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Imagine living in a country where the prime minister could announce one 
morning that his drastic spending cuts would now roll on for twice as long 
and hear barely a murmur of protest. 
(Aditya Chakrabortty, ‘Ten years of austerity? Only the British would 
meet that with barely a murmur’, The Guardian, 23rd July 2012).  
 
In 2010, Britain entered the ‘age of austerity’. As Liam Byrne, the former British 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, put it somewhat flippantly in a note for his successor 
in 2010: ‘there’s no money left’. Byrne was referring to the increasingly politicised 
fact that, amongst developed Western nations, the UK had one of the largest fiscal 
deficits that was contributing to increasing debt levels. In the melee to explain this 
seemingly novel situation, various reasons were cited – including the effect of 
automatic stabilisers owed to the 2008-09 recession, a collapse in revenues from the 
financial industry, and New Labour economic mismanagement. In May of that year, 
the British Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties formed a coalition government 
in which the leaders of both parties formally agreed that ‘the most urgent task facing 
this coalition is to tackle our record debts’, which was justified in terms of tackling 
‘Labour’s Debt Crisis’ to ensure that the UK lived within its means. The resulting 
policy strategy combined moderate tax rises with the largest cuts to public spending 
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since the Second World War (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker 2011). Consequently, fiscal 
consolidation became perhaps the priority of the British state, representing not just a 
short-term rebalancing of the books but a more concerted effort to transform the state 
to institutionalise fiscal responsibility in the long-term.   
According to the UK coalition government, the reasons for this are obvious. They 
claim that there is no alternative to austerity if the UK’s all-important international 
credibility is to be saved: the fiscal deficit and/or debt is the cause of the previous 
government’s systematic overspending. The answer to too much debt is never more 
debt: it is to cut spending and live within means, like a responsible household with too 
many credit cards should. With the recent innovation of ‘growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation’, proponents of austerity argue that states can ensure that purposefully 
deflating the economy through a large fiscal squeeze does not dampen demand and 
thus growth, because the spending cuts and retreating public sector will free up space 
for the private sector (otherwise ‘crowded out’) to drive the economy forward. 
Furthermore, according to Ricardian equivalence, consumers and businesses will 
calculate that when spending is cut on the proviso of cutting the state’s debt the threat 
of future taxation is dampened and so go out and spend money and start businesses – 
giving the economy an important boost. This is the justification for fiscal 
consolidation. This thesis focuses on the legitimation of this strategy, from 2008 to 
2012, in the UK. 
This idea of fiscal consolidation has come under increasing attack from all corners 
since 2010. For instance, chief economic commentator for the Financial Times Martin 
Wolf, along with New York Times columnist and Nobel prize-winning economist 
Paul Krugman, have repeatedly decried the economic logic behind the UK’s fiscal 
consolidation plan. Even the stereotypically liberal Economist has suggested that 
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although ‘commendable’ the UK ‘could easily lose a decade’ unless considerably 
more emphasis is placed upon regaining growth (Economist 2013). Furthermore, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) made thinly veiled criticisms of a similar kind in 
their surveys of the British economy. There have been many attempts by political 
economists to argue for the inherent dangerousness, invalidity, and inappropriateness 
of the idea (e.g. Baker 2011, Boyer 2012, Callinicos 2012, King et al. 2012, Sawyer 
2012, Blyth 2013a). To top it all, there is emerging evidence that austerity is seriously 
detrimental to the physical and mental well-being of citizens (Stuckler and Basu 
2013). The message is loud and clear, austerity is a dangerous idea: dangerous 
because it has never worked during a global slump; dangerous because it seriously 
dampens economic growth; dangerous because it misunderstands what requires fixing 
in the current crisis; dangerous because it has no credible intellectual underpinning; 
and, ultimately, dangerous because it imposes losses on normal citizens, with those 
losses particularly concentrated on the poor and impoverished.  
Yet in another sense, austerity is a powerful and ‘successful’ idea. It has not been 
successful necessarily in the sense that it has resulted in sensible, correct and fair 
policies. Instead, it has been successful in the sense of capturing the imagination of 
the public and legitimating a significant economic strategy that promises to impose 
losses on many citizens. Indeed, significant segments of the British public – and not 
just the wealthiest asset-holding classes – seem largely to accept the imperatives of 
the ‘debt crisis’ and the subsequent spending cuts. While there has been a flurry of 
research that aims to discredit the economic basis of the idea of austerity, very few 
scholars have paused to reflect on how the idea is powerful and successful in spite of 
its apparently flawed theoretical basis. In order to tackle this puzzle, this thesis asks:  
• How do everyday actors make sense of austerity?  
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• What do these processes tell us about the legitimation of austerity and the 
wider politics of crisis?   
It primarily researches these questions through a number of focus group discussions 
with non-elite actors to explain this austerity acquiescence in its own right. It is shown 
that when we talk about austerity we are not necessarily talking about just short-term 
fiscal consolidation: it is talk about debt, and talk about tax that emerges – talk of 
which is necessarily bound up in complex issues of morality, fairness, identity and 
other everyday politics. Consequently, the idea of austerity is not reducible to just 
economic theories since it also gives meaning to the increasing focus on thrift, 
frugality and financial responsibility in the post-2008 British context.  
The central argument of this thesis, that austerity is a powerful idea, contains within it 
three distinct contributions. First, analytically or empirically, it explains austerity 
acquiescence. It argues that austerity successfully resonated with the ‘mood of the 
times’ – pre existing and culturally embedded experiences and knowledge that ensure 
that the debt crisis, and the imperatives of fiscal consolidation, give meaning to how 
everyday actors make sense of how the economy does and should work. By showing 
how potentially unpopular reforms were legitimated, this aspect of the thesis 
contributes to debates about political and economic change following the global 
economic downturn of 2008 and beyond. Second, methodologically, it incorporates 
the otherwise empirically unexplored constructivist concept of ‘mood of the times’ 
into an everyday politics framework that uses focus groups to explore the process of 
legitimation on a micro-level. This framework thus proposes one way to study how 
economic ideas are ‘successful’ while also extending and expanding upon recent 
‘everyday’ international political economy (IPE) calls to incorporate, both empirically 
and conceptually, the role of non-elites in analysing the process of legitimation. Third, 
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conceptually, this thesis shows how the idea of austerity extends beyond just 
economic theories of fiscal consolidation or ideological commitments to a smaller 
state. The idea of austerity is also bound up in subtly shifting norms and expectations 
about how decent households ought to act and conjures up images of post-war 1940s 
‘austerity’, and seeing it in this light has important implications for understanding the 
cultural politics of fiscal consolidation. The rest of this introductory chapter is 
dedicated to unpacking the existing literature and research puzzle, delineating in more 
detail the argument and contribution of the thesis, and outlining the structure of the 
thesis itself.  
The agenda: post-2008 change and the idea of austerity 
Crisis conjures up many meanings: a turning point, a decisive intervention, an 
opportunity, a failure, and so on. As every good student of crisis knows, the concept 
can be traced back to medical use in Ancient Greece, where it referred to a moment in 
which a patient either dies or makes it through a debilitating illness (Habermas 1976: 
1-5, Koselleck 2006, Gamble 2009b: 38-9, Froud et al. 2012: 44). While these 
etymological origins may seem arcane, they mirror the current use of crisis in political 
science and political economy. ‘Crisis’ is a concept that is central to understanding 
the institutional transformations – the rise and fall of the post-war settlement and the 
subsequent dominance of something akin to neo-liberalism – that constitute many 
salient historical narratives of twentieth century capitalism (e.g. Jessop 2002, Blyth 
2002). This is perhaps why much of the academic literature on the global economic 
downturn of 2008 and beyond is so geared towards identifying a great transformation 
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or not1. This meaning of crisis is filtered into political economy debates about the 
global economic downturn and austerity.  
These accounts emerge from political economy analysis of the 2008 global economic 
downturn. Many reasons have been put forward for this crisis: contagion from the US 
sub-prime debacle (Gamble 2009a: 455); the form and content of recent reforms to 
financial regulation (Crotty 2009), in particular the Basel accord (Friedman 2009); a 
model of economic growth based on private indebtedness (Crouch 2009, Hay 2013a). 
Given these diagnoses, it is unsurprising then that the crisis was seen by some as a 
window of opportunity to rally against the market (Wade 2008: 6), reclaim a role for 
the state (Hattersley and Hickson 2012), and rethink financial regulation (Froud et al. 
2010, for excellent critiques of this view see Konings 2009, Thompson 2012). 
However, with this window of opportunity firmly closed following the period of 
quasi-Keynesianism in 2008, this initial optimism has dissipated. Consequently, there 
is much debate about whether to declare either the end of the neo-liberal project (e.g. 
Marsh 2009, Nesvetailova and Palan 2010, Abdelal et al. 2010), or instead claim the 
essential vitality and continuation of the pre-crisis paradigm (e.g. Gamble 2009b, 
Hodson and Mabbett 2009, Crouch 2011) – while others argue new ‘walking-dead’ 
forms of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ are appearing, in which an intellectually 
discredited free-market ideology can only sustain itself through increasingly 
undemocratic politics  (e.g. Peck 2010, Macartney 2013, Bruff 2014).  
Many political economy analyses of the politics of fiscal consolidation continue this 
line of questioning. Both Mark Blyth and Colin Hay, for instance, offer interesting 
                                                
1 This reflects IPE more generally. For Amin and Palan, IPE has ‘tended to see economy and polity in 
the international system in terms of the dynamic of equilibrium and temporary disequilibrium (until a 
new order settles)’ (2001: 567). Moschella and Tsingou’s (2013) recent edited collection, for instance, 
is specifically framed against this search for a great transformation.  
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analyses of the idea of fiscal consolidation, but ultimately limit these analyses to 
explaining the post-2008 ‘reinforcement’ (Hay 2013b: 23) or ‘maintenance’ (Blyth 
2013b: 210-1) of the neo-liberal paradigm. Huw Macartney perhaps captures part of 
the mood in concluding that ‘a crisis of neoliberalism is being countered by re-
invoking neoliberalism’ (2011: 197). At the heart of these debates is an important 
question: how has a crisis ostensibly either of (or at least in) finance or of neo-
liberalism been transformed into the crisis of state overspending and of state debt that 
makes spending cuts seem so inevitable? While there are many excellent analyses of 
this phenomenon, they remain silent on how this shift has been successfully 
legitimated by the elite actors who drove the discourse of debt crisis forward.  
In addition to this literature on the nature of change following the crises of 2008, there 
have been several political economy analyses of the idea of austerity itself. Photis 
Lysandrou (2013), for instance, successfully challenges two of the theories central to 
the economic justification of austerity: the argument that rising deficits and debts will 
lead to a crisis of confidence amongst sovereign bond investors, and that a 90% debt 
to GDP ratio will have an adverse impact upon economic growth. Mark Blyth’s 
(2013a) Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea demonstrates how fiscal 
consolidation is based on an premise that severely misdiagnoses the current crisis, an 
idea that has no substantive theoretical underpinning, and a strategy that has never 
worked in conditions akin to the current global economy. Suzanne Konzelmann 
(2014), meanwhile, provides an unparalleled political economy analysis of austerity, 
tracing the social, political and economic developments that have shaped ideas about 
austerity – extending her reach from classical political economy to the present day, 
with everything in-between. Konzelmann concludes, capturing the mood, that ‘[t]he 
tragedy today is that, with the benefit of hindsight, we should know better’ (2014: 36). 
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While presenting a very convincing case against austerity, this literature is unable to 
adequately explain how and why large sections of the public accept its imperatives. 
Here, the economic theory and history of austerity is far less relevant. As Malcolm 
Sawyer (2012: 208) points out, there was little direct appeal to these theories in the 
justifications for austerity. So while debunking them is at the very least an important 
political activity, it is not particularly helpful in analysing the puzzle here. In contrast, 
struggles over what is right and wrong, for instance, have been a key feature of the 
debt crisis analysed here. Marion Fourcade has rightly suggested that ‘these moral 
struggles and the different paths they inspire are not a distraction from some ‘real’ 
economic issues beneath’ (2013: 626). However, tellingly, ‘morality plays’, so central 
to the justification of austerity, tend to be discarded early on in these analyses 
(although Konzelmann is partially an exception here), presumably since they are 
considered a rhetorical distraction that obfuscates the real political economy issues.  
A key part of the argument here is that we should move away from this limited focus. 
These debates about whether austerity works (and, if so, how and when it should 
apply) are relatively arcane, and should at least be supplemented with an analysis of 
how spending cuts in the name of austerity are presented and justified. Otherwise, we 
will gain very little analytical traction into answering an important puzzle: how and 
why segments of the population accepted austerity as necessary, in which seeing how 
elite actors used the idea of austerity to claim legitimacy for spending cuts will be a 
crucial part. My suggestion here is simple and straightforward: instead of trying to 
work out (and then refute) what the underlying economic theory of austerity may be, 
we additionally accept and explore the public justifications for fiscal consolidation as 
a potentially constitutive (rather than an epiphenomenal) part of the idea of austerity 
itself. This approach treats austerity not as an arcane and technical economic theory to 
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be debunked, but as a cultural artefact embedded in society – to be explored and 
understood in its own right, but also as a means to explaining austerity acquiescence.  
Taking this approach to the idea of austerity is also potentially illuminative in regard 
to an issue that in principle should be relatively straight-forward: how to define 
austerity. While Lysandrou does not really define austerity per se, there is a genuine 
ambiguity at the heart of Blyth’s definition of austerity. As Chris Bickerton (2013) 
pointed out in a blogpost, Blyth himself uses up to 12 different definitions of 
‘austerity’ (‘internal deflation’, ‘a mere sensibility’, and so on) in his book. 
Konzelmann, to her credit, acknowledges this ambiguity when she writes on how 
‘lengthy debate has failed to produce general agreement about what constitutes 
austerity, much less why and when it should be applied’2 (2014: 3). We therefore have 
the strange situation in which the discipline of political economy is unable to 
precisely define one of the most important words in contemporary politics and 
economics.  
Konzelmann’s definition of austerity, a ‘form of cutting back on spending, notably 
(but not only) that of governments’ (2014: 3), is helpful in showing the way. However, 
a singular definition of austerity may be misguided. In the field of cultural studies 
meanwhile, Rebecca Bramall, herself borrowing from an essay by John Lanchester, 
introduces the very useful distinction between spending cuts and austerity. While 
spending cuts indicates ‘real’ specific reductions in services, austerity represents a 
harder to locate general reduction in government spending (Bramall 2013: 2). Bramall 
downplays spending cuts, just looking at austerity as a cultural phenomenon through 
                                                
2 Given this understanding, it perhaps unsurprising that Konzelmann designates considerably more 
time than either Blyth or Lysandrou in analysing the moral justifications for austerity – although she 
too ultimately limits her analysis of this to concluding that most of the justifications are misleading 
without seeking to explore how they are powerful or successful in resonating with the public.  
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the specific lens of memory studies. Consequently, she does not spend much time or 
space on whether adopting austerity as a lifestyle has much bearing on accepting 
spending cuts. We can, anyway, go somewhat further, and identify three parts of the 
idea in focus: spending cuts, fiscal consolidation, and austerity. While spending cuts 
refers to the very specific and almost muddling through nature of instigating reduced 
services and welfare retrenchment, fiscal consolidation is closer to the Blyth and 
Lysandrou understanding: the idea that governments should practice ‘sound finances’ 
to facilitate a minimum state is much less clear-cut. Throughout this thesis, but 
especially in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion, I make the case that austerity is simply 
the idea of living within one’s means, an inherently moral imperative that should be 
contrasted against the technocratic and bureaucratic logics of fiscal consolidation and 
spending cuts, respectively. These distinctions run through the entire thesis, but the 
full consequences of this conceptual distinction are explored briefly in the Conclusion. 
The puzzle: explaining austerity acquiescence  
This novel research agenda shifts the focus onto questions about how elite actors 
justify spending cuts in the name of fiscal consolidation through ‘morality plays’. 
This agenda is a means to best explain the central puzzle of this thesis: how and why 
segments of the population have accepted the necessity of austerity. More specifically, 
this agenda shifts the focus onto questions about how legitimacy was conferred on 
this strategy despite the potential for strident public opposition.  
In the face of this full-frontal and explicit assault on the state, one may expect mass 
protest and contestation to emerge, or perhaps even a legitimation crisis (Habermas 
1976). David Bailey (2014) has, for instance, shown how the global financial crisis 
has led to a demonstrable increase in the quantity of political protests. While this 
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contestation is important, it remains the case that there is a general trend in which 
significant sections of the British public have met the onset and imperatives of 
austerity with a reluctant acceptance. This should not be confused with an assumption 
that no one has resisted spending cuts, or that the majority of the public think they are 
fair. It is instead to point out the overall trend of large segments of the population 
towards inertia in the face of fiscal consolidation. This is a phenomenon I refer to as 
austerity acquiescence.  
Within political economy, a few scholars have explored austerity acquiescence. For 
Marion Fourcade, Eurozone austerity is distinct because the morality plays on which 
it is based have ‘the backing, if not the active encouragement, of a large segment of 
their populations’ (2013: 625). For Martijn Konings, meanwhile, the rise of a 
‘neoliberal populism’ is ‘conspicuously absent in recent political economy 
commentary’ (2012: 612). Austerity acquiescence has become the ‘elephant in the 
room’ (2012: 613) because progressive thought and constructivist political economy 
are unable to make sense of episodes where the ‘public has itself clamoured for 
neoliberal austerity’ (2012: 610). I seek to significantly expand upon these 
preliminary analyses.  
This thesis explores a particular and distinctive period within the self-styled ‘age of 
austerity’ in the UK in the period up to 20123: when the politics was characterised by 
acquiescence from the British public to the idea of fiscal consolidation. The focus on 
the idea is what makes this period distinctive: as of 2012 (when the focus groups were 
conducted, and this thesis thus analyses up to) many of the spending cuts were still 
                                                
3 Since the focus groups were conducted in 2012, this is an appropriate cut off point for this research. 
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projected4 and indeed yet to be fully implemented5. Furthermore, as Chapter 1 shows, 
the extent of the spending cuts may have been overplayed, since there is evidence that 
only the 2010 budget introduced particularly sizable cuts. Both the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ (Hay 1996a) and the poll tax fiasco (Bellamy 1994, Besley et al. 1997) 
highlight, in different ways, the importance of legitimising controversial economic 
strategies. The age of austerity provides a distinct challenge in this respect. For Posner 
and Blöndal, the ‘democratic political imperative is viewed as being at odds with the 
fiscal responsibility imperative’ (2012: 12)6. In other words, with many voters being 
‘squeezed’ due to the rising cost of living, one would not expect to woo voters with 
the promise of yet greater hardship. Yet, the Conservative Party, it must be 
remembered, won a minority election victory and formed a coalition government on 
the back of explicitly promising and foregrounding ‘the age of austerity’ as a 
necessary solution to an out-of-control fiscal deficit. 
Yet fiscal consolidation was not the stark reality for the UK it may have appeared to 
be for many Eurozone periphery states (including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Italy). Without monetary autonomy due to the institutional design of the 
Eurozone, the periphery states had little option but to reassure bond markets through 
retrenchment, or otherwise continue to borrow at increasingly unsustainable levels 
that would exacerbate the situation. Rising bond yields (see Figure 1) provided 
                                                
4 According to the Institute of Fiscal Studies ‘only 12% of the planned total cuts to public service 
spending, and just 6% of the cuts in current public service spending, will have been implemented by 
the end of [the 2011-12 financial year]’ [Source: http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2012/12chap3.pdf]. 
5 This implementation may well give rise to a second phase of politics characterised by resistance 
based on the lived and direct experiences of spending cuts and the stilted recession-riddled economy 
that cuts gives rise to. Or, the ‘sound finances’ resulting from balancing the budget may give rise to a 
new economic prosperity based on a newly invigorated private sector. The point is that such 
acquiescence in this specific first period is, I believe, worthy of analysis.  
6 There is also an emerging literature on the potential ramifications of the age of austerity for political 
participation (e.g. Crouch 2013, Offe 2013, Streeck 2013, Streeck and Mertins 2013) that is not of 
direct relevance for purposes here.  
  13 
incumbent politicians with shared and relatively incontestable public evidence to 
build a consensus around a notion of the state in crisis7. The UK, on the other hand, 
had both monetary and fiscal policy-making autonomy, mostly because low gilt yields 
made debt financing very cheap8 (Thompson 2013: 10-12). But this also meant that 
British politicians did not have the same market-blaming technocratic justifications 
for austerity as those in Europe had. For these reasons, the legitimation of fiscal 
consolidation in the UK is a particularly interesting and illustrative case study. 
Figure 0.1 10-year government bond yields 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 91 database.     
                                                
7 As Simona Pino (2012) has tentatively argued, this indeed proved the case in legitimating Monti’s 
fiscal consolidation plan in Italy – where rising bond yields acted as the impetus behind the necessity 
of intervention and the imposition of an anti-democratic technical government itself. 
8 The answer to the particular puzzle of why gilt bond yields have stayed low is explained as either the 
result of a favourable market reaction to a perceived credible fiscal consolidation strategy or because 
the UK, unlike Greece for instance, has more autonomy that renders sovereign default virtually 
impossible. 
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Austerity acquiescence can be further illustrated with polling data. YouGov have been 
conducting a weekly opinion poll on austerity and attitudes to public spending cuts. 
Interestingly, as Figure 0.2 shows, polling evidence from YouGov indicated that a 
considerable amount of respondents (36-46%) polled between 2010 and 2012 blame 
the Labour party for spending cuts, which tentatively suggests that either 
Conservative narratives resonated or that it was successful in persuading people – 
although the blame put on Labour did decrease over time. From looking at some of 
the other survey data they have collected (see Figure 0.3), one could easily conclude 
that the public are against spending cuts: 63% of those polled think the cuts are being 
done unfairly; 72% of people are worried that they won’t have enough money to 
comfortably live on; around 75% people think they will suffer directly from cuts to 
welfare in the next two to three years9. One survey question, however, asks a different 
question: whether they think spending cuts are necessary. And, interestingly, as 
Figure 0.3 highlights, a majority of people (57%) think such cuts are necessary. This 
is a potentially profound and important insight. Believing that a state strategy is unfair 
and likely to worsen life may be negated somewhat by the perception that the very 
strategy is itself a necessary intervention. This raises an interesting question: how is 
the idea of austerity and the subsequent imperative to cut the deficit so powerful? 
How does the general public deem it so necessary?  
  
                                                
9 These figure was reached by averaging the 2012 responses to a recurring poll on the economy 
conducted by YouGov. Respondents were asked ‘Thinking about the way the government is cutting 
spending to reduce the government's deficit, do you think this is...Necessary or unnecessary?’ 
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Figure 0.2  Public attribution of blame for spending cuts 2010-2012 (average) 
 
Source: YouGov (note *From June 13th onwards, **Up until July 16th) 
 
Figure 0.3 Attitudes to spending cuts 2010-2012 (average) 
 
Source: YouGov (note that survey data is from June 13th  2010 until July 16th 2012) 
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Political economy and political science typically have two approaches to tackling this 
puzzle of austerity acquiescence. The first set of explanations focus on interests. The 
‘new politics of welfare’ (Pierson 1994, 1996) literature, for example, assumes that 
(welfare) retrenchment is an intrinsically unpopular policy strategy due to the human 
cognitive bias towards loss aversion (see Kahneman and Tversky 1984)10. Similarly, 
an economics conventional wisdom is that fiscal adjustments are ‘the kiss of death for 
the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following 
elections’ (Alesina et al. 2011: 1)11. Thus, politicians must engage in the ‘politics of 
blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1987, see also Hood 2002a, 2002b) to generate 
acquiescence through controlling (and obfuscating) the information that the 
preferences of the mass public are based. Based on this logic, austerity acquiescence 
may not be a reluctant acceptance at all, but instead just a waiting period until the 
Coalition government can be adequately punished in the best way the electorate 
knows: through the ballot box. Ricardian equivalence, meanwhile, theorises that when 
state debt levels rise rational agents, such as households and businesses, alter their 
behaviour on the calculation that more national debt will lead to tax rises (Barro 
1989). To reverse this is to argue that when spending is cut and thus the state’s debt 
reduced, then agents perceive that the threat of future taxation is lifted – and thus 
accept spending cuts on the basis of future savings. 
The second set of explanations focus on ideology. In essence, what lies at the 
foundation of these explanations is the lack of a viable alternative: without an 
alternative economic policy paradigm to neo-liberalism to choose from, the public 
                                                
10 Although it should be noted that as this literature has developed, the assumption that welfare 
retrenchment is inherently unpopular has been increasingly scrutinized (e.g. Starke 2006). 
11 Although we should perhaps be slightly wary of Alesina’s broader conclusions about fiscal 
consolidation as potentially electorally popular, given the economist’s consistent motivation to justify 
austerity (as catalogued in Blyth 2013a).  
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have no option but to accept more of the same. For instance, it has been argued that 
spending cuts have been constructed as a necessary imperative ‘depoliticising rhetoric’ 
(Kerr et al. 2011: 201) that has shaped the preferences (see Lukes 1974/2005) of the 
mass public into believing that austerity is in their interest. Alternatively, it may be 
argued that the dominant market-friendly subject positions of ‘investor’ and 
‘borrower’, and the subsequent realigned interests and political allegiances, that link 
everyday actions to the imperatives of the global economy have created a 
constituency for exactly the sort of political settlement that austerity promises.    
Rather than overturning or rejecting these explanations, this thesis aims to supplement 
them by tackling the puzzle of austerity acquiescence from a different and novel 
direction. It proposes that by offering a more concrete analysis based on the empirical 
analysis of everyday sense-making from focus group discussions, unique and practical 
insights into austerity acquiescence can be produced. Consequently, and to reiterate, 
the central research questions of this thesis are: 
• How do everyday actors make sense of austerity?  
• What do these processes tell us about the legitimation of austerity and the 
wider politics of crisis?   
The argument: austerity is a powerful and successful idea 
The central argument of this thesis is that austerity is a powerful idea because it 
resonates with the mood of the times: since it can be justified with shared beliefs 
spending cuts are conferred a degree of legitimacy. Within this argument are three 
contributions: an empirical argument about austerity acquiescence, a novel 
methodology for studying how economic ideas are conferred legitimacy from the 
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public, and a sketch of a basic conceptual framework that makes an important 
distinction between spending cuts, fiscal consolidation and austerity.  
Underpinned by a constructivist methodology fully outlined in Chapter 3, the 
empirical claims in this thesis consist of a case-specific analytical narrative that offers 
a necessarily incomplete and one-sided explanation of austerity acquiescence in the 
UK. It is adequately causal in the sense that it shows that due to a number of factors 
austerity acquiescence was ‘historically so and not otherwise’ (Weber 1949: 72). This 
is assisted through an ‘ideal-type’ conceptual framework about how crises resonate 
with the mood of the times, the claims of which are based on its ability as ‘means’ to 
this empirical end (Weber 1949: 80). The primary claim to originality (that 
encapsulates all three distinct contributions briefly surveyed above) is that this 
particular analytical narrative, and the assemblage of facts and the framework that 
underpins it, can help us order our experiences and scholarly practices in ways that 
existing literature can and has not.  
Crisis is one of the central and underpinning themes of the argument. Since spending 
cuts are an intrinsically unpopular policy, a (debt) crisis can convince the populace 
into accepting fiscal consolidation as a necessary solution to an existential turning 
point in the nation’s trajectory. It is difficult to make sense of both the transformation 
from a global financial crisis to a debt crisis – ‘the greatest bait and switch in history’, 
according to Blyth (2013a) – or the relatively sudden politicisation of the UK’s fiscal 
deficit without a concept of crisis. In this sense, the language of crisis itself is of 
particular importance: it is used to signify an irremediable condition of emergency – 
unless an intervention is made with decisive swiftness (Hay 1999: 323-7, Koselleck 
2006: 358, Gamble 2009b: 38-9). As Colin Hay puts it, power ‘resides not only the 
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ability to respond to crisis, but to identify, define, and constitute crisis in the first 
place’ (1996a: 255). In this sense, the debt crisis clearly matters.  
Crisis also has a central place in some of the key literature on fiscal consolidation, in 
which the debt crisis is rejected as a mere symptom of an alternative underlying 
disease or crisis. Chapter 1 surveys five theses – financial crisis, growth crisis, fiscal 
crisis, social crisis, and capitalist crisis – that follow this symptom-disease distinction. 
The point is that contesting crisis – and more specifically, rejecting the debt crisis as a 
misrepresentation of a different crisis and identifying an alternative true underlying 
cause – is a high stakes issue in making sense of the politics of austerity. This thesis 
acknowledges that distinguishing between disease and symptoms of crisis is a useful 
approach, but suggests it is at least equally worthwhile to also explore how the debt 
crisis was socially constructed without recourse to contrasting representations with an 
underlying reality. By examining the cultural and political history of the debt crisis, 
we are able to better understand how its terms became accepted as everyday common 
sense (Hall 1979), and thus be better placed to provide a convincing and plausible 
explanation for the puzzle posed in this thesis.  
I define crisis as an essentially narrated process that is brought to life through a 
process of problem definition, an interpretive battle over the causes and solution to 
that problem, and an intervention that seeks to resolve the crisis. When introducing 
controversial economic policy change in the name of crisis, however, politicians will 
be significantly aided if the public accept the terms of their crisis definition. 
Constructivist scholars suggest that crises are legitimated through resonating with the 
‘mood of the times’, i.e. acquiring an intersubjective consensus about the 
appropriateness of imperatives of crisis (Widmaier 2004: 437, see also Widmaier et al. 
2007). Yet, this constructivist literature tends to remain quiet on how to go about 
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researching this, subscribing to an implicit view that legitimacy is conferred by 
‘proclamation’ (Seabrooke 2006: 40). 
Due to this ‘methodological elitism’, the existing political economy literature is 
unequipped to answer these puzzles because it focuses largely on top-down processes. 
Everyday IPE seeks to counteract this problem by turning the tables to show how the 
mass public can drive change in the global economy (e.g. Hobson and Seabrooke 
2007b, Seabrooke 2007a, 2010a, 2012, Langley 2008, Broome 2009, Montgomerie 
2008, 2009, Watson 2013a). Influenced by this Everyday IPE critique, I argue that 
this process of crisis can be conferred a required degree of legitimation if it can be 
‘justified via shared belief’ (Beetham 1991). This means that when we seek to assess 
legitimation, one way we can do so is on the basis of it conforming to existing shared 
values, standards and expectations. Yet Everyday IPE relies on methodological 
proxies. While historical sociology is an illuminating method (Seabrooke 2007b), to 
gain the best understanding possible of justification by shared beliefs, primary data 
gained from everyday talk would be desirable – in this case from focus group 
interviews.  
Focus groups are particularly relevant to analysing intersubjectivity: the common-
sense conceptions and ordinary explanations shared by a set of social actors (Calder 
1977: 358). Indeed, focus groups produce ‘sociable public discourse’ in which 
participants tend to act as if ‘speaking to a gallery’ as governed by the norms of 
public discourse (Gamson 1992: 20). Everyday talk, gathered through the focus group 
discussions, allows the analyst to witness the production and performance of these 
shared meanings and experiences. Consequently, the common-sense assumptions that 
support certain views – such as those regarding the necessity of cutting the fiscal 
deficit – can be reconstructed and analysed. Between May and October 2012, I 
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conducted 6 focus groups with 36 participants divided into two sub-groups: 
homeowners from middle-income areas and community volunteers from poorer areas. 
Crisis, then, is a process of problem definition, narration and decisive intervention. In 
order to achieve legitimacy, this process must resonate with the mood of the times – 
or, in the other words, it must be justifiable via shared beliefs. In order to 
operationalize this, I disaggregate the mood of the times into a three-pronged 
framework consisting of: (1) the public life of an economic downturn; (2) the role of 
sense-making in everyday narratives of crisis; (3) legitimacy gaps between the 
profligate experiences and normative expectations of public money. These three 
aspects of the mood were all conducive to the debt crisis narrative; indeed, through 
each one, spending cuts could be justified via shared beliefs. Each will be briefly 
looked at here for the purposes of signposting.  
Public life 
The public life of crisis can engender different state interventions. In the case of 
widespread hardship and privation, a strong intervention by the state to prop up those 
suffering could be deemed legitimate. In the absence of such widespread hardship and 
an inability for private troubles to be converted into public issues (Mills 1970 [1959]: 
14), such as in this case, critical events and disruption to the ‘routine texture of social 
life’ (Hay 1996a: 255) can create uncertainty among the public by upsetting ‘normal 
expectations’ (Goffman 1971, Habermas 1976). I found that focus group participants 
often relayed significant private troubles, especially amongst the lower-income 
groups where participants provided some dark anecdotes about the quality of life but 
also celebrated the togetherness and resilience of their communities in hard times. 
However, despite this private hardship, normal expectations were rarely disturbed. 
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This helped create a mood in which general political and economic inertia could be 
justified since public life had not been too severely disrupted during the downturn. 
This is despite a number of critical events that could have disturbed normal 
appearances and given the impression of something being ‘up’.  
Sense-making 
Within this context, all focus groups identified the problem and crisis of debt. 
Although there were some other alternative crisis narratives, many participants 
(sometimes when specifically asked) identified debt as the problem facing the UK. 
The sheer act of identifying a debt crisis (as opposed to, say, a financial crisis or a 
growth crisis) placed significant limits on the sorts of crisis narratives produced. 
Identifying this crisis in this manner meant that participants tended to view (and 
accept) the imperatives of fiscal consolidation through a strong moral sense that there 
was excessive indebtedness. With the UK as a whole, including the state and 
households, deemed to have overspent during the pre-crisis years, there was a mood 
that ‘we must reap what we sowed’.  
What was notable about this sense-making process is the extent to which states and 
households were consistently placed within a wide-ranging narrative of previous 
profligacy and a future asceticism. This does, to an extent, provide some limited 
evidence of the ‘household analogy’ (an important theme in this thesis): that in 
making sense of something as intangibly large and complex as the modern state’s 
finances, people will inevitably simplify it through the heuristic of the household 
economy – but in a way that limits the possibilities and renders Keynesian policy 
options as non-sensical. However, I argue that this intertwined narrative can be best 
explained through the deeply moral nature of debt. When considered as a moral 
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obligation rather than a financial instrument, it does not appear necessarily incoherent 
or illogical to place households and states in an intertwined narrative. Although some 
were critical of this analogous and moral reasoning, participants typically drew on 
popular wisdom about managing debt in everyday life (‘one must pay back one’s 
debts’, ‘one must live within means’) and the experience of financialisation to 
construct a narrative of austerity that produced a form of acquiescence to the fiscal 
imperatives of the debt crisis.  
Legitimacy gaps 
Since fiscal consolidation is about the funding of the state, it should be of little 
surprise that tax plays a central role in austerity acquiescence. Specifically, a promise 
to cut public spending can be legitimated by seemingly closing the gap between the 
expectation of how public money should be spent and the actual experiences of how 
public money is (seemingly) spent (see Seabrooke 2007a: 796). In the focus groups, 
this legitimacy gap came out in two ways. First, participants consistently drew upon 
anecdotes of state overspending. These were typically mundane, such as how a nearby 
road had been unnecessarily repaved at great cost. But they had a wider point – 
especially considering they often followed conversations about state indebtedness. 
This was part of the narrative of austerity as almost a way of accounting for debt 
crisis by identifying some of the sources of state profligacy. Second, participants 
consistently identified with a sense of group position in an abstract moral order, in 
which the hard-working taxpayer was constituted in opposition to a morally 
undeserving rich and poor – both of whom are seen to be irresponsibly receiving 
redistribution from the taxpayer (Blumer 1958, Kidder and Martin 2012). There was a 
sense that ‘taxpayers’ money’ was unfairly diverted to unnecessary projects and 
redistributed to the undeserving.  
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Taken together, this suggests that there was a gap between the expectations and 
experience of public finance with which the imperatives of the debt crisis resonated. 
This in turn helps explain austerity acquiescence: If one experiences the seeming 
redistribution of public money to support (a) wasteful and unnecessary spending, and 
(b) morally undeserving groups, then one will question the legitimacy of contributing 
further revenue through tax increases to reduce the deficit and be inclined towards 
accepting the inevitability of spending cuts in the context of a widely accepted debt 
crisis. In other words, these lived experiences of profligacy jarred against the 
normative expectations of prudence, creating a gap that spending cuts could indirectly 
narrow. 
*** 
From these three stylised aspects of the mood of the times – public life, sense-making, 
legitimacy gaps – an ideal-typical narrative of austerity emerged. Both states and 
households lived excessively. Households became indebted through being 
increasingly networked within global finance; states built up debt through wasteful 
spending and unfair redistribution to the undeserving rich and poor. Since the public 
life of crisis was relatively mundane, it represents a good time to restore the balance. 
The result is that ‘austerity’ is seen as a society-wide phenomenon, invoking both 
state and household to live within means after pre-crisis credit fuelled excesses. 
Cutting back public spending (through efficiency savings and welfare retrenchment) 
thus implicitly promises to make the life of the taxpayer fairer; ‘cutting back’ and 
living within means as a more general mindset, meanwhile, promises to escape the 
guilty excesses of the recent past by rediscovering the moral code of thrift and 
prudence. 
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Crucially, however, this austerity acquiescence is not reducible to interests or 
ideology. When justifying following the fiscal imperatives of the debt crisis, 
participants did not perform a cost-benefit analysis or attempt to maximise their utility. 
Instead, their justifications were firmly embedded within shared notions of morality 
and fairness that are not reducible to interest. Similarly, although the role of the media 
in disseminating information is undoubtedly crucial, the production of acquiescence 
cannot be reduced to the internalisation of a narrative passed down by elites. To be 
clear, the debt crisis narrative propagated by Coalition government elites was 
undoubtedly political and far from neutral. Yet I would follow Stuart Hall’s (1979: 
20) analysis of Thatcherism, and argue that the success of the idea of austerity ‘does 
not lie in its capacity to dupe unsuspecting folk but in the way it addresses real 
problems, real and lived experiences …  It works on the ground of already constituted 
social practices’. As I show, in making sense of the age of austerity participants 
consistently drew upon norms and experiences (such as those surrounding debt, or the 
undeserving poor). In particular, there was a mood in the focus groups that there was 
a moral crisis, in that the UK had irresponsibly lived beyond its means in the pre-
crisis years and now required some necessary asceticism to reverse a moral decline as 
evident in all aspects of society – but especially the very top and bottom parts. Part of 
this thesis, then, involves historicising these norms, experiences and moral crisis in 
order to highlight how these sources of acquiescence existed prior to the construction 
of a debt crisis. Consequently, we can say that the mood was already receptive to the 
idea of austerity.  
In short, one reason austerity is a powerful and successful idea is because it resonates 
with the mood of the times. Since spending cuts can be justified via shared belief, 
austerity acquiescence is produced since the fiscal imperatives of the debt crisis are 
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conferred a degree of legitimacy. This argument is dependent, in turn, upon 
developing an everyday politics method that uses focus groups, and by disaggregating 
between spending cuts, fiscal consolidation and austerity.  
The structure: outlining the thesis 
Chapters One, Two and Three review the relevant literature and outline the 
methodological argument and contribution of the thesis. Chapter One begins by 
outlining the context of the age of austerity, with a particular focus on the rise of 
financialisation, the unfolding of the global financial crisis and the politicisation of 
the UK’s debts and deficits, and the perilous politics of fiscal consolidation. To make 
sense of this process we need a concept of crisis. After reviewing the literature on 
crisis and austerity, I suggest that exploring the social construction of the debt crisis 
can be just as fruitful as rejecting the debt crisis as a misrepresentation. Chapter Two 
draws on constructivist, cultural economy and Everyday IPE literature to build a 
framework for analysing how social constructions of crisis are conferred legitimacy 
by resonating with the mood of the times. Since legitimacy can be conferred via 
shared beliefs, Chapter Three argues that focus groups can offer rich and primary data 
in this vein. It justifies this method selection, and also disaggregates the concept of 
the mood of the times into the three parts briefly outlined in the previous section: 
public life, sense-making and legitimacy gaps. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six roughly correspond to these three parts. Chapter Four 
starts by exploring the elite justifications for austerity, before surveying the public life 
of crisis in regards to critical events and the experience of focus group participants. 
Chapter Five begins by showing how focus group participants consistently narrated a 
debt crisis in which austerity was accepted through a strong moral sense that was 
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related to excessive indebtedness. It also reviews the alternative crisis narratives 
offered by participants. Chapter Six is dedicated to showing how focus group 
participants accounted for the state’s indebtedness by drawing on anecdotes about 
state inefficiency or profligacy and placing themselves within a ‘moral abstract order’ 
that created the sense that ‘the taxpayer’ could gain from spending cuts. Chapter 
Seven then reviews the thesis thus far, before spending considerable time pushing 
beyond the focus group data in order to historicise the norms and experiences that 
underpinned the everyday narrative of austerity surveyed. Considerable emphasis is 
placed upon exploring the household analogy and the underserving poor in order to 
gain a wider perspective on austerity acquiescence. It is argued that a moral crisis is 
primary: austerity has been experienced as a necessary reversing of a moral decline. 
In the Conclusion, I summarise the argument and contribution of the thesis to political 
economy – with a particular emphasis on the status of crisis in political economy and 
the tentative distinction between spending cuts, fiscal consolidation and austerity. I 
end by exploring both the limitations and the potential for future research. 
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Chapter 1. Contesting crisis: The disputed turning 
point for fiscal consolidation 
 
 
 
 
 
The global financial crisis has had an undeniable impact upon how the UK’s economy 
is governed. The downturn prompted, for instance, the largest government 
intervention into financial markets in living memory. The state’s fiscal and monetary 
resources, whether direct bailouts or through quantitative easing, were required to 
shore up both confidence and balance sheets. Debates about financial regulation 
shifted arenas from the back to the foreground (Froud et al. 2012: 44), with the rising 
idea of macroprudential regulation significantly challenging and even rejecting 
efficient market theories (Baker 2013: 113). In other words, much change is and was 
afoot. This chapter focuses on one particular element of this change: the turn to fiscal 
consolidation. The chapter has two main aims, as reflected in the two-section 
structure. The first section provides an overview of the key events and factors that 
preceded and impacted upon fiscal consolidation, in order to both provide general 
context as well as to flag up elements that have a constituent and necessary part in the 
overall analytical narrative of the thesis. The second section reviews the academic 
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debates about the underlying causes, or turning points, for fiscal consolidation with 
the aim of carving out and refining the unique niche and potential contribution of this 
thesis.  
In doing so, it poses an argument: crisis lies at the heart of the politics of fiscal 
consolidation. In particular, the debt crisis: the idea that since the UK had such an 
insurmountable and credibility-shattering fiscal deficit, fast and deep spending cuts 
were required. Without the invocation of a crisis, the large intervention seen here 
would not be possible. Understanding how the seemingly unsustainable fiscal deficit 
unfolded, then, is important. Many have gone further than this by seeking to 
demonstrate how the debt crisis is essentially a misrepresentation or a mere symptom 
of a different underlying disease (or crisis) that, if accepted, requires an alternative 
solution to fiscal consolidation. I conclude by questioning the utility of this disease-
symptom distinction as a methodological means for achieving the analytical ends of 
this thesis, opening the space for a different conception of crisis that is not necessarily 
reducible to this binary.  
1.1 The making of the age of austerity 
1.1.1 The tempestuous rise of finance 
There might be some people who argue that the name of this sub-section should, 
given the events of 2008 onwards, include a reference to both the rise and fall of 
finance. However, at the time of writing – 2014, with talk of another British housing 
bubble on the cards thanks in part to the Coalition’s ‘Help to Buy’ scheme – it is clear 
that making such an assumption would be rash (see Blyth 2013b). Nevertheless, this 
section provides a brief but necessary detour into the historical context of the 2008 
economic downturn – in particular, the rise of so-called ‘financialisation’. This detour 
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is necessary for two reasons. First, to gain the fullest of understandings of the politics 
of fiscal consolidation, we need to, quite simply, examine the historical context 
leading up to the sub-prime debacle and the subsequent economic downturn. Fiscal 
consolidation, at least in the way it has specifically panned out in the sheer scale 
looked at here, would not have happened without the events that preceded it. Second, 
financialisation and the latter credit crunch provide a context that was consistently 
drawn upon by focus group participants when making sense of spending cuts. 
Therefore some basic background is required to fully elucidate this later analysis.  
Colin Hay (2011) argues that, from the perspective of the UK, we need to carefully 
delineate between two interlinked contexts: (i) contagion from the 2008 U.S. sub-
prime crash and resulting distress on the inter-bank credit system; and (ii) the 
implosion of the UK’s ‘Privatised Keynesian’ growth model and related housing 
bubble. In both, ‘financialisation’ (e.g. Langley 2008, Finlayson 2009, Montgomerie 
and Williams 2009, Engelen et al. 2011, Krippner 2011, Callinicos 2012) – a general 
conceptual tool that seeks to make sense of ‘the tempestuous rise of finance in 
contemporary capitalism’ (Engelen 2008: 111) – is of central importance. Although a 
general term, financialisation is used here to refer to something quite specific: for it 
was the transformation of credit markets and the subsequent extension into, and 
impact upon, everyday life that made both the lending to American sub-prime 
borrowers and the 125% mortgages emblematic of Britain’s own housing boom 
possible. Indeed, the mass liberalisation of credit that occurred throughout the thirty-
years prior to the 2008 financial crisis helped fuel both the US and UK housing 
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booms and busts (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008: 249-53, Watson 2008a: 293)1. A 
number of factors made this possible.  
One key factor was the deregulation of the financial services that created the space for 
‘innovation’ in new financial products and instruments. The most significant element 
of this for purposes here is ‘mortgage-backed securitization’ (Blyth 2010, see 
Friedman 2009, Seabrooke 2006, 2010b, Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008, Schwartz 
2009, Thompson 2012), a common and relatively simple method for repackaging 
mortgages for secondary markets 2 . These instruments were often repackaged 
themselves into more complex multi-tranched ‘collateralised debt obligations’, which 
were made infamous for their role in the US subprime crash. This ‘securitization of 
securitization’ (Langley 2010: 81) process allowed banks to pass on the risks of 
mortgage lending by taking vast pools of securities and selling shares of the mortgage 
and interest payment streams to investors around the world (Friedman 2009: 131), 
while simultaneously refreshing capital for more loans (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2008: 249). The originator bank makes the majority of income from transaction fees, 
while the purchasers of the securities were mitigated from small amounts of 
mortgage-defaulters by, amongst other things, the large-scale and convoluted nature 
of the instrument (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008: 249). Due to a number of regulatory 
                                                
1 Throughout this discussion I draw on literature about both UK and US economies, something 
consistent in the wider debates about the financialisation of ‘Anglo-American’ capitalism (e.g. Langley 
2008a). 
2 Mortgage securitization was a crucial part in the inexorable linking of international financial flows 
and residential housing in the pre-crisis growth model (Schwartz 2009: xiv). Understanding this link 
required thinking outside of the normal disciplinary boxes. As Wesley Widmaier (2009: 946) wryly 
observes: ‘Fifteen years ago, an article or book suggesting that US subprime mortgage standards might 
have implications for the health of the global economy would have likely to have encountered 
considerable difficulty in getting published in international relations (IR) or IPE journals’. 
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peculiarities3 and intervention from the US state (Seabrooke 2006), mortgage-backed 
securities and similar products boomed with credit risks largely removed. A massive 
expansion into the sub-prime markets followed. Although the role of mortgage 
securitization is most well-known for fuelling the U.S. subprime crash, the UK 
mortgage market witnessed similar trends and a similarly debilitating bubble bursting 
(Watson 2008a: 249).  
In combination with an existing predilection for homeownership (Smith 2008), this 
broad process of financialisation and increased homeownership had a number of 
important implications. With the housing market seemingly only going up, it meant 
that for many people asset price stabilisation became intimately intertwined with 
maximising one’s life chances. Consequent state intervention to secure and strengthen 
the housing market, or to make it more accessible by facilitating credit, would be thus 
conferred a degree of legitimacy (Seabrooke 2006). It also helped create a 
considerable conservative constituency whose interests came to be bound up in the 
extension of policies that promised low inflation, low interest rates and low taxes 
(Schwartz 2008: 281). This meant the constitution of monetary conservatives in the 
UK (Watson 2008a). Although this meant an obvious increase in (and indeed a 
macroeconomic reliance upon) household indebtedness, the New Labour government 
attempted to reshape the social policy around the idea of ‘asset-based welfare’ 
(Finlayson 2009, Watson 2009b). These shifts were in turn dependent upon a marked 
                                                
3 The main institutions involved in US sub-prime lending – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are 
government-sponsored enterprises, which meant that under Basel capital adequacy ratios holders of 
securities from these institutions required less than half the reserves of non-government sponsored 
mortgage-securities. The incentive for these investments was increased further with the advent of 
‘Credit Default Swaps’ which insured investors from defaults. Furthermore, Basel II gave credit rating 
agencies’ evaluations, which famously rated sub-prime as AAA before the crash, a clearer and primary 
role in evaluating risk. Not that this necessarily mattered, since many investments of this nature were 
moved off the books through ‘Special Investment Vehicles’.  
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qualitative shift in the way in which people conducted their financial lives (Langley 
2008: 21-2). For Langley, this required the ‘re-assembly of everyday financial 
subjectivities and the re-making of financial self-disciplines’ (2008: 161). For Watson, 
the bank bailouts initiated by the Labour government must be seen within this context 
as an attempt to ensure asset-price stability (Watson 2013b) and to placate the 
panicked concerns of middle-class homeowners (Watson 2009a).  
It was not just residential housing that was increasingly financialised. The boom in 
consumer credit markets helped ignite significant growth in consumer spending and 
borrowing in the context of increasing expectations of living standards and stagnating 
wages (Finney and Davies 2011: 1). Consumer credit came to be used in the UK as a 
means to extending the capacity for consumption (Dearden et al. 2010: 7), possibly to 
‘maintain a historically constructed and politically significant standard of living’ 
(Montgomerie 2009: 19) in order to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ (McKay 2005). Both 
secured and unsecured credit were relatively ‘easy’ before the 2008 crisis, leading to 
certain expectations about the role of debt in everyday life that, as argued later, were 
problematised come the ‘credit crunch’. 
The rise of finance needs to be placed within context regarding the fiscal pressures on 
the state. A popular perspective, looked in more detail below, argues that the rise of 
finance helped postpone (or provide a spatio-temporal fix for) the 1970s fiscal crisis 
of the state through providing both an alternative method of legitimating capital 
accumulation and of capital accumulation itself (Schäfer and Streeck 2013b). 
Although this policy regime was most likely fortuitous in origin (Krippner 2011), 
financialisation involved a trade-off with conventional welfare. With low taxation 
required for citizens to supplement the credit-fuelled consumer lifestyles both desired 
personally and required systemically, ‘permanent austerity’ (i.e. permanent welfare 
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retrenchment) was required given dwindling revenues (Pierson 1998, Offer 2003). 
These pressures were exacerbated by the new imperatives of globalisation, which 
required, from the New Labour government in particular, credible public finances to 
assuage global capital markets (Watson 2013b: 8-10).  
Mark Bevir (2007) makes the useful distinction between the ‘delivery stage’ and 
‘tired stage’ of the New Labour project. The first New Labour government can be 
characterised as the delivery stage, in which they paid heed to these imperatives – 
most notably through their fiscal rules under the Code for Fiscal Stability (see 
Burnham 2001, Clift and Tomlinson 2006, Hay 2006b) – resulting in a fiscal surplus. 
However, they increasingly tried to have their cake and eat it, by significantly 
increasing investment in public services without adequately raising more revenue. 
This ‘tired stage’ involved giving up all pretence of ‘trying to keep the public finances 
on an even keel’ (Watson 2013b: 18), thus leading to a serious deterioration of their 
previous surplus into a deficit (Thompson 2013: 6-10, see also Figure 1.2 below). 
Despite this, the Labour government generated a baseline economic and fiscal 
credibility throughout the majority of their administration through consistently 
meeting the self-imposed ‘sustainable investment rule’ and ‘golden rule’ from 1997-8 
to 2006-7 4 (Chote et al. 2010). Nevertheless, this strategy would have serious 
repercussions following the economic downturn.   
                                                
4 This is because the rising expenditure was used to finance investment, particularly in the NHS, rather 
than funding the day-to-day running costs of the public sector (Chote et al. 2010: 1, Thompson 2013: 
8). 
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1.1.2 The politicisation of debts and deficits 
The 2008 credit crunch follows the classic story of a bursting bubble and subsequent 
financial crash5, exacerbated by the increasingly interdependent and complex nature 
of the financial system. The bursting of the US housing bubble due to mortgage 
defaults and delinquencies (see Mayer et al. 2009) led to an estimated write down of 
hundreds of billions of dollars, when simultaneously the stock market value of some 
major banks was more than halved (Brunnermeier 2009: 77). Essentially, as financial 
institutions panicked about the value of these assets – a large component of their 
balance sheets – credit froze, beginning a period of serial deleveraging (Blyth 2010: 
22). Since UK financial institutions had large amounts of these assets, the UK was 
always likely to be susceptible to contagion from the sub-prime crash (Hay 2011: 14). 
The credit crunch itself had two sides: the seizing up of the inter-bank lending system 
in 2008 and global downturn; and the subsequent impact upon the credit conditions 
for households and businesses (see Figure 1.1).  
                                                
5 On a very general level, the same pattern of bubble and downturn tends to emerge (see Kindleberger 
1978, Blyth 2010). First, and for whatever given reason, novel opportunities for profit while arise in a 
particular asset class (such as, for our purposes here, residential property). This opportunity combined 
with general economic stability leads to a perceived relatively risk-free environment in which credit is 
pursued to make an easy profit. As the method gains popularity and more join, the price of the asset 
increases, as does the amount of credit required. The quantity and price of that asset, and the amount of 
debt continue to spiral upward, until a tipping point in which the asset is not deemed to be worth the 
going price. At this point, most if not all investors attempt to escape and sell all at once, leaving the 
price of that asset spiralling downwards. If severe enough, market confidence and trust dries up due to 
mass deleveraging, moving events on from a panic to a crash.  
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It is the first of these two sides that had the most immediate impact, as many major 
financial institutions struggled for solvency. Although the run on and subsequent 
nationalisation of UK bank Northern Rock (looked at in more detail in Chapter 4) was 
the ‘first sign that this was no ordinary crisis’ (Gamble 2010: 4), the failure of US 
investment bank Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 is generally accepted as the 
turning point in the move from a credit crunch to a global financial panic. Due to its 
reliance on finance – before the crisis, the financial industry provided a quarter of all 
British tax receipts – it was perhaps unsurprising that government revenues fell by 
18.1 per cent between 2008 and 2009 (Blyth 2010: 27). Given the impact of the credit 
crunch on the credit-fuelled consumer spending and housing bubble that UK growth 
depended on, the deepness of the 2008-9 recession is unsurprising. These events 
prompted the largest-ever bail-out of the financial sector, and a deep and prolonged 
global recession advanced by a further freezing-up of inter-bank lending (Hay 2011: 
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Source: Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey 2012 Q3 
Figure 1.1  Banks' perceptions of change in availability of 
credit to households over previous three months 
Unsecured credit Secured credit 
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13). As Table 1.1 highlights, the UK dedicated a staggering amount of public funds to 
securing the financial industry through bailouts, nationalisations and quantitative 
easing. In October 2008, the Labour government announced a £20 billion fiscal 
stimulus (including, most notably a 2.5% cut in VAT, a 45% tax rate on earnings over 
£150,000 from 2011, and a 0.5% rise in National Insurance contributions from 2011)6. 
This supposed ‘resurrection’ and ‘rediscovery’ of Keynesianism (Lee 2009: 29, 
Marsh 2009: 124, Burnham 2010: 37) was short-lived. Unsurprisingly, this recession 
and subsequent bank bailouts had large consequences for the British state’s finances.  
Table 1.1 Percentage of GDP committed to 2008-10 UK Bank Rescues 
Capital 
Injections 
Asset 
Purchases 
and lending 
by 
Treasury 
Asset 
Purchases 
and Swaps 
by Central 
Bank 
Guarantees 
 
Central 
Bank 
Refunding 
by Treasury 
 
Total 
6.4 13.8 28.2 17.2 12.831 78.4 
(Source: Blyth 2010: 26) 
The extent to which Britain’s debt and deficit became politicised is, in the briefest of 
hindsight, both astounding and unsurprising. It was only in the March 2008 Budget 
that the Treasury confidently asserted that ‘the economy is stable and resilient, and 
continuing to grow, and that the Government is meeting its strict fiscal rules for the 
public finances’ (HM-Treasury 2008: 1). The Treasury even projected the UK to be 
running a budget surplus by 2012-3 (HM-Treasury 2008: 27). Given the relative 
optimism of the Treasury, it is worth keeping in mind what events had already 
unfolded by this point. While Lehman Brothers was still solvent, Northern Rock had 
been brought into public ownership and US bank Bear Stearns was just in the process 
                                                
6  Source: BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7745340.stm, accessed September 3rd 
2013.  
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of collapse (Thain 2009: 436-7). The fiscal deficit was not on the agenda. There was 
no looming debt crisis. The October 2008 Pre-Budget Report, which coincided with 
deteriorated public finances (see Figure 1.2), had a significantly different tone. How 
did the deficit rise so quickly? 
 
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2013 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/01/pdf/fm1301.pdf7.  
 
In the last sub-section we saw how New Labour’s tired stage resulted in a pre-
downturn fiscal deficit. This suggests, perhaps controversially, that the UK was 
running a structural rather than cyclical deficit8. This is significant as it highlights 
how both systemic imbalances and political mismanagement were important – 
alongside the recession – in paving the way for the budget deficit. This first stage of 
                                                
7 Note: ‘Debt’ refers to General Government Gross Debt as Percentage of GDP, ‘Deficit’ refers to 
General Government Cyclically Adjusted Balance as Percentage of GDP. 
8 Since many contestable assumptions have to be made about potential growth, making this distinction 
can be problematic (Thompson 2013: 6-7). 
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fiscal deterioration was accompanied with consistently optimistic forecasts for tax 
receipts in every year from 2001 onwards with the exception of 2006 (Thompson 
2013: 7)9. Nevertheless, it is clear that the deficit did significantly worsen come the 
downturn – the second stage of fiscal deterioration. As with any recession, automatic 
stabilisers will exacerbate any existing fiscal weaknesses especially when a 
significant segment of tax revenues come from a temporarily weakened finance 
industry. There is some debate about how the bank bailouts impacted upon the UK’s 
fiscal situation. Although Table 1.1 above shows that the UK committed a staggering 
78.4 percentage of GDP to bailing out and supporting the financial sector, others point 
out that these financial interventions are not included on the budget balance sheet 
(Thompson 2013: 7), while Robert Chote (2009) demonstrates how including bank 
bailouts only accounts for less than 10% of UK public sector net debt. 
In the backdrop of these deteriorating finances, the October 2008 Pre-Budget Report 
was a significant turning point in the unfolding of the age of austerity. Due to these 
worsening conditions, the fiscal rules were ‘temporarily suspended’ until 2015/16. In 
their place the government set a ‘temporary operating rule’, which required the 
government to reduce the cyclically adjusted budget deficit year by year once the 
economy emerges from the downturn (Hodson and Mabbett 2009: 1053, Sawyer 
2012: 206). Consequently, mild fiscal consolidation was proposed. During the 2009 
Queen’s speech, the Labour government proposed to legally enshrine a requirement to 
halve the deficit over the life of the next parliament (Bailey and Bates 2012: 205). 
The final Labour government Budget of March 2010 set out proposals to reduce the 
                                                
9 Interestingly, this argument of institutionalised optimism is consistent with some of the views at the 
time (e.g. Economist 2005) and was, of course, a central and justified motivation for creating the Office 
for Budget Responsibility. 
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structural budget deficit over a five-year horizon through cuts worth £11bn (Sawyer 
2012: 206).  
Meanwhile, the Conservative party completely abandoned their commitment to match 
Labour’s spending, and rebuilt their entire political strategy around restoring, in their 
words, ‘fiscal responsibility’. Labour lost the 2010 election, with the Conservatives 
gaining a minority victory. The Coalition Agreement, signed by the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat parties in May 2010, recognises ‘that deficit reduction, and 
continuing to ensure economic recovery, is the most urgent issue facing Britain’ 
(Cabinet Office 2010: 15). The emergency budget in June 2010 proposed an 
additional £40bn of cuts per year (HM-Treasury 2010: 2)  
In the same month, the G20 issued its increasingly infamous communiqué following 
the meeting in Toronto. For Blyth (2013a: ix), this marks the moment in which the 
age of austerity became established, and a proto-Keynesianism was firmly discarded 
for a more orthodox view. These seemingly disparate nations came together to 
announce the need for sustained austerity. More specifically, it called for ‘growth 
friendly consolidation’ because debts and deficits constrain economic growth and that 
state borrowing can crowd-out the private sector (see Lysandrou 2013). 
1.1.3 The politics of spending cuts 
Since it is much harder to generate legitimacy for providing goods and services than it 
is to take them away, spending cuts do not make for simple politics. Two difficulties 
are particularly relevant here. First, there are tensions with governing in a democracy. 
Spending cuts require elected officials ‘to pursue unpopular policies that must 
withstand the scrutiny of both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups’ 
(Pierson 1996: 144). Since politicians require continued ballot-box support from the 
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electorate, they may be unwilling to impose clear losses on the citizenry in the form 
of reduced services and benefits. This dilemma had led some to question whether 
liberal democracies have the audacity to meet clear fiscal pressures since the 
democratic political imperative is viewed as ‘being at odds with the fiscal 
responsibility imperative’ (Posner and Blöndal 2012: 12). As a consequence, it is 
alleged that there are few incentives to introduce fiscal consolidation as leaders are 
more likely to find reasons to delay and deny in the name of self-preservation (Posner 
and Blöndal 2012: 12). According to some, such distorted incentives create a 
‘shortsightedness’, derived ‘from concerns about electoral prospects’, which 
potentially leads to ‘insufficient attention to [the] longer-term requirements’ of fiscal 
sustainability (Kumar et al. 2009: 14). Those politicians that decide to accept this 
fiscal responsibility imperative face the threat of serious challenges to their legitimacy. 
Second, there are serious questions over whether enforcing the sort of wide scale 
fiscal consolidation proposed is even possible. This might seem like an odd statement, 
since intuitively we might assume that it is the creation of new policies and 
programmes that typically require formidable administrative capacities and political 
capital (Pierson 1994: 37). But as Pierson argues, previous policies can create long 
term commitments that lock in particular paths of change and continuity that are hard 
to reverse (1996: 153). This path dependency can be split into two constraining 
processes that are at the heart of the politics of retrenchment. First, the creation of past 
policies may bring about unintended elaborate policy networks of interests, the 
dismantling of which are seen as very costly thus inhibiting a substantial change from 
the existing policy path (Pierson 1994: 42). Sometimes the political cost of ending 
even a particularly costly programme or policy may outweigh its continuation. 
Second, and related to the previous paragraph, the creation of past policies may bring 
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about unintended elaborate public networks of interests. To put it simply, it is harder 
to take things away from people when they are already accustomed to certain services 
and benefits. For example, it is far more politically straight-forward to introduce a TV 
licence fee waiver for pensioners than it is to later remove that benefit. The TV 
licence fee waiver is thus locked in. This locked-in effect is reflected in the recent 
literature on ‘fiscal democracy’ that demonstrates how Western states’ ability for 
discretionary spending is increasingly declining (e.g. Streeck and Mertins 2010, 2013, 
Genschel and Schwarz 2013).  
In regard to the first of these problems, politicians tend to insulate themselves behind 
technocratic rules and delegate decision-making to others in an attempt to sidestep the 
inevitable conflict between fiscal responsibility and democratic politics (Posner and 
Blöndal 2012: 12). These dynamics are well covered by a range of literature on 
depoliticisation (e.g. Burnham 2001, Flinders and Buller 2006, Jenkins 2011) and 
blame-shifting (e.g. Weaver 1987, Hood 2002b). Together, we can take these 
processes as ‘blame displacement’. The aim of blame displacement is to seemingly 
off-load responsibility from the political arena, typically through either delegating 
some decision-making via a principal-agent relationship or by self-imposing rules that 
constrain otherwise discretionary policy-making. The aim is to close down debate and 
limit the political possibilities around a certain issue (i.e. depoliticisation) or deflect 
blame for difficult decisions away from elected politicians (i.e. blame shifting).  
It is, once again, this scenario in which crisis comes to the fore. It is the sense of 
emergency and urgency engendered by crises that can discount the tensions between 
the democratic and fiscal responsibility imperatives. While spending cuts in the name 
of deficit reduction are very likely to impose losses upon many, these same people 
may ‘also realise immediate gains by the rescue of the broader economy that a crisis 
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has made into a compelling and immediate concern’ (Posner and Blöndal 2012: 20). 
In this way, a crisis can help turn a problem of the government into a problem of the 
broader public, thus legitimating the imposition of losses if some sort of normally 
ambiguous future disaster is averted.  
Conventional economic wisdom tells us that incumbent politicians in liberal 
democracies will only turn to austerity when there is sustained market pressure (e.g. 
rising bond prices) and ensuring debt crisis to blame (Posner and Blöndal 2012: 12). 
Despite being one of the forerunners in the post-2008 turn to austerity, the UK has 
suffered relatively little market pressure to cut its budget deficit and reduce debts. 
This is in contrast to harder-hit Eurozone states that have received discernible market 
pressure for a credible deficit reduction plan through rising government bond yields. 
Rising bond yields provide incumbent politicians with shared and relatively 
incontestable public evidence that can be used to build to a consensus around a notion 
of the state in crisis10. With such market pressure in the UK lacking, the coalition 
government has invoked the threat of market pressure and the possibility of ‘crowding 
out’ if the deficit and debt are not adequately reduced. This still resembled a debt 
crisis of sorts, and, as Chapter 4 explores in detail, was certainly spoken as such. 
The Coalition government has used other blame displacement tactics. The ‘coalition 
agreement’, signed by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties in May 2010 
was, for example, itself an important blame displacement strategy, with both parties 
agreeing to ‘recognise that deficit reduction, and continuing to ensure economic 
                                                
10 As Simona Pino (2012) has tentatively argued, this indeed proved the case in legitimating Monti’s 
fiscal consolidation plan in Italy – where rising bond yields acted as the impetus behind the necessity 
of intervention and the imposition of an anti-democratic technical government itself. 
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recovery, is the most urgent issue facing Britain’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 15)11. The 
presence of two opposition parties united on an issue of national interest in a moment 
of emergency is a powerful image, and a classic blame displacement tactic (Pierson 
1996: 147). Another example is how many decisions about what to cut have been 
passed on to the local level, which deflects ‘some of the criticism away from 
government and towards local authority and services management’ (Burnham 2011: 
502). The Conservatives within the coalition can even displace blame for this blame 
displacement, as it were, by pointing out their long standing commitment to giving 
local councils more autonomy in the name of localism, empowerment and the ‘Big 
Society’ (see Lowndes and Pratchett 2012: 25). The creation of the Office for Budget 
Responsibility has also been cited as an example of blame displacement (e.g. 
Macartney 2011: 198, Bruff 2014: 10). 
It is, of course, extremely difficult to gauge the success or efficacy of blame 
displacement strategies. Resistance to austerity has, however, been relatively limited 
in the UK. Although there hasn't been the mass public disruption seen in some 
Eurozone periphery countries, there have been relatively high-profile grassroots 
action-oriented protests – such as those organised by UK Uncut and Occupy London 
– which sought to highlight opposition to capitalism through disruptive and 
‘prefigurative’ occupations (Bailey and Bates 2012: 208). Although David Bailey 
(2014) has shown that the global financial crisis has led to a demonstrable increase in 
the quantity of political protests, others argue that the global financial crisis and age 
of austerity has been characterised by a relative passivity – or even a ‘clamouring for 
neoliberal austerity’ (Konings 2012: 610).  
                                                
11 Crucially, the agreement ties the Liberal Democrats to the Conservative fiscal consolidation plan. 
Strategically speaking, if key Lib Dem actors change their mind over the primacy of fiscal 
consolidation, they would put the stability of British politics and, more importantly, their first position 
of parliamentary power in their history at stake. 
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Invoking the second of the difficulties in the politics of spending cuts, one reason 
resistance may have been relatively limited is that spending cuts take considerable 
time to filter down. The planned cuts to spending are undoubtedly large, with the plan 
as of 2011-12 to cut public services in real terms for seven years in a row – in recent 
history, the UK has never cut by this measure for more than two years in a row 
(Emmerson et al. 2012: 68). Yet what immediate impact these have and will have is 
hard to discern. 
For one, it is becoming clearer now that the spending cuts were almost exclusively 
concentrated in the first 2010 emergency budget. Using data from the Treasury, The 
Guardian calculated the cumulative estimated effect of the policy decisions over the 
following five financial years after the budget. Figure 1.3 shows how the June 2010 
emergency budget was essentially one short and sharp bout of austerity, followed by 
just very modest cuts. Osborne may have decided to change tack after being spooked 
following heightened criticisms that the speed and depth of the cuts were an 
impediment to recovery but felt pressured to maintain the talk of austerity to avoid the 
perception of u-turning. Alternatively, following the 2010 election, Osborne may have 
realized that the legitimacy for spending cuts would never be higher, and that one 
short and sharp austerity budget would generate credibility in bond markets.  
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Furthermore, when cuts have actually been budgeted in Whitehall, this does not 
instantly filter down to ground level. As an Institute for Fiscal Studies report points 
out, although 73% of planned tax increases were implemented by 2011-12, only 12% 
of the planned total cuts to public service spending were implemented (Emmerson et 
al. 2012: 47). Perhaps unsurprisingly, cuts to public investment (34% of proposed by 
2011-12) were the easiest (Emmerson et al. 2012: 68). Despite the understandable 
uproar about the cuts to welfare benefits (such as the ‘bedroom tax’), only 12% of 
planned cuts to welfare spending had been implemented by the end of 2011-12 
(Emmerson et al. 2012: 68). These welfare reforms are, however, likely to have a 
pernicious impact by institutionalizing policies that harm those of working age – 
particularly women and families – which will be exacerbated by the restructuring of 
the NHS, social care, education and all benefits apart from pensions (Taylor-Gooby 
2013).  
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Source: HM Treasury, via the Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/news/
datablog/2014/mar/19/budget-2014-all-osbornes-budgets-so-far-in-five-
charts) 
Figure 1.3       Overall effect of policy decisions at each budget 
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Summary 
One cannot fully grasp the age of austerity without invoking crisis. The imperative of 
fiscal responsibility is at odds with the democratic imperative since imposing losses 
on the public through spending cuts is the only credible way to consolidate. In this 
scenario, governments require a debt crisis to legitimise spending cuts as for the good 
of the country as a whole. Academic debates, meanwhile, mirror some of the issues 
discussed in this overview. The political economy literature on fiscal consolidation 
typically disputes ballooning debts and deficits as a debt crisis per se, instead 
recasting them as mere symptoms of a different underlying crisis. The next section 
reviews and critiques five alternative accounts of the turning point for fiscal 
consolidation.  
1.2 The turning point for fiscal consolidation 
This section offers a review of the literature on fiscal consolidation. Each of the five 
crisis theses reviewed seek to essentially reject the direct imperatives and narrative of 
the debt crisis by recasting the rise of state debt and the widening fiscal deficit as a 
mere symptom of a different disease or underlying crisis. After reviewing five theses, 
I conclude the section by questioning the usefulness of viewing crisis through this 
symptom-disease distinction for answering the austerity acquiescence puzzle of this 
thesis. 
1.2.1 Five theses on austerity and crisis 
Financial crisis  
Many accounts of austerity start with the global financial crisis of 2008. The weakest 
of these accounts typically begin by ambiguously asserting that the need to address 
the UK’s fiscal deficit ‘occurred due to the global financial crisis and the UK’s 
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decision to nationalise several banks rather than see them collapse’ (Lowndes and 
Pratchett 2012: 23). More detailed accounts typically begin with financialisation. 
King et al. (2012), for instance, start their account with how a crisis of financialisation 
led to emergency monetary and fiscal stimuli as well as bank bailouts. The resulting 
‘high level of sovereign debt was, to a large extent, attributable to bank bailouts and 
their economic consequences’ (King et al. 2012: 2). These accounts emphasize how 
the failed financial industry was saved by the state, which then had to take first the 
burden and then the blame: the ‘seriousness of the 2008 crash commanded a surge in 
state intervention, but, once collapse had been averted, the default position was re-
established’ (Callinicos 2012: 66). Matthew Watson (2014), meanwhile, traces how a 
crisis of economics – as evident in the performative role of a certain kind of 
economics in the subprime crash – has been alleviated thanks to the emergence of the 
debt crisis narrative.   
Mark Blyth’s (2013a) analysis reflects these arguments in a more substantiated 
fashion. ‘The crisis’, according to Blyth, ‘has almost nothing to do with states and 
everything to do markets’ (2013a: 7, 22, 53). He backs this up with two arguments. 
Before the crisis, the first argument goes, finance was built around particular 
‘instruction sheets’ (i.e. ideas) about how the economy can and should work which 
led to risky financial practices that culminated in the subprime debacle. However, 
through bank bailouts, the buck was passed onto the state – an unlucky guarantor who 
deserved no ill fate, but who is now being blamed for everything. The second 
argument is that ‘the real reason we all have to be austere’ (2013a: 87) is because 
without the option of inflation or devaluation (due to the design of monetary union), 
the only way the troubled Eurozone nations can deal with their massively 
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overleveraged banks is to deflate their economies through cutting spending (see also 
Boyer 2012). 
These two arguments form the basis for Blyth’s persuasive case for recasting fiscal 
consolidation as essentially dangerous because it is a potentially fatal misdiagnosis of 
what the true problems are. To extend the analogy, we therefore risk providing sick 
economies with medicine that only target the symptoms and not the causes or 
underlying disease. Consequently, the only outcome is long-term pain. In Blyth’s own 
words: ‘This is a banking crisis first and a sovereign debt crisis second. That there is a 
crisis in sovereign debt markets, especially in Europe, is not in doubt. But that is an 
effect, not a cause’ (2013a: 7). The main problem with Blyth’s account, for our 
purposes here, is that the explanations he offers for why we all have to be austere do 
not add up for the UK. The UK has fiscal and monetary autonomy, but a large fiscal 
deficit that existed, in part, prior to the subprime debacle and later recession. Despite 
these weaknesses, it still confidently explains austerity simply as one chain in a series 
of contagion that is ultimately accountable to problems in finance.  
Growth crisis  
Although the rise of finance and the subprime meltdown is of crucial importance as a 
trigger in this growth crisis thesis, the crisis or disease is instead to be found in the 
dominant British economic growth model. Colin Crouch’s (2008, 2009, 2011) 
account of the rise and (potential) demise of the ‘privatised Keynesian’ regime is 
crucial for understanding this perspective. Public Keynesianism is best represented in 
the post-war consensus system of neo-corporatism that came under attack and lost 
intellectual credibility in the late 1970s. One of the cornerstones of public 
Keynesianism involved running a fiscal deficit, when necessary, to stimulate demand. 
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However, under privatised Keynesianism other actors, especially households and 
consumers, instead take on the debt. The main motors for this were ‘the near-constant 
rise in the value of owner-occupied houses and apartments along-side an 
extraordinary growth in markets in risk’ (Crouch 2008: 476). 
Colin Hay (2011, 2013a, 2013b), while building on Crouch, prefers the term ‘Anglo-
liberal growth model’ to describe the ‘debt-financed, consumer-driven growth … 
model that has sustained the UK economy since the early 1990s’ (Hay 2011: 1). For 
reasons of electoral expediency New Labour institutionalised a ‘low interest rate–low 
inflation equilibrium’ (Hay 2011: 5), which when combined with new financial 
instruments such as securitization, created the perfect storm for a significant 
expansion of residential housing and the beginning of a structurally-dependent 
recession-triggering asset bubble12.  
For Hay, this crisis of Britain’s Anglo-liberal model may have reflected the subprime 
debacle unfolding at the same time in the US, but the UK’s recession can not be 
reduced to contagion from this. Hay’s key counterfactual claim is that there would 
have been a recession without the contagion from the subprime debacle. This claim is 
absolutely crucial. Hay makes a distinction between two sources of the recession. 
While the first was exogenous contagion from US banks due to particular exposure in 
British financial institutions, the second was an endogenous mechanism ‘peculiar to 
the Anglo-liberal economies and concerns the relationship between monetary policy, 
the housing market and aggregate domestic demand’ (Hay 2011: 14) – i.e. the 
bursting of the housing bubble on which the UK economy was so dependent. This 
                                                
12 While this growth model or housing bubble was not intentional, its continued stoking was decidedly 
political – whether ensuring the continued inflation of the housing market was a given (Hay 2009), or 
using housing as the basis for a new and decidedly ‘Third Way’ asset-based means to a welfare end 
(Watson 2008, Finlayson 2009). 
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distinction allows Hay to argue that the crisis was due to the endogenous pathologies 
of the growth model and logically subsequent asset bubbles. Austerity is thus a 
‘dangerous idea’, as it is for Blyth’s ‘market crisis’, because it fundamentally 
misdiagnoses a ‘growth crisis’ for a ‘debt crisis’. Instead of blaming and restructuring 
the state, Hay argues, we should focus our attentions on restoring growth through the 
formulation of a new model that does not replicate the endogenous failures of the pre-
crisis Anglo-liberal growth model.   
Fiscal crisis 
Other scholars, however, have less trouble attributing the fiscal deficit and debt crisis 
to the state. As Helen Thompson’s (2013) empirically rich and conceptually nuanced 
analysis demonstrates, the UK’s troubles are, at least in part, very much down to 
running a pre-crisis budget deficit, which was then exacerbated – not caused – by 
bank bailouts and automatic stabilisers (on the latter see also Sawyer 2012: 206). 
Thompson explains the pre-crisis fiscal deficit as a result of the ‘political context of 
Labour’s electoral predicament in the post-Blair years’ (2013: 9), which while 
undoubtedly important unfortunately ignores the more long term fiscal and welfare 
trade offs in democratic capitalism.  
Wolfgang Streeck and his co-authors (Streeck 2013, Schäfer and Streeck 2013a, 
Streeck and Mertins 2013), however, take the long (fiscal) view and argue that 
Western democratic states generally have something akin to a long-burning budgetary 
crisis. As Schäfer and Streeck explain (2013a: 3), while ‘the fiscal crisis of today’s 
rich democracies became apparent only after 2008, it has long been in the making’. 
For the past four decades or so, the majority of OECD states have ‘had to borrow 
money to cover a chronic gap between public expenditure and public revenue, 
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resulting in a steady increase in public debt’ (Schäfer and Streeck 2013a: 4). It is 
argued that in response to the crises of the 1970s, an increasingly deregulated and 
unequal democratic capitalism was legitimized through tax cuts and a proliferation of 
easy credit to compensate citizens for low growth and stagnating wages (see also 
Cameron 2006: 242). These changes led to both increasing public and private debt. 
The global financial crisis brought an end to these conditions, and with it the 
seemingly necessary consolidation of public finances. This is the price ‘governments 
paid for their inability to prevent the advance of liberalization, or for their complicity 
with it’ (Schäfer and Streeck 2013a: 17). 
In this regard, this debate resurrects the tradition of classical ‘fiscal sociology’ (see 
Block 1981, Campbell 1993) – in particular, James O’Connor’s (1973) Marxist 
classic The Fiscal Crisis of the State. O’Connor (1973: 6) starts from the premise that 
the capitalist state must fulfil two basic contradictory functions of accumulation and 
legitimisation: 
This means that the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which 
profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must try to 
maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that 
openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the 
expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of 
its loyalty and support. 
To sustain its on-going programme of accumulation, the capitalist state has to 
legitimise itself through the continued expansion of welfare programmes to dampen 
unrest – an expense that the state cannot afford without compromising the conditions 
for capital accumulation itself. The result is a fiscal crisis of the state, which is unable 
to sustain its basic functions in lieu of these basic contradictions. From this 
perspective, the underlying turning point for austerity was the breakdown in the 
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solution to the (perhaps systemic) fiscal crisis of ‘late-capitalism’ (see also Habermas 
1976, Krippner 2011, Lodge 2013). 
Capitalist crisis 
A more radical set of explanations seek to reject the debt crisis as a symptom of a 
crisis in the very social relations that constitute capitalism. Of course there is a 
multiplicity of crisis theses that fall under this broad Marxist church, and they range 
from the polemical to the exhaustively empirically rich. Hugo Radice (2011), who 
leans closer to the former of these two poles, argues that cuts are an attack on the 
living standards and lives of workers to preserve the interests of the ruling classes. 
Radice (2011: 126) talks of the ironies of responses to the panic and downturn – 
socialism for the rich and austerity for the poor – which is also invoked by Burnham 
(2014). Burnham cites the austerity measures as one moment in which depoliticisation 
– an economic policy strategy that removes the politically contested nature of 
governing – has ‘formed the lynchpin of economic policy’ (2014: 197). Forced to deal 
with the crisis-ridden nature of capitalism, ‘state managers’ use depoliticisation 
strategies to avoid a political crisis in response to necessary imposition of austerity on 
to social relations in order to preserve the circuit of capital.  
One major blindspot in Burnham’s analysis is an inability to explain why the crisis 
tendencies in capitalism arose here and now in this specific time period and why the 
state has become indebted at this particular juncture. This may be down to a general 
reluctance amongst Marxist scholars to attribute these crisis symptoms to a crisis of 
neo-liberalism or of financialisation (for an exception see Callinicos 2012) since such 
a diagnosis implies that only a specific manifestation of capitalism is in crisis, 
therefore soliciting different and altogether less radical solutions.  
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With such concerns at the forefront, Andrew Kliman’s (2011) work shows how the 
debt crisis is a symptom of an underlying crisis of capitalist production. Kliman starts 
by observing how capitalism has a tendency for a falling rate of profit that is 
counterbalanced by the periodic destruction of capital that recreates the capacity for 
profit. During these booms and busts, states have institutionalised a number of buffers 
to prevent a legitimation crisis when the destruction of capital significantly harms and 
radicalises the population. The softening of this process of destruction means profits 
are lowered, leading in turn to less capital accumulation, less investment and stale 
growth. In order to prop up profits states intervene to prop up benefits by, for instance, 
cutting corporation tax that in turn places significant fiscal and budgetary pressures on 
the state itself. Thus, the debt crisis is a mere symptom of a deeper disease of 
capitalist production.  
Social crisis 
The ‘Broken Britain’ social crisis thesis is a bit of a departure from the previous 
theses and is not as obviously imbricated within the academic debates about austerity. 
This thesis is not really put forward by political economists. It also differs from the 
others in that it is not underpinned by an economic mechanism of some kind. The 
political economy aspects of this thesis are, then, vague and far from obvious and 
subsequently require some teasing out. Indeed, it is primarily a moralised and cultural 
critique that would fail to stand up to even the smallest economic scrutiny. In this 
sense, it closely resembles the government’s narrative of austerity, which itself is 
looked at in more detail later. However, I aim to show it is still important to consider 
in this context. 
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This social crisis is often conjured through the notion of ‘Broken Britain’: a condition 
of serial and interlinked social pathologies – family breakdown, worklessness, 
antisocial behaviour, personal responsibility, out-of-wedlock childbirth, dependency – 
caused by behavioural problems and family breakdown (Slater 2013: 1). The Broken 
Britain narrative, which has been the main public justification for the sweeping (and 
arguably damaging) changes to welfare, originated in the publications of the current 
Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith’s think tank Centre for Social 
Justice (Slater 2013: 3). Duncan Smith’s ‘Social Justice Policy Group’ – 
commissioned by then-new Conservative leader David Cameron in 2007 – reported 
that an ‘underclass’ lived a life of dependency, addiction, debt and family breakdown, 
supported by a ‘mentality of entrapment, where aspiration and hope are for other 
people, who live in another place’ (Finlayson 2010: 25). It is perhaps unsurprising 
that this narrative has come under much criticism, especially for producing a distorted 
picture of poverty in the UK (Slater 2013). 
What matters for our purposes here is the purported sources of this corrosion of social 
life: the excesses of big government that have undermined responsibility (Finlayson 
2010: 25-6). The thesis is thus primarily a critique of a particularly selfish form of 
individualism that has eroded society through the mass abandonment of responsibility 
(Finlayson 2010: 26). The main source for this lack of responsibility is the social 
democratic New Labour state that has fostered a right-based and dependency culture 
(Finlayson 2010: 26-29). It is this aspect of the thesis that ensures it is relevant for our 
purposes here, since the erroneous use of public money is implied to have played a 
role in fostering this culture – therefore creating a link to the debt crisis. 
Unsurprisingly, this diagnosis suggests a withdrawal of the state from various areas as 
evident in much Conservative-coalition government policy such as free schools and 
  
 
56 
directly elected police commissioners, but it also leads to state intervention, through 
trying to change dominant social norms of dependency and unproductive behaviour 
through behavioural economics (Finlayson 2010: 29).  
1.2.2 Crisis? What crisis? 
Given that these five theses are all essentially explaining the same phenomenon – the 
turn to fiscal consolidation – it is interesting just how different these accounts are. In 
explicating his financial crisis thesis, it is necessary for Blyth to dedicate substantial 
space to carefully delineate the subprime crash – and the ideas that underpinned the 
institutionalisation of certain models of risk within finance. Yet for Streeck’s fiscal 
crisis thesis, the subprime crash barely warrants a mention, at all. Likewise, Blyth 
barely mentions the long-term fiscal pressures facing liberal democratic states. Since 
each thesis makes clear claims about the object of crisis – finance, growth model, 
fiscal state, capitalist production, and Broken Britain – this perhaps leads to questions: 
which one is right? Which crisis is it? 
However, these are the wrong questions to be asking. This line of questioning over 
which crisis thesis is right assumes that this at heart is an empirical dispute over the 
cause of crisis. This, in turn, implies a singularity of crisis; that a single underlying 
cause or disease is possible to identify. These assumptions are a result of dividing 
crises into symptoms and an underlying disease. Alternatively, instead of seeking to 
adjudicate the explanatory power of each thesis to properly account for the true 
disease that lies beneath the symptoms of state debt, we could simply reject the entire 
enterprise and question of empirical adjudication. I suggest we recast these theses not 
as an empirical dispute over the transformative power of one particular objective 
economic failure or disease, and instead recast it as an ontological level-of-analysis 
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problem13 for which there is no definitively right or wrong singular answer (Hay 
2002: 59-88). Seen in this light, all five theses (especially the first four) are perfectly 
commensurable. There is no contradiction in suggesting that Britain’s debt crisis is in 
reality a mere symptom of five different factors: bailing out banks, a debt-fuelled 
growth model, a slow-burning and recurring fiscal crisis of the state, capitalist crisis, 
and (to a much lesser extent) taxpayer funded transfers to the irresponsible14. The 
downside of acknowledging this, however, is that the critical potency that 
accompanies speaking of crisis is somewhat diminished.  
It is possible to push this line of thinking even further. An implicit two-part symptom-
disease crisis distinction underpins all five of these theses. The first part is to reject a 
dominant representation of crisis (in this case of debt), and recast that as a mere 
symptom of a deeper and underlying cause or disease. The second part is to 
demonstrate how this different underlying phenomenon came to cause this symptom, 
and recasting this cause as the real disease or object of crisis. The posing of this new 
object of crisis will inevitably demand that a different solution is required if the real 
causes of the disease (and not the mere symptoms) are to be adequately dealt with. 
This critical component is one of the main advantages of the symptom-disease crisis 
                                                
13 There is no method for definitively adjudicating between a claim that the debt crisis began with a 
failure in finance that states were forced to take the hit for, or that the crisis is a result of inherent 
tensions in the legitimation of the state. Both, in some sense, have sufficient explanatory power, but 
what convinces is ultimately dependent upon a ‘wager’ regarding the appropriate scale and time for 
social scientific analysis. Depending on how one answers these wagers, scholars will produce different 
answers to the same question. These wagers are, in turn, dependent on ontological assumptions and 
normative commitments. These issues are explored further in Chapter 2 when I outline the framework 
for this thesis.  
14 If we adopt the constructivist methodology outlined in the next chapter, we can assume that the all 
five crisis theses looked at are adequately causal. Doing so means accepting that each of the theses 
above represents a necessarily imperfect, one-sided analytical narrative – one-sided because they all 
make essentially contestable commitments to certain levels of analysis and abstraction in terms of 
scope, space and time. We could therefore tentatively suggest that while all these five crisis theses are 
important, what is really important is the five taken together: the specific and boundlessly complex 
historical occurrences that they help illuminate.  
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distinction. By effectively denaturalising an accepted chain of events upon which an 
undesirable economic policy strategy is logically dependent upon for justification, the 
distinction possesses the potential analytical traction to open up contingencies for 
alternative solutions.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this symptom-disease crisis distinction 
either in principle or practice. As this chapter has shown, the crisis theses that they 
lead to are very illuminating. My argument is far more modest than an outright 
rejection of the merits of this distinction. Simply put, and like any method or 
methodology, this symptom-disease distinction is by definition limited; it possesses 
analytical weak spots. One downside is the constant search for a true representation of 
crisis15. Since the analytical strategy that the distinction tends to lead to is based upon 
rejecting representations of crisis on the basis of their correspondence to reality, it 
requires investing considerable energy into disproving these representations.  
My argument is that while this strategy is noble and important, there are other ways of 
conceptualising crisis that can provide an alternative foundation for producing 
different, but no less interesting and important, insights. Instead of working with this 
symptom-disease distinction that typically leads to rejecting representations of crisis 
as invalid, this thesis can develop a strategy that seeks to understand how these 
representations (e.g. debt crisis) historically came to be so. Doing so would liberate 
this thesis from the imperative to identify a singular underlying crisis, and create the 
space to explore the process of ‘social construction’ in the broadest sense possible. By 
examining the cultural and political history of the debt crisis, we might be able to 
                                                
15 The style of this critique is significantly influenced by Brett Christophers’ (2011) article on the 
productivity of finance. Christophers argues that instead of constant to-ing and fro-ing about whether 
finance is really productive, it would be equally illuminating to explore the performative techno-
politics of expertise and calculation that socially constructed finance as productive in the first place. 
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better understand how its terms became accepted as everyday common sense, and 
thus be better placed to provide a convincing and plausible explanation for the puzzle 
of austerity acquiescence posed in this thesis.  
The possible downsides of the symptom-disease strategy are often acknowledged in 
the literature. For instance, in analysing the Conservative ‘Labour’s Debt Crisis’ 
narrative, Colin Hay claims that: 
in the end, what matters politically is not whether and to what extent we [i.e. 
academics], but the electorate, held, hold and continue to hold Labour in 
office culpable. Whether it deserves to be held culpable is a secondary and a 
more narrowly academic consideration (2013b: 25). 
Despite this, exploring the social construction of the debt crisis without recourse to 
the symptom-disease strategy remains rare. Indeed, this strategy is built in to the very 
understanding of crisis that is predominantly used in the literature on austerity (and 
possibly even political economy more broadly). I remain unconvinced that one can 
properly understand how the debt crisis works to the extent sufficient to answer the 
puzzle and research questions of this thesis when one seeks to simultaneously reject it 
as wrong. The debt crisis, even if it may or may not be a correct representation, is still 
worth exploring as such an analysis will provide the basis for explaining how its 
imperatives came to be reluctantly accepted by the mass public. I am therefore 
convinced it is justified to claim that we require an alternative way of conceptualising 
crisis if we are to fully cash out this critique and build a framework capable of 
adequately answering the austerity acquiescence puzzle of this thesis. This is the aim 
of the next chapter.  
Concluding remarks 
It is impossible to understand the age of austerity without a notion of crisis, whether 
explicit or implicit. This chapter has argued that the concept of crisis matters in two 
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central ways. First, the politics of spending cuts are inherently challenging for 
politicians due to the locked-in nature of many policies and the inherent unpopularity 
of spending cuts. Politicians therefore seek to legitimise harmful spending cuts in the 
name of solving a ‘crisis’. Political economists have sought to demonstrate how the 
debt crisis used to justify these spending cuts is essentially a symptom of a different 
underlying disease, thus implying that an alternative solution that specifically targets 
the sources of the actual disease is more appropriate. However, this leads to more 
controversy, as political economists cannot agree on what this underlying disease or 
crisis consists of. When did the crisis begin? What is the crisis of? How can one be 
sure of whether the purported causes of crisis are not just the symptoms of an 
underlying more systemic crisis? I argue, second, that in organising itself around 
these sorts of questions, the academic literature on austerity has a number of 
blindspots – most notably, how a preoccupation with invalidating the debt crisis 
means there is little literature that seeks to ask how and why the imperatives of the 
debt crisis came to be legitimated and accepted by the public at large. The aim of the 
next chapter is to propose a framework for crisis that decidedly avoids falling back 
into the very same symptom-disease distinction I wish to avoid, and that can 
appropriately analyse the legitimation of crises – a question that is as deserving of 
attention as the questions currently asked.  
 
 
  
  
 
61 
  
 
Chapter 2. The social construction of crises: 
Incorporating the mood of the times and the question 
of legitimation 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis holds a special place in the English language. While a recession has an official 
definition with formal starting and ending points (Watson 2014: 3) and financial 
‘crashes’ tend to have a clear pattern that follows a ‘mania’ and then ‘panic’ 
(Kindleberger 1978), crises are far more amorphous with a deep range of different 
meanings and manifestations1. A particularly common usage of crisis conjures the 
turning point in a disease: ‘the moment when the body either starts to shake off the 
disease or succumbs to it’ (Gamble 2009b: 38-9). This is reflected in modern usage 
when talking about the economy, when a crisis implies an irremediably sick or 
morbid condition of emergency – unless an intervention is made with decisive 
swiftness. This intervention may be viewed, through the lens of history, as structural 
or transformative and as bringing about an entire new order. As Reinhart Koselleck 
                                                
1 For excellent conceptual overviews and intellectual histories of ‘crisis’ see O'Connor (1987), Hay 
(1999), Koselleck (2006) and Samman (2012: 10-45).  
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writes, crisis ‘has become an expression of a new sense of time which both indicated 
and intensified the end of an epoch’ (2006: 358). The sheer act of invoking a crisis in 
politics is to suggest not just failure itself, but a need to impose a solution. The 
naming of a crisis is important since by identifying a key area of failure it contains 
many clues and leads as to the appropriate nature of that intervention. Fiscal 
consolidation, on the scale studied here, would be extremely hard to justify if it were 
not for some sort of emergency situation, turning point, or, indeed, crisis.  
It is this latter element that makes conceptualising and identifying crisis so inherently 
political. While the accounts of austerity and crisis reviewed in the previous chapter 
were sensitive to these concerns, they primarily viewed crisis through a symptom-
disease distinction. As a result, the legitimation of fiscal consolidation and wider 
questions about austerity acquiescence tend to be secondary concerns. The aim of this 
chapter is to remedy this by outlining an analytical framework for the study of how 
crises, and the imperatives they engender, are conferred a degree of legitimacy 
through resonating with the mood of the times. To do so requires first outlining the 
general constructivist methodological principles of this thesis, rethinking crisis in a 
manner that avoids the pitfalls of the symptom-disease distinction, and 
conceptualising about the mood of the times and the conferral of legitimacy.  
The chapter is split into the three sections, which reflect these concerns. The first 
section outlines the very first methodological principles that underpin and shape this 
thesis. I outline a constructivist methodology that seeks to generate necessarily one-
sided explanatory analytical narratives about how specific occurrences are historically 
so. Although this section does not directly conceptualise about crisis, in laying out the 
logic behind the later analytical framework it resembles a crucial part of the building 
process. The second section then draws on constructivist institutionalist and cultural 
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economy literature to outline a basic framework for analysing crises. I show that by 
understanding crises as an enacted process of problem definition, interpretive battle 
and intervention the pitfalls surrounding the symptom-disease distinction can be 
successfully bypassed. However, I suggest that this framework is ill-equipped as a 
standalone method for sufficiently answering the puzzle of this thesis. The third 
section consequently draws on Everyday IPE literature to argue that despite often 
conceptualising about the ‘mood of the times’, constructivist frameworks (broadly 
conceived) tend to have a limited top-down view of legitimacy. I therefore propose an 
alternative conception of legitimacy – as conferred by justification via shared belief – 
and suggest finally that to fully cash this out we need to consider going beyond both 
methodological elitism and proxies.  
2.1 A constructivist methodology 
In this section I draw on Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2002, 2010) and Max Weber 
(1946, 1949) to outline the constructivist methodology that underpins this thesis. This 
methodology involves ordering lived or recorded practical experience into stylized 
narrative accounts that seek to pinpoint key factors in contingent processes of 
historical change (Jackson 2010: 112-55). However, before getting on the substance 
of this it is necessary to first clear up what I mean when I write of ‘methodology’ and 
‘constructivist’ respectively in order to pre-emptively clear up any potential 
misunderstandings.  
First, by methodology I mean something quite specific that may not chime with 
dominant understandings in political science. Political science, and to a lesser extent 
political economy, increasingly places value upon reflexivity: the appreciation that 
there is no one right way of doing social science since all research is underpinned by a 
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number of unsolvable assumptions about the nature of being and knowing (Hay 2002, 
Bates and Jenkins 2007, Stanley 2012b). It is thus important that whatever 
(methodological) means are being utilized to achieve whatever (epistemic) ends, both 
those means and ends are fully explicated and justified. In this vein, this section does 
not outline substantive ontological assumptions about the make-up of the world or 
about how best to collect or analyse data. Instead it aims to outline the most basic 
methodological principles that underpin the design and execution of this thesis. These 
principles laid out in this section are methodological and not philosophical to the 
degree that they are pragmatically driven and geared towards nothing more than a 
means to an end (i.e. research). Following Jackson and Nexon (2013: 550-1), 
methodology can be defined as the reflection upon and justification of the ‘epistemic 
status of claims and their proper use in the process of generating knowledge’. 
Outlining the underpinning values of this methodology should not be read as an 
exercise in philosophical self-absorption, but instead as an attempt to clearly and 
explicitly spell out the methodological values that underpin the knowledge claims of 
this thesis so as to provide the best opportunity that they can be evaluated on the 
terms in which they were generated. This is especially important when such values 
deviate considerably from the mainstream. 
Second, by constructivist I also mean something quite specific that may not chime 
with dominant understandings in political economy. Given what the previous 
paragraph hinted at, the constructivist methodology I outline here should not be 
mistaken for substantive or theoretical claims that, say, objects in the world are not a 
pre-given but a product of history (although I do, later on, make such claims). Instead, 
in this section I simply outline a set of wagers about the nature of explanation and our 
necessary epistemic limits that can be usefully categorized as ‘constructivist’. 
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Consequently, this constructivist methodology has an uneasy and uncertain 
relationship with the recent rise of a narrow and specific manifestation of ‘economic 
constructivism’ in IPE that has arisen since Mark Blyth’s (2002) seminal contribution 
that demonstrated the autonomous power of economic ideas during the uncertain 
periods of crises (for evidence of this specific manifestation compare Palan 2000, 
with Broome 2012). Although I do draw on some of the key interlocutors of this 
specific strain of constructivism in building a framework for this thesis, it should be 
clear by the end of this Chapter that I do not accept the methodological imperatives 
that are inevitably bundled in with this approach (for a far fuller discussion see 
Samman and Stanley 2013). So, when I write of constructivism I am seeking to speak 
to the recent decade-long rise of ‘economic constructivism’ while simultaneously 
situating myself in a much broader tradition of social constructivism.   
My methodological starting point is the observation that social science is inherently 
value-laden (Weber 1946). This is not (necessarily) in the sense that behind all 
seemingly neutral analyses lays a hidden political agenda. It is value-laden not even 
just in the sense that there is no inherently correct way to go about producing social 
scientific knowledge. It is value-laden in the sense that the very definition of social 
scientific knowledge itself is contested. The slow realisation of this is perhaps why 
political science and political economy literature have begun to emphasise the 
importance of methodological reflexivity. One must be able to, amongst other things, 
clearly explicate the ontological basis for which empirical claims are being made if 
fairly evaluating different forms of scholarly knowledge is an achievable aim. To be 
‘scientific’, then, should in no way be equated to adhering to the values of the largely 
common-sensical neo-positivist standards of hypothesis testing. In ensuring a fair 
evaluation of scientific knowledge, the only criteria we can propose then is the 
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internal validity of methodology for systematically producing facts (Jackson 2010: 
22-24). Guaranteeing this, in turn, means being upfront about one’s foundational 
assumptions and the basis for which empirical claims are based. There are many 
methodological values that underpin this thesis. 
For one, this thesis has been strongly influenced by work that argues that research 
should be driven by non-paradigmatic and a-disciplinary puzzles about salient public 
issues, drawing on an eclectic approach to the selection of concepts and methods. 
Such work includes that on the sociological imagination (Mills 1970 [1959]), 
‘phronetic’ social science (Flyvbjerg 2001), research puzzles (Hobson and Seabrooke 
2007a), and analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). What these approaches 
share, on some level, is that ‘knowledge of the cultural significance of concrete 
historical events and patterns is exclusively and solely the final end’ of social science 
(Weber 1949: 111).  
More fundamentally, this methodology is underpinned by a number of ‘wagers’ – a 
term I borrow from Jackson (2008, 2010). Jackson provides a useful typology for 
thinking about the methodological values that underpin scholarship. At the heart of 
this typology are wagers about the very nature of knowing and being that can never be 
settled definitively by definition. ‘At a minimum’, Jackson explains, ‘a wager locates 
and specifies three things: the researcher, the world to be researched, and the 
character of the relationship between them’ (2010). Every scholar makes assumptions 
about this, but answering such questions requires a ‘measure of faith’ (2010: 35) 
because they cannot, and never can be, resolved definitively. Consequently, in 
outlining this methodology, the aim is not to convert others to its virtues, but to 
convince that it is an acceptable and adequate underpinning for scholarly knowledge.  
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However, the ‘directional dependence’ model is the default position in political 
science: begin with questions of ontology (‘what exists?’) and then move on to 
questions of epistemology (‘how can we know about this?’) (Hay 2002: 61-5). As 
some critics have pointed out (Bates and Jenkins 2007), this common-sense view 
should be contested as it can render an essentially contestable methodology as just 
that: common sense. Crucially, built into this directional dependence model is the 
assumption that working out what exists in regards to a mind-independent world ‘out 
there’ to discover is prior to working out how to know the world. Consequently, 
knowledge is judged on its ability to represent this external world, typically through 
hypothesis testing through empirical observation (i.e. neopositivism), or through 
retroductive reasoning about unobservable (but real) causal mechanisms (i.e. critical 
realism). The main aim in these methodologies is to know about things that exist in a 
mind-independent external reality (Jackson 2010: 34). As a result, this directional 
dependence model leads to Cartesian anxiety ‘by introducing a characteristic fear: the 
fear that our elaborate intellectual constructs might be, in whole or in part, nothing 
more than the fanciful products of our own imagination’ (Jackson 2010: 59).  
My methodology wagers a different answer to the position of the relationship between 
knower and the known – i.e. the ‘mind-world’ problem. A dualist position, surveyed 
in the previous paragraph, would maintain that ‘mind’ is radically separated from an 
externally existing ‘world’, and that knowledge is produced through the bridging of 
this gap – that is, researchers must strive to demonstrate an accurate correspondence 
between their scholarship on the one hand, and the character of a mind-independent 
world on the other (Jackson 2010: 35). In contrast, a monist position would maintain 
that ‘mind’ is inseparable from ‘world’ in such a way that knowledge can only 
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reasonably aim at understanding the ways in which each constitutes the other 
(Jackson 2010: 35-6).  
Jackson shows how justification for this monist position proceeds, logically not 
ontologically, that the entire mind-world problem is not quite the panacea it is made 
out to be (2010: 135). A mind-independent reality ‘cannot be sensibly referred to 
outside of the context of the practices of knowledge-production that we employ when 
investigating them’ (Jackson 2010: 31). The claim is not about whether an external 
reality exists or not, but that even tackling that question – the nature of a mind-
independent world – is impossible due to the primacy of human experience in 
knowledge making. Thus, a monist position is not idealist, relativist, subjectivist 
(Jackson 2010: 31) – nor, indeed, about turning base metal into gold (Bieler and 
Morton 2008) – because such arguments presume a philosophical view that maintains 
a separation between mind and a mind-independent reality can be scientifically 
bridged – a view that is reducible to an irresolvable wager. If we assume that 
knowledge emerges from experience, and that experience – including scholarly 
practices – is always pre-structured by the categories and values and purposes that we 
bring to it, then the ‘Cartesian anxiety’ of neopositivism and critical realism loses 
meaning (Jackson 2010: 136). What matters is the useful ‘analytical order[ing] of 
empirical social reality’ (Weber 1949: 63), not the comparison of knowledge to a 
mind-independent world on the basis of its representability (Jackson 2010: 34). 
Combining this monist position with a wager that it is impossible to produce 
knowledge beyond that of experience – whether sensory or practical-lived – results in 
a methodology Jackson names as ‘analyticist’ – but that for the purposes of clarity I 
will name as constructivist. This methodology seeks to order the experiences from 
practical research activity through crafting analytical narratives – involving the 
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deliberate over-simplification of ideal-typical concepts in exploring historical 
contingencies – to make empirical claims with pragmatic explanatory utility (Jackson 
2010: 37). Again, to reiterate, the aim of conceptualising or theorising is not to best 
map a mind-independent reality (for that would be internally contradictory), but 
instead instrumental (see also Stanley 2012a). Knowledge is valued on the basis to 
categorise practical experience as the underpinning for analytical narratives (Jackson 
2010: 157). ‘World’, as it were, becomes closely related to practical experience and 
the social practices in which ‘people engage as they live their lives and go about their 
business’ (Jackson 2010: 113). The ‘world’ is thus no longer considered as a 
collection of things in an external reality for scholarly knowledge to most accurately 
represent. I, following Weber and other scholars, deem this to be logically non-
sensical. Instead I assume ‘world’ to consist of an assemblage of facts to order and 
make sense of experience. 
It is illustrative to turn to Weber’s explanation of ideal-types to get a better grasp of 
this methodology2: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less 
present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are 
arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be 
found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia (Weber 1949: 90). 
This quote is worth fleshing out. Due to the ‘infinite richness of events’ (1949: 111), 
all explanations are by definition imperfect. This is what, in part, makes science so 
value-laden, because all scholars are forced to focus on just a relatively limited aspect 
of explaining a historical event equating to their specialism and interests (Weber 
                                                
2 Although Weber’s ideal-type method is best known in political science and political economy for the 
specific construction of analytical categories (such as varieties of capitalism), others have shown how 
can be used as a general methodological principle in its own right (e.g. Jackson 2002, Seabrooke 2006). 
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1949: 71). Hence, all explanations are necessarily one-sided, but are also ‘free from 
the charge of arbitrariness to the extent that it is successful in producing insights into 
interconnections which have been shown to be valuable for the causal explanation of 
concrete historical events’ (Weber 1949: 72).  
Consequently, this methodology looks to isolate ideal-typical factors that can 
adequately account, causally speaking, for a historical event through counterfactual 
reasoning. These analytical ‘concept-constructions’ (Weber 1949: 101) are not 
supposed to be ‘tested’ by comparing them to reality, because, as Weber makes clear 
in his use of ‘utopia’, they cannot be found. The only way they can be judged is as 
means to an end. As Jackson explains, the only meaningful way to evaluate such 
constructs is pragmatically: ‘that is, to examine whether, once applied, the ideal type 
is efficacious in revealing intriguing and useful things about the objects to which it is 
applied’ (2010: 146). The end, in this case, is an analytical narrative about austerity 
acquiescence, which must be, to be consistent with the terms I have laid out, judged 
valid in that ‘our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as ‘objectively 
possible’ and which appear as adequate’ (Weber 1949: 92). So while the epistemic 
basis for knowledge claims is not as strong as in critical realism or neopositivism, the 
advantage is that it is better placed to offer typically culturally rich explanations that 
are otherwise not as possible. Indeed, one key benefit of this methodology is that it is 
particularly well suited to analyse intersubjectivity and lived experiences as reflected 
in focus group discussions. The substantive theoretical underpinnings of 
intersubjectivity are explored fully in Chapter 3 in the context of these focus group 
methods.  
This section has outlined the foundations for the methodology of the thesis. 
‘Methodological’ because it provides the basic foundations and justification for the 
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types of knowledge claims made since the actual ‘method’ for generating these claims 
is discussed later on in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the empirical claims in this thesis 
consist of a case-specific analytical narrative that offers a necessarily incomplete and 
one-sided explanation of austerity acquiescence in the UK. It is adequately causal in 
the sense that it shows that due to a number of factors austerity acquiescence was 
‘historically so and not otherwise’ (Weber 1949: 72). This is assisted through an 
‘ideal-type’ conceptual framework about how crisis resonates with the mood of the 
times, the claims of which are based on its ability as ‘means’ to this empirical end 
(Weber 1949: 80). The primary claim to originality is that this particular analytical 
narrative, and the assemblage of facts and framework that underpin it, can help us 
order our experiences and scholarly practices in ways that existing literature can and 
has not. 
2.2 Conceptualising crisis 
Having set out the foundational terms and status for a constructivist framework for 
analysing crisis, I am now in a position to outline the substance of that framework 
itself. In this section I draw on constructivist institutionalist and cultural economy 
literature3 to outline an approach to conceptualising crisis that avoids the symptom-
disease distinction that I seek to bypass. A particularly useful way of conceptualising 
crisis for the purposes of this thesis is as an enacted and iterative process of problem 
definition (i.e. a sudden change for the worse in a key economic performance 
indicator), interpretive battle (i.e. a conflict to convince others to place that problem 
                                                
3 Although some may consider these literatures as representing incommensurable ontological positions 
and thus otherwise incompatible, I must stress that I am not seeking to amalgamate these positions into 
a novel ontological fusion of (say) institutionalist and post-structuralism. Given the terms of the 
constructivist methodology (with a monist philosophical ontology) I have outlined, there is no logical 
reason why conceptualising about the performativity (or enactment, the term I prefer) of crises must 
necessarily entail the radical epistemic positions taken by post-structuralism despite the prior and clear 
association between the two.  
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within a wider story of systemic or personal failure), and intervention (i.e. the logical 
solution to the problem based on the largely accepted story of events).  
2.2.1 Constructivist institutionalism  
Although the typical intellectual history of constructivist institutionalism involves 
overcoming the overly structuralist or materialist nature of historical institutionalism 
(Blyth 1997, Hay and Wincott 1998), it is also built upon critiques of orthodox 
neopositivist and Marxist crisis theories. First, mainstream international and 
comparative political economy approaches – which are typically arranged around a 
neopositivist epistemology (for recent general critiques see Farrell and Finnemore 
2009, Phillips 2009) – tend to explain divergent policy responses during crisis through 
material factors. For instance, Peter Gourevitch argues that international economic 
crises are moments of radical political ‘openness’ (1986: 35) that have the power to 
transform the interests of domestic groups. International crises transform the 
‘placement’ of interests groups within distinct and different domestic economies, 
which leads to the creation of new political coalitions and thus divergent outcomes 
(1986: 20-1). Thus, crises are analytically revered for their reordering of material 
interests.  
Second, Marxist approaches, meanwhile, reject ‘bourgeois’ theories that explain 
crises as the contingent result of exogenous shocks to capital accumulation (Clarke 
1994: 7). Instead, these radical accounts typically consider crises as intrinsic to the 
very social relations that lie at the heart of capitalist accumulation (Shaikh 1991: 160, 
Burnham 2010: 29). Some of these approaches adopt a distinction between ‘general’ 
and ‘partial’ crises. A general crisis refers to an overall transformation of society: 
‘that is, to the erosion or destruction of those societal relations which determine the 
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scope of, and limits to, change for (among other things) economic and political 
activity’ (Held 1991: 120-1). In contrast, a partial crisis is, in relative comparison, 
merely the seemingly natural fluctuations of the business cycle inherent in capitalism. 
This is reflected in Claus Offe’s (1985) distinction between conjunctural and 
structural logics of change4. Thus, (general or structural) crises are analytically and 
politically revered for the ability to transform the capitalist state and/or the material 
conditions of social existence. 
Since the constructivist institutionalist literature is built upon rejecting the seemingly 
materialist underpinnings of these approaches by instead recasting crises as 
essentially narrated phenomena, it has considerable potential to assist in dismantling 
the symptom-disease distinction. Although constructivist institutionalist scholars 
might dispute the singularity of the methodology (see Schmidt 2012), there is a shared 
foundational explanation (Hay 2006a). Building upon new institutionalist literature 
(particularly Hall 1993), it is assumed that a downturn in the economy causes radical 
uncertainty as elite actors attempt to make sense of their interests. This radical 
uncertainty creates the space for an interpretive battle in which competing norm 
entrepreneurs use economic ideas to define and make sense of the downturn. The 
resulting crisis narratives contain causal stories (Stone 1989) in which failure and 
blame are attributed with a logical solution posited. The ‘successful’ crisis narrative 
will then legitimate and make possible a seemingly necessary and essential 
intervention in the name of resolving a crisis. The validity of the ideas that underpin 
our narrative is not necessarily a crucial factor. Indeed, as the literature consistently 
                                                
4 Whilst a conjunctural policy response aims to steer the state away from crisis via minor tinkering and 
economic management, a structural policy response will ultimately attempt to restructure the 
fundamental system itself (see Hay 1999: 339, figure 3). 
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reminds us, ideas do not get judged on a scientific basis, but a sociological basis in 
respect to resonance with the mood of times (Hall 1993: 280, Widmaier 2004: 437). 
Mark Blyth and Colin Hay offer two of the key frameworks.  
Blyth’s starting point is dissatisfaction with the predominant neopositivist assumption 
that material interests are the key factor in driving change during crises. As Blyth 
succinctly puts it ‘structures do not come with instruction sheets’, suggesting that 
interest-based explanations problematically assume that actors automatically always 
act upon their materially-telegraphed interests (Blyth 2004). This problem stems from 
a view that essentially equates uncertainty with risk and a lack of information. By 
adopting a more radical Knightian conception of uncertainty, the causal power of 
ideas comes to the fore as crises cause agents’ interests to become intensely 
problematized and fluid. Using this as a theoretical basis, Blyth (2002) hypotheses 
that during moments of radical uncertainty or crisis, agents have no other choice than 
to draw on ideas in order to not only simplify their environment but also make sense 
of their own interests. Ideas provide agents with a ‘weapon’ – both scientific and 
normative – for delegitimizing the pre-crisis institutions and the ideas that underpin 
them, as well as a ‘blueprint’ for building a new post-crisis order. Thus, a period of 
contestation ensues via an interpretive battle to convince others and build coalitions 
centred on certain crisis narratives that emerge from different economic ideas. The 
framework, then, is very successful in providing an ideational dosage to the otherwise 
materialist neo-positivist accounts. However, it still essentially reproduces the neo-
positivist methodological base that sits uncomfortably with the constructivist 
methodology of this thesis5. 
                                                
5 One possible downside of this approach is that in its aim to contribute to the mainstream, it ends up 
generating accounts of change that equate to what Seabrooke (2007: 798-800) calls ‘ideational 
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Through a study of the etymology of crisis, Colin Hay defines crisis as a decisive 
intervention: a process of discursively constructed failure in which a contingent 
intervention must be made (Hay 1999: 323). In contrast to Marxist approaches, the 
objective failure of an economic regime cannot constitute a crisis per se, because it 
only provides the ‘raw materials’ for actors to transform it into a crisis. This moment 
of crisis arrives when various symptoms of the failure and the attribution of blame are 
recruited into a narrative of crisis in which a decisive intervention – based on the 
causal logic of the narrative itself – becomes both possible and necessary (Hay 1996a). 
Crisis narratives must however make sense to individuals’ lived experiences, since 
their ‘success’ generally resides in providing ‘a simplified account sufficiently 
flexible to ‘narrate’ a great variety of morbid symptoms while unambiguously 
apportioning blame’ (2001: 204). However, since a crisis is defined as a decisive 
intervention into the organization of the state (whether that is conceptualized as a 
paradigm or regime), a crisis can only be so when there is a ‘structural’ (or general) 
transformation. A ‘conjunctural’ (or partial) crisis is really no crisis at all6. It is this 
move that allows Hay to show the inherently political nature of crises, and also 
reproduce the general/partial or structural/conjunctural distinction that many consider 
politically and analytically important. 
                                                                                                                                      
punctuated equilibrium’ in which ideas are mostly stable until periods of crisis force a shift. More 
critically, we may wish to unpick the unnecessary imperatives of the ‘disciplining function of its field-
specific meta-discourse’ (Samman 2011: 30) in which ideas are seemingly only relevant when their 
causal efficacy can be explicitly demonstrated (see also Samman and Stanley 2013). 
6 Andrew Gamble (2009: 461) and Colin Hay (2011: 2), for instance, have written that the subprime 
debacle of 2008 and beyond is not a ‘crisis’ per se, but a series of pathologies. However, it must be 
remembered that their definition of crisis is synonymous with a complete transformation in the 
macroeconomic principles that underpin the management of the state, seen, for instance, in the move 
from the post-war consensus to neo-liberalism. If one defines a crisis as essentially synonymous with a 
rejection and subsequent replacement of policy-makers underlying macroeconomic principles, then it is 
indeed highly unlikely that one will find one in the 2008-2012 period.  
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Constructivist institutionalism provides some interesting and important insights into 
the social construction of crises. Crises can be depicted as the process in which a 
decisive intervention is made following an interpretive battle to define a failure. 
Ultimately, crises do not just happen; they are made. However, as a partial result of 
their distinctive intellectual genealogies, both Hay and Blyth tend to reproduce the 
very symptom-disease distinction that requires dismantling for the purposes of this 
thesis. By seeking to provide existing materialist accounts of crisis with the correct 
dosing of ideational factors, they reproduce the divide between true economic failure 
(akin to disease) and fallible ideas about that failure (akin to symptoms) as a 
meaningful and useful distinction. Although the constructivist institutionalist 
emphasis on the narrated nature of crises is very useful, cultural economy literature 
provides important insights in how to conceive of crisis without recourse to a 
symptom-disease distinction and thus satisfactorily completes this framework for 
analysing crisis.  
2.2.2 Cultural economy 
‘Cultural economy’, an emerging sub-discipline in its own right (see Best and 
Paterson 2009), has helped bring the concept of performativity to the foreground of 
political economy analysis as broadly conceived7. Performativity has been applied to 
political economy and cognate subject fields (e.g. Callon 1998, Clark et al. 2004, De 
Goede 2000, MacKenzie and Millo 2003, MacKenzie 2006), and, more specifically, 
                                                
7 Cultural economy needs to be differentiated from cultural political economy, an approach particularly 
associated with Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum (Jessop and Sum 2001, Jessop 2009, 2013, Sum and 
Jessop 2013). This approach attempts to avoid ‘soft economic sociology’ (Jessop and Oosterlynck 
2008) by fusing a semiotics of crisis with an analysis of underlying economic contradictions. Jessop 
and Sum’s ambitious epistemic aims leads to a series of different (more abstract) aims and an explicit 
symptom-disease distinction in analysing crisis that decreases its direct applicability to this thesis an 
analytical framework (although I do still draw on insights from the approach in a less systematic 
manner).  
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to the recent crisis (Brassett and Clarke 2012, Langley 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). 
Drawing on differing traditions of JL Austin (1975) and Judith Butler (1993)8, 
performativity has had two main applications to political economy. First, 
performativity has been utilised to show how ‘economics, in the broad sense of the 
term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it 
functions’ (Callon 1998: 2). It has been particularly utilised in the social studies of 
finance to demonstrate how financial models, devices and formulas are not merely 
passive descriptions of financial logics but actually have a generative function in the 
enactment of markets (e.g. MacKenzie 2006). Second, political economists have used 
performativity to argue how discourses of finance ‘do not exist above and beyond 
human action but are in need of constant enactment, affirmation and reconstruction by 
financial practitioners’ (De Goede 2000: 75). At its foundation, however, the concept 
of performativity demonstrates how certain knowledge has a constitutive effect: 
‘markets are enacted, and financial subjects are produced through discursive 
repetition’ (Brassett and Clarke 2012: 4). 
This tool has recently been applied to understanding how the recent global financial 
crisis has been governed. James Brassett and Chris Clarke (2012) argue that the sub-
prime crisis was performed as a ‘traumatic’ event that thus required a suitably drastic 
response. Thus, they argue, we have come to think about the crisis as a specific and 
time bound event (2012: 5). Paul Langley’s (2012) approach, meanwhile, starts from 
the Foucauldian concept of ‘problematisation’ to interrogate the different ‘metaphors 
of crisis management’ – e.g. liquidity, foreclosure, risk, regulation, sovereign debt, 
and so on – since 2008. Focussing on how the subprime crisis was governed in 2007-
                                                
8 While Austin’s more linguistic approach focuses on the impact of self-actualizing ‘utterances’, 
Butler’s notion of performativity operates through the ‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (1993: 2). 
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8 as a crisis of liquidity, Langley (2010) traces how seeking to ‘fix’ the illiquidity of 
financial markets by injecting liquidity tells its own story of crisis narration. The 
range of solutions employed – most notably including the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) in the US, but evident in the justifications for bank bailouts and 
recapitalisations more generally – suggested that the crisis was a temporary disruption 
to market equilibrium that can be solved swiftly via relatively limited but costly 
intervention. Illiquidity was thus rendered as something ‘abnormal and 
uncharacteristic of the ways in which markets function’ (Langley 2013b: 118). The 
crisis was thus rendered as a governable object, and particular responses were 
licensed, legitimated and limited (Langley 2010: 86).  
That crises are enacted or performed has powerful implications for how we 
understand the essentially narrated nature of crises. While rhetoric is an important part 
of establishing a narrative of failure (as well as providing a data source in researching 
it), narration can be achieved in other ways too – such as through enactment, or (in a 
self-perpetuating manner) through the very intervention the causal story makes 
possible. In this way, a crisis is constituted not just through talk but also practice. A 
piece of legislation, the creation of an agency, or something similar, can also ‘speak 
volumes’ in terms of narrating a story or engendering an intervention (Yanow 1995: 
18, MacKenzie 2006). However, the crucial point is that if crisis can be defined as an 
enacted and iterative process of problem definition, narration and intervention, then it 
is possible to not only identify numerous crisis narratives since 2008 but crises per se. 
In this sense, the 'Debt Crisis' is not just one narrative among many (such as a 
Keynesian fiscal-stimulus alternative, or the recent politicization of tax avoidance) in 
this specific space of the fiscal deficit problem, but also one crisis amongst many - 
including a crisis of liquidity (as apparent by intervention to inject liquidity), a crisis 
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of excessive risk (as evident by interventions to stress test banks and the impetus to 
‘reign in’ excessive bonuses), etc. – all of which are evident in the various practices of 
post-2008 crisis management9. By providing some supplementary conceptual tools, 
the cultural economy approach can assist us by showing how we can understand the 
constitution of crisis without resource to the symptom-disease distinction.  
This perspective supplements the constructivist institutionalist approach to crisis. 
Other than dismantling the symptom-disease distinction, it also amplifies the 
constructivist institutionalist underlying theory of power. As Colin Hay puts it, (state) 
power ‘resides not only in the ability to respond to crisis, but to identify, define, and 
constitute crisis in the first place’ (1996a: 255). As the performativity concept 
explicitly illuminates, defining crisis and responding to crisis can be intertwined in the 
same process. Causal stories can successfully set the agenda if ‘the proponents have 
visibility, access to media, and prominent positions’ (Stone 1989: 294), and in this 
sense a normal member of the public is quite clearly going to have a smaller audience 
for their crisis diagnosis than the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Power extends beyond 
just information dissemination, however, for it is the more traditional power to 
intervene that is equally crucial. Intervention is a constitutive part of narrating and 
constituting a crisis, but it is a power that is reserved for the few.   
Summary 
This section has argued that crises are necessarily narrated phenomena. Through 
drawing on constructivist institutionalist and cultural economy approaches, this 
section has sought to produce a basic framework for understanding the constitution of 
crises. Crisis, then, can be understood, at a basic level of, as constituted via a 
                                                
9 The job of mapping these different crises is, of course, not the aim of this thesis – but it is one of the 
aims of Paul Langley’s new book (Langley, forthcoming).  
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threefold process: (1) problem definition, (2) interpretive battle, (3) intervention. The 
first part of this process is similar to Blyth’s notion of uncertainty and involves the 
definition of failure as a political problem. Some piece of data or metric will confound 
both normality and expectations with an unanticipated change that is generally agreed 
that it might pose some sort of existential political-economic problem. Secondly, an 
interpretive battle to build an intersubjective consensus around a causal story that 
explains and attributes blame for this development will ensue; often the simpler and 
more moralistic narratives fare better. The speaking of ‘crisis’ is important, as it 
engenders a sense of danger and the need to intervene. Finally, the decisive 
intervention is not just the logical corollary of an intersubjective consensus about 
sources and attribution of crisis, but actually enacts crisis and (re-)confirms the very 
‘diagnosis’. In this sense, the crisis is continually being narrated. These three elements 
– problem definition, interpretive battle, decisive intervention – constitute a crisis in 
an iterative and enacted fashion.  
However, it is clear that this framework only gets us so far inasmuch as meeting the 
ambitions of the thesis to explain and explore the process of austerity acquiescence. 
Specifically, the framework is still unequipped to answer why people would accept 
the justifications of the elite. Invoking the Introduction, is it because the public are 
interpellated into a quiescent subject position, or is it because they can rationally 
calculate the tax benefits of a long-term reduction in the debt burden? The 
methodological tools of these approaches are – of no fault of their own, it must be 
said – quite seriously stunted when it comes to posing an analysis in response to this 
question. To remedy this, we can begin by properly and explicitly conceptualising 
legitimacy. As the next section argues, much IPE scholarship (broadly conceived) 
suffers from what Leonard Seabrooke has termed ‘legitimacy-by-proclamation’ 
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(2006: 40). This tendency can be overcome by seeing legitimacy as a ‘two-way street’ 
between elites and the mass public and by, eventually, seeking to reject the, what I 
term, ‘methodological elitism’.  
2.3 Beyond methodological elitism 
2.3.1 The ‘mood of the times’ 
In the space created by a widely shared problem, an interpretive battle will ensue to 
define crisis as part of a causal story that engenders a decisive intervention. However, 
elite actors do not act in a societal vacuum: they cannot simply narrate any crisis they 
wish with the expectation that society will agree that the intervening solution is 
appropriate and necessary. How, then, are crisis narratives ‘successful’ in this sense? 
In existing accounts of crisis, the success of narratives in getting a particular causal 
story and blame attribution accepted is explained through powerful coalitions or 
ideational entrepreneurs (Blyth 2002), affective factors such as how ‘emotional 
predispositions themselves shape cognitive choices’ (Widmaier 2010: 135), inter-elite 
persuasion (Blyth 2007), or through the ability of simplifying media narratives to 
interpellate the public into a particular quiescent subject position (Hay 1996a).  
Echoing some of these suggestions, some have suggested that crises must resonate 
with an intersubjective consensus about the legitimacy of change among the broader 
population if they are to be successfully accepted as blueprints for a post-crisis order 
(Widmaier et al. 2007). Wesley Widmaier claims that ‘elite and mass views interact 
as each is influenced by – and can reshape through the construction of a crisis – the 
wider ‘mood of the times’’ (2004: 437, emphasis added). Crises, then, must resonate 
with the norms and experiences of the mass public – the ‘mood of the times’ – if they 
are to acquire an intersubjective consensus about the appropriateness of the 
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intervention they engender. As Widmaier et al write, 'the success of an elite group 
engaged in persuasion is often less related to their analytic skills than to the broad 
mass intuitions of the moment, which will favour one movement to the exclusion of 
others' (2007: 755).  
Reflecting this latter point, Colin Hay argues that the imperatives of crisis can become 
accepted by resonating with lived experience. Indeed, ‘their ‘success’ as narratives 
generally resides in their ability to provide a simplified account sufficiently flexible to 
‘narrate’ a great variety of morbid symptoms while unambiguously apportioning 
blame’ (Hay 2001: 204). He goes even further by suggesting that  ‘crisis is not merely 
a property of a system … it is a lived experience’ (Hay 1999: 323, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Stuart Hall has persuasively written how ‘success’ of the Thatcherite story 
of state overload ‘does not lie in its capacity to dupe unsuspecting folk but in the way 
it addresses real problems, real and lived experiences’ (1979: 20). This invites us to 
think of crisis not as either a material failure in an economic regime or an ideational 
creation of elites but as a public lived experience that rejects the separation between 
ideational-material and between symptom-disease.  
Although they use a different conceptual vocabulary, the literature on institutions and 
ideas can help us map a basic illustrative conceptual heuristic. Peter Hall’s (1993) 
piece on policy paradigms is a seminal influence on the modern research agenda on 
the politics of economic ideas. While the specific concept of paradigm might not 
always be present in the vocabulary of contemporary scholars, the notion that 
studying ‘the overarching hierarchical goals that guide policy’ (Hall 1993: 278) or the 
‘elite assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions available to 
policy makers’ (Campbell 1998: 385) remains an important factor in explaining 
policy change and stability for many. Meanwhile, the likes of John L. Campbell 
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(1998) and Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2010a) have sought to conceptualise ideas beyond 
paradigms as the background cognitive assumptions of elite policy-makers: ‘Public 
sentiments’ refer to ‘public assumptions that constrain the normative range of 
legitimate solutions available to policy makers’; frames are the ‘symbols and concepts 
that help policy makers to legitimise policy solutions to the public’ (Campbell 1998: 
385). In many ways, this thesis seeks to see how, in the case of austerity, the latter 
resonated with the former: while public sentiments can be understood as the mood of 
the times, ‘frames’ can be understood as crisis narratives. 
 Concepts and theories in 
the foreground of the 
policy debate 
Underlying assumptions 
in the background of the 
policy debate 
 
Cognitive level Programs  
Ideas as elite policy 
prescriptions that help 
policy makers to chart a 
clear and specific course 
of policy action 
Paradigms 
Ideas as elite assumptions 
that constrain the cognitive 
range of useful solutions 
available to policy makers 
Normative level Frames 
Ideas as symbols and 
concepts that help policy 
makers to legitimize policy 
solutions to the public 
Public sentiments 
Ideas as public 
assumptions that constrain 
the normative range of 
legitimate solutions 
available to policy makers 
Table 2.1 Campbell’s (1998: 385) typology of ideas 
 
As I suggested earlier in the chapter, the period of crisis since 2007 has led to many 
different interventions in different times and spaces. Yet, each crisis requires different 
forms of legitimacy. Andrew Baker (2012) has shown that crisis narration and 
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ideational change is easier to instigate in the ‘back stages’ of the policy-agenda, such 
as in financial regulation, where technocrats can introduce change quietly. 'Front 
stage' issues, such as changes to tax, property, and credit policies – what Seabrooke 
(2006: 3) terms the ‘financial-reform nexus’ – directly affect normal life chances, thus 
require politicians to engage in a process of legitimation or, at least, avoid blame for 
unwelcome changes. Public spending and taxation policies – the obvious target of 
fiscal consolidation – are, unlike financial regulation, most certainly front stage issues. 
This distinction, however, is far from clear-cut. For instance, Paul Langley argues 
how the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the US – an intervention that 
could appear as ostensibly backstage – was justified in terms of not just securing the 
finances of every American, but also in terms of saving a small part of the American 
liberal life (Langley 2013b: 119-20). However, since TARP essentially used state 
funds to save the otherwise vilified finance sector, these legitimation claims may 
seem necessary. Andrew Baker’s (2013) empirical focus, meanwhile, on seemingly 
arcane shifts in perspective in financial regulatory networks is firmly backstage and 
not costly. The crucial difference, it appears, is direct or indirect impact upon life 
chances – and, in particular, the use (and potential abuse) of state funds (see Ross 
2004).  
However, despite the conceptual focus on how crisis narratives must resonate with the 
mood of the times in order to be conferred legitimacy, the concept typically remains 
just that: a concept. Empirical analyses of crises do not typically include an 
engagement with the mood of the times – and when they do, it is typically through a 
methodological proxy such as media narratives (Hay 1996a). This sort of approach to 
the study of the process of social construction means prioritising ‘elites as the carriers 
of ideas and the main agents of change’ (Schmidt 2010b: 198). The social 
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construction of crises is not necessarily a process that is reducible to policy, 
legislative and media texts; it is something that also occurs on an everyday level 
whereby people are constantly drawing on intersubjective knowledge and experience 
when making sense of various political issues. Even more simply, elites cannot just 
say what they want, for their programs and prescriptions must resonate with an 
audience. It is for this reason that ‘methodological elitism’ – so-called because 
although it acknowledges attempts to conceptualise beyond elites and the media, it 
equally acknowledges how there is little concrete methodological commitment 
apparent in the subsequent analyses – is problematic. Before we can fully 
disaggregate and operationalize the concept of the mood of the times in Chapter 3, we 
need to first review the ‘Everyday IPE’ call to move beyond elites and to reconsider 
legitimacy. 
2.3.2 Legitimacy and the Everyday IPE challenge 
‘Everyday IPE’ is a burgeoning research programme that seeks to reverse the top-
down nature of ‘regulatory’ IPE by highlighting examples that demonstrate how non-
elite actors can drive change in the global political economy (Hobson and Seabrooke 
2007b, Seabrooke 2007a, 2010a, Langley 2008, Montgomerie 2008, 2009, Broome 
2009). Far from reflecting a homogenous methodology, we can follow Matthew 
Watson’s (2013a) useful distinction between two strands of Everyday IPE: ‘everyday 
politics’ and ‘everyday life’, which typically adopt historical sociology and 
Foucauldian methodologies respectively.  
‘Everyday politics’ uses historical sociology to show how the existing economic order 
has been transformed by ‘individual acts of agency that snowball through mimetic 
behaviour in something approaching collective action but without necessarily any 
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formal protest’ (Watson 2013a: 5). These historical sociological strategies tend to 
envision everyday politics as the accumulated outcome of a critical mass of individual 
belief-driven acts (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007a). This means that while everyday 
politics can indeed often matter, it is not always through acts of purposeful resistance, 
e.g. how intersubjective understandings about a currency can effectively make or 
break monetary reform (Broome 2009). As such, the ‘everyday’ is subsequently 
aligned with an accumulated (critical) mass of non-elite actors going about their 
normal (financial) business trying to maximise their life-chances in line with 
conventions and norms about how the economy ought to work. In contrast, ‘everyday 
life’ uses Foucauldian methodologies to look at how ‘agents enact certain 
subjectivities in line with the production of prevailing structures’ (Watson 2013a: 5). 
This work is often predicated on the observation that with Anglo-American 
financialised capitalism operating at increasingly low level, a great number of normal 
people and households have realigned themselves as investors due to the increased 
embedding of finance in everyday life (e.g. Langley 2008). The question then 
becomes how these subject positions are constituted, which is done by conducting 
analyses akin to a Foucauldian ‘history of the present’.  
As Chapter 3 shows, the methodology of this thesis is far more closely aligned with 
the everyday politics strand than it is with everyday life. This everyday politics strand 
is particularly useful for our purposes here since something akin to the public 
sentiment or the mood of the times is given a more prominent role in explaining how 
the imperatives of crisis are legitimated. Empirically, Seabrooke (2007a) argues that 
the Keynesian revolution in British interwar economic policy was made possible by 
shifting everyday expectations about the economy. In contrast to elite understandings 
at the time, mass conventions considered equality and fairness as increasingly 
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important parts of a functioning economy. The gap between public and elite ideas 
about justice lent the eventual elite Keynesian demand-side thinking legitimacy. 
Furthermore, Matthew Watson (2009a), in the more recent context of the 2007-8 
global financial crisis, argues that a middle-class moral panic regarding falling house 
prices shaped the Labour Government’s response to banks’ bailout demands. With 
middle-class homeowners positioned as beneficiaries of the rescue plan, the moral 
panic gave important legitimacy to the Government’s positive response to banks’ 
bailout demands. Both of these studies, however, rely on methodological proxies in 
the form of secondary sources to make claims about the lived experiences of non-elite 
actors. While this is entirely consistent with the methodologies deployed, it would be 
mistaken to believe that accessing primary sources, when possible, would not be 
beneficial. To highlight how and why this is so, it is worth briefly unpacking the 
concept of legitimacy by critiquing how it is commonly used implicitly and explicitly 
in constructivist literature.  
Legitimacy is of course one of the central concepts in the social sciences. 
Understanding or explaining how governments and institutions sustain political 
authority, stability, and a shared sense of possibility has long been a central concern 
of both political science and IPE (e.g. Barker 1990, Brassett and Tsingou 2011), as 
has more specific questions regarding how the powerful attempt to legitimize or 
justify their specific actions to a broader public. This latter concern has been at the 
center of existing constructivist approaches that often analyse the legitimation claims 
and justifications of the powerful. Although it is rarely discussed in explicit terms, 
this endeavor necessarily contains an underlying theory of legitimation that could be 
expressed and exposed as answers to a number of basic questions: Why study the 
legitimation claims of some actors rather than others? What is it that actors do when 
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they make legitimation claims? And what sorts of knowledge claims can or should the 
study of such legitimation claims support? 
In his book The Social Sources of Financial Power, Leonard Seabrooke (2006) 
provides invaluable insights into the theory of legitimacy implicit in constructivist and 
institutionalist scholarship. Seabrooke argues that much constructivist work contains 
an implicit concept of ‘auto-legitimacy’, whereby elite narratives and the various 
social relations they underpin are assumed to unproblematically gain legitimacy ‘by 
proclamation’ (2006: 40). Although not the primary focus of much of this research, 
this underlying theory of legitimacy-by-proclamation also makes implicit claims 
about the public – that policymakers and ideational entrepreneurs themselves address 
and justify themselves to – as the passive referents and recipients of their legitimation 
claims (Seabrooke 2006: 22). Seabrooke rejects this legitimacy-by-proclamation and 
turns instead to the Weberian concept of belief-driven action. Through this he is able 
to reframe legitimacy as a ‘two-way street’ between elite and mass actors, whose 
interactions he then weaves into an analytical narrative about how positive state 
intervention intended to improve the life chances of the mass public can be an 
important source in the international financial capacity of the state.  
The legitimacy-by-proclamation thesis also reflects another common albeit wider 
underlying theory of legitimacy in the social sciences in general. That is, the notion 
that legitimation is conferred through those without power having the perception that 
the actions of those with power is fair and legitimate. The result of this formulation is 
an underlying theory that focuses on how legitimation claims help propagate 
‘perceptions of legitimacy’ or the ‘construction of legitimacy’ with little reflection on 
whether the legitimation claims in question have worked in convincing or coercing 
the audience of the justness or necessity of the action. For David Beetham (1991), this 
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is a view that is widespread across the social sciences: legitimacy as synonymous with 
belief-in-legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 6-19, see also Clark 2003: 80, Seabrooke 2006: 
45, and Reus-Smit 2007: 158: 158). The modern incarnation of this view is perhaps to 
be found in the popularity of survey research in social sciences, in which an 
aggregation of individual beliefs and preferences in favour of a certain system or a 
particular policy is provided as evidence of legitimacy.  
For Beetham, this has a deleterious impact upon how legitimation is analysed. The 
central problem with this definition is that scholars end up assuming that if people 
believe in the legitimacy of those with power then it must be because the powerful 
have managed to convince (or trick people) people that they are legitimate (Beetham 
1991: 10). Consequently, the question of legitimacy is placed within the hands of the 
powerful themselves, thus reinforcing and supporting the top-down focus of existing 
approaches that assume that the best data source for understanding legitimation is 
media and elite texts. For Beetham, this is not just an analytical or methodological 
pitfall since it also empties ‘the concept of legitimacy of any objective reference or 
moral content’ (1991: 9). Nevertheless, the central mistake he identifies is to separate 
people’s individual beliefs about legitimacy from the intersubjective grounds or 
reasons for holding them in the first place – which are to be found not in the 
aggregated individual minds of people but in the shared values of a society or the 
ability to satisfy the interests of key social groups (1991: 10). This formulation of 
legitimacy is not only superior in its explanatory potential, but it also fits very well 
with the constructivist methodology outlined above.  
Beetham goes further in arguing that legitimacy is not conferred by belief per se but 
through justification via shared beliefs: ‘a given power relationship is not legitimate 
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because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of 
their beliefs’10 (1991: 11). As Beetham (1991: 11) explains in more detail: 
This may seem like a fine distinction, but it is a fundamental one. When we 
seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, a political system, or some other 
power relation, one thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified 
in terms of people’s beliefs, how far it conforms to their values or standards, 
how far it satisfies the normative expectations they have of it. We are making 
an assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given 
system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its 
justification. We are not making a report on people’s ‘belief in its legitimacy’.  
Seabrooke helps in unpacking this argument. He argues that the idea of legitimacy as 
belief alone must be rejected since people believe something holds legitimacy 
‘because they can justify it in accordance with their experience of the world’ 
(Seabrooke 2006: 45). Legitimation then, is not conferred by belief but by belief-
driven action ‘between those who claim that their actions have sufficient legitimacy 
and those who can confer or withdraw their consent for the actions’ (Seabrooke 2006: 
45). Rather than a condition, legitimation is thus a continual process in which 
authority may or may not become eroded and (as Chapter 3 outlines in more detail) 
‘gaps’ may emerge between the lived experiences and normative expectations of what 
the state provides.  
This formulation of legitimation has important implications. For one, it suggests that 
the power of ideas cannot be reduced to the ‘means of power available to those who 
control their dissemination’ but should be ‘measured’ in terms of their credibility to 
the recipient (Beetham 1991: 106). The imperatives engendered by a certain crisis are 
not legitimate because those with power say so – an example of the legitimacy-by-
proclamation thesis – but because the story can be justified in light of existing 
assumptions and lived experiences. As I suggested above, although Everyday IPE 
                                                
10 This is just one of three factors that make can confer legitimacy in Beetham’s framework, along with 
(1) via meeting rules and laws and (2) via actions that express content.  
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(particularly the everyday politics strand) is in part premised upon reversing the top-
down nature of IPE by incorporating the question of legitimacy, it tends to rely upon 
methodological proxies and secondary data. While these represent in principle fine 
and appropriate data sources for the study of legitimation, it is justified to still suggest 
that if legitimacy can be conferred by justification via shared beliefs, then collecting 
primary data that captures those justifications first hand is surely a very useful source. 
Summary 
In sum, then, this framework allows us to go beyond the pitfalls of methodological 
elitism in IPE and the drawbacks of using methodological proxies in Everyday IPE. 
Specifically, it allows us to explore the extent to which the austere imperatives of the 
socially constructed debt crisis resonate with the mood of the times, i.e. the extent to 
which they can be justified via shared beliefs and lived experiences, thus conferring a 
degree of legitimacy to the fiscal consolidation strategy.  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined the basic conceptual foundation for this thesis. It has made 
three distinct points. First, it has outlined the most foundational principles for a 
constructivist methodology. Second, it has highlighted how crises can be 
conceptualised as an enacted process of problem definition, narration and intervention. 
Third, when these crises are in the front-stage of the financial-reform nexus, such as 
the debt crisis is, they must resonate with the mood of the times (i.e. be justifiable by 
shared belief) if they are to be conferred necessary legitimacy. While Everyday IPE 
provides a method for studying the legitimation of political economic change without 
recourse to top-down analyses, these studies tend to rely upon methodological proxies 
and secondary data about the process of this justification. While this suits the specific 
  
 
92 
puzzles and methodologies they ask and employ, primary data of these justifications 
in practice will provide the sort of data that can provide the in-depth analysis and 
understanding that this thesis seeks. The question then turns over to fully 
disaggregating and operationalizing the ‘mood of the times’ and to selecting 
appropriate methods and data collection, the focus of the next chapter.  
  
  
 
93 
  
 
Chapter 3. From time machines to focus groups: An 
everyday politics method 
 
 
 
 
 
Would political economy possess a strengthened explanatory capacity if its exponents 
were equipped with a time machine? Yes, it would – at least, according to Leonard 
Seabrooke  (and possibly Michael Mann too1). Seabrooke (2007b) argues that while 
the conventional concepts used to explain political and social change are both 
powerful and useful, they are not perfect. The explanations they help generate are 
often reasonably simplistic: typically assuming change is overtly path-dependent or 
that effective ideational or norm entrepreneurs drive history (Seabrooke 2007b: 396-
402). Equipped with a time machine, however, the political economist could go back 
to, say, the eighteenth century and talk to people in order to work out how they think 
the economy ought to work (Seabrooke 2007b: 391). This exercise would provide a 
lot of information about what is seen as just. This in turn will help us explain how 
some relations are seen as acceptable and others not, and why some change is 
                                                
1 According to Seabrooke: ‘This is not my invention. According to legend, Michael Mann asks his 
students to imagine projecting themselves back in time to ask ordinary folk about their lives, in order to 
convey what historical sociology should aim for as a field of study’ (2007b: 410).  
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reluctantly accepted or actively rebelled against. More specifically, it may allow us to 
see in greater detail how (to deliberately invoke E.P. Thompson’s famous study) food 
riots in eighteenth century Britain were not just driven by hunger, but by a form of 
everyday politics (or moral economy) that sought to restore fairness in burgeoning 
market relations (see Thompson 1971). In other words, this exercise would provide 
important clues as to how political and economic change is legitimated. In the 
absence of a time machine, Seabrooke suggests that historical sociology is the next 
best thing: using an approach of document analysis and advocacy interviews in order 
to trace changing norms. This chapter seeks to slightly divert from this view, by virtue 
of the contemporary nature of my research puzzle. As Steiner Kvale asks, ‘If you 
want to know how people understand their world and their lives, why not talk to 
them?’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: xvii). 
This chapter has two central aims: first, an analytical framework that unpacks what is 
meant by ‘everyday’ and then disaggregates and operationalizes the concept of the 
‘mood of the times’ into three distinct parts; then, second, a discussion of how focus 
groups are the most appropriate data collection method since they are premised upon 
studying intersubjectivity. The central argument is that this analytical framework and 
method is the most appropriate means to proposing an answer to this thesis’ puzzle: 
how do everyday actors make sense of austerity? I have already argued that crisis is 
an important part of any puzzle to do with austerity. While crises may be enacted by 
elites, this does not make crisis an exclusively elite phenomenon since the decisive 
intervention that in part constitutes crisis must be legitimated. One way in which this 
process can occur is through resonating with the mood of the times; or, to be more 
specific, when the imperatives of a crisis can be justified by shared belief. If elite 
actors do not justify their actions within social maxims, then ‘they may as well be 
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talking to the wall’ (Seabrooke 2006: 45). Yet the success of this process of 
persuasion is related to the ‘broad mass intuitions of the moment, which will favour 
one movement to the exclusion of others’ (Widmaier et al. 2007: 755). This chapter 
provides a method that seeks to go beyond the previously identified problems with 
other approaches. It seeks to avoid the methodological elitism of constructivism (that 
ends up smuggling in problematic one-sided conceptions of legitimation) and the 
methodological proxies of Everyday IPE (that avoids collecting primary data of 
everyday justifications in favour of other methods).  
The structure of the chapter is built around fulfilling these two aims. The first section 
begins by outlining what, exactly, this thesis takes ‘everyday’ to mean. It is argued 
that everyday politics represents, rather than subordinates in fixed position within 
specific and formalised power relations, an inescapable site within which practices 
and norms about resource allocation are confirmed and contested. The second part of 
this first section disaggregates the mood of the times into three parts: public life, 
sense-making, and legitimacy gaps. Each is unpacked in detail. The second section 
starts by outlining the intersubjective basis for focus groups, showing how this is 
intimately related to both the specific sampling strategy used as well as the sort of 
knowledge claims this thesis makes. The rest of the section outlines the practical side 
of the research design. It outlines the recruitment strategy, the interview style and 
questions used, the necessary ethical considerations, and how the focus group 
transcripts were analysed. The chapter ends by placing this method within the context 
of Everyday IPE.  
3.1 Operationalising concepts  
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In this section I outline and operationalize some key concepts relevant for the method. 
First, I offer a definition of everyday politics. Second, I disaggregate the mood of the 
times into three conceptual parts: public life, sense-making and legitimacy gaps.  
3.1.1 What is everyday politics? 
How do everyday actors make sense of austerity? That is the primary research 
question of this thesis. Defining and operationalizing what exactly constitutes an 
everyday actor is the aim of this sub-section, placed here within the thesis as a 
structure as a whole because it is a decidedly methodological question. The first thing 
to point out in going about this exercise, however, is exactly what this thesis does not 
take as an everyday actor. For instance, much of the work on legitimacy is founded 
upon a distinction between rulers and ruled, or elites and non-elites (e.g. Barker 1990, 
Beetham 1991, Seabrooke 2006), from which a definition of the everyday could 
naturally flow. While certainly a useful distinction, we should be wary of equating 
non-elites or the ruled with what the everyday constitutes. For to do so assumes a 
fixed identity based on official positions of power, and ignores the process in which 
different publics can be assembled around different issues that can transcend those 
fixed positions. The focus also often smuggles in a relatively narrow conception of 
what politics entails, often equating it with governments, states, and the intentional 
efforts to influence them (see Hay 2007, Jenkins 2011) – or, in IPE, the top-down 
regulation of the world economy (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007a: 2). 
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet offers a very convincing critique of this. His starting point 
is to define politics as not only about the control, allocation, production and use of 
resources but also the values and ideas underlying those activities (Kerkvliet 2009: 
227). When understood in this way, politics ceases to be synonymous with the formal 
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activities of governments and states since the allocation (and the values and ideas 
underlying those activities) of important resources is rarely confined to these spaces. 
As Kerkvliet (2009: 229) points out, resources are often distributed in corporations, 
factories, universities, families and numerous other sites and institutions. Crucially, 
however, the distribution of these resources – on whatever scale – is constantly 
contested through whether the ideas they are based upon are just. This, for Kerkvliet, 
is what politics is and involves.  
On the basis of this definition, Kerkvliet then goes on to distinguish between three 
different types of politics: official, advocacy, and everyday. Official politics involves 
authorities in organisations ‘making, implementing, changing, contesting, and 
evading’ policies over the allocation of resources (2009: 231). The actors in this form 
of politics typically hold positions of authority, in that they are authorised (in different 
ways) to make decisions or hold an important (but perhaps indirect) role in the wider 
decision making process (2009: 231). Advocacy politics involves the intentional and 
direct attempts at influencing authorities and thus the way in which resources are 
allocated (2009: 232). As Kerkvliet points out, advocates are ‘straightforwardly, 
outwardly, and deliberately aiming their actions and views about political matters to 
authorities and organisations, which can be governments and states but need not be’ 
(2009: 232). Political science and political economy tend to focus on just these 
activities, resulting in a relatively narrow focus.  
In contrast to these, everyday politics involves ‘people embracing, complying with, 
adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or 
allocation of resources’ (Kerkvliet 2009: 232). The key way in which everyday 
politics differs from official and advocacy politics is the lack of organisation and 
often seeming non-political nature of the actions in question (Kerkvliet 2009: 232, see 
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also Scott 1990). This chimes very much with Hobson and Seabrooke’s understanding 
of everyday politics (2007a: 1-15). Seemingly mundane struggles over what is 
considered both procedurally fair and morally “valid’ action in line with how the 
economy ought to work may not be considered overtly political but can legitimate 
certain interventions (Seabrooke 2006: 46). This is crucial as a reminder that, at a 
basic and almost counterfactual level, those without the direct authority or influence 
over official politics still have a capacity to influence political and economic change 
through rejecting or conferring the claims of the governed (Hobson and Seabrooke 
2007a: 3).  
This typology highlights the disadvantages of the otherwise useful ruler-ruled 
distinction. For everyday politics is not intrinsically linked to one’s position in society. 
For even a politician who is normally engaged in official politics, or an activist who is 
normally engaged in advocacy politics, will still take part in society through the 
constant everyday negotiation and contestation of norms about the allocation of 
resources. The everyday, then, is not a signal of one’s position in politics or the 
economy. It is instead a site, and not normally a place or activity that one can choose 
to opt into or out of unless they opt out of society itself. The notion of everyday ‘actor’ 
is therefore somewhat of a misnomer. It is used as a way of signalling those who are 
specifically within a site of everyday politics – as the focus group participants were in 
this study.  
3.1.2 Disaggregating the mood of the times  
Following the discussion, an even more pressing question arises: what is the mood of 
the times? The aim here, in line with the constructivist methodology outlined in the 
Introduction, is not to theorise or conceptualise the mood of the times as a totality or 
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as representing some form of world external to mind. The mood of the times is not a 
real thing to be observed, but a conceptual category that usefully orders our scholarly 
experiences. The aim is instead to disaggregate the concept in a Weberian ideal-
typical manner in order to operationalize it. The resulting ideal-type is artificial and 
stylised, but more importantly it is also practical and useful. In line with the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 2, the framework should be judged on the analytical 
narrative it helps produce rather than the validity of the framework per se (see Stanley 
2012a). In this section I disaggregate the mood of the times into three parts: (1) the 
phenomenology or public lived experience of economic downturns; (2) the shared 
sense-making processes of the mass public; and (3) legitimacy gaps between 
expectations and experiences of what is fair in the economy.  
Public life 
This first part of the mood of the times refers to the public lived experience of the 
recession and subsequent austerity. In line with the intersubjective basis of this 
framework, this public life is not, on the one hand, logically linked to subjective and 
individual experiences of hardship – of which there were undoubtedly many examples 
in the UK since 2008. On the other hand, neither is public life in this sense 
demonstrable through aggregated economic indicators such as unemployment, since it 
is the intersubjective basis of those experiences that is most relevant. C. Wright Mills’ 
distinction between private troubles and public issues is useful in illuminating this. 
While private troubles are deemed to ‘occur within the character of the individual and 
within the range of his [sic] immediate relations with others; they have to do with his 
self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally 
aware’ (1970 [1959]: 14-15), public issues transcend these local environments and 
instead concern ‘society as a whole’ and the ‘larger structures of social and historical 
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life’ (Mills 1970 [1959]: 15). One of Mills’ points is that there is no inherent logic 
behind how and when private troubles become public issues since the latter are 
socially constructed. For what I am interested in here is this public life of recession 
and austerity and how the social order is seen to have been affected, which is not an 
objective condition but one that is formed collectively and intersubjectively (Blumer 
1971). 
To take this nascent conceptualisation further and relate it directly to a notion of crisis, 
we can draw on Jürgen Habermas’ (1976) Legitimation Crisis for inspiration. While 
Habermas’ extremely ambitious and tentative overall theory of crisis and capitalist 
development outlined in the book has little direct applicability to this thesis as a 
whole, some of the insights he provides are very useful. An extended review of 
Habermas’ theory is not required for these reasons. Nevertheless, Habermas theorised 
the process in which an economic crisis will eventually via the logic of crisis 
displacement become a problem of political-administration (i.e. rationality and then 
legitimation crisis) and then even a socio-cultural problem (i.e. motivation crisis) that 
would endanger the stability of the capitalist system itself (see also Held 1980: 284-95, 
Hay 1996b: 88-92). These four crises – economic, rationality, legitimation and 
motivation – were categorised by Habermas in various ways in addition to the 
economic, political and socio-economic categories outlined in the last sentence. One 
distinction was between objective crises within ‘system integration’ (i.e. economic 
and rationality) and more subjective crises within ‘social integration’ (i.e. legitimation 
and motivation). This so-called subjective social integration that Habermas identifies 
is potentially very useful for purposes here, as it implies that a crisis cannot just be 
reduced to an objective failing within a system but must also incorporate an 
intersubjective and publicly lived experience too.  
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It is this focus on the so-called subjective side of crisis that seems to have inspired 
Hay’s earlier work into how crises can be legitimated through resonating with lived 
experience (Hay 1996a, Hay 1996b). For Hay, Habermas’ theory brings into focus 
how a crisis is dependent upon people making a link between their experiences and 
the conditions of a deeper crisis:  ‘Individuals in such a context interpret and make 
sense of changes in their routine modes of existence in terms of a failure of the system 
(in this case the state), treating these experiences as confirmation of the crisis 
diagnosis’ (1996b: 89). The question then becomes whether people come to view 
changes in their lived experiences and disruption to the routine social fabric of public 
life as symptomatic of a systemic political and economic crisis (Hay 1996b: 92)? If so, 
the mood may be receptive to a more drastic or revolutionary change; if not, the mood 
may be receptive to inertia.  
Erving Goffman’s (1971) work on public interaction can help us take this line further 
forward still by inviting us to consider the sociological phenomena of the disturbance 
of ‘normal appearance’ (1971: 238). Goffman argues that social orders rely on a 
constant ‘confirmation that everything is in order’ whereby things can be taken at face 
value (Goffman 1971: 239). When the world appears to let people continue their 
normal routines, we can say that the person senses that appearances are ‘normal’ 
(Goffman 1971: 239), but should something prove to be ‘up’ then expectations can be 
shaken (Goffman 1971: 239). These things that are ‘up’ can be seemingly trivial 
occurrences, but by breaking or disturbing expectations (or ‘normal appearance’) 
seemingly disproportionate responses can be deemed necessary. All that is necessary 
to destabilise the social order is for the veneer of normal appearances to be broken 
(Goffman 1971: 241, see also Watson 2009a: 430). What matters, then, is disruption 
of norms or expectations as a collective problem that may aid the transition of private 
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troubles into public issues2. The point being that associated lived public experiences 
that can elicit and provoke different interventions in the name of crisis differ 
according to the extent to which those imperatives can be justified by shared belief 
and experiences.  
To make this sense of public life as part of the mood of the times researchable, we can 
distinguish between three parts as eventually reflected in the structure and content of 
the analysis in the latter half of Chapter 4. First, we can look at general and 
widespread mass privation, and how such a public issue may lead to drastic political 
and economic change being demanded. There clearly been much private troubles in 
this regard. However, due to the expansion of welfare and financialisation, massive 
wealth and income inequalities, and the continued demonization of the poor as the 
architects of their own hardship, a public experience of mass privation is and was not 
a realistic possibility during the recent economic downturns in Britain3. 
Second, we can examine the extent to which critical events – whether mediated or 
directly lived – are experienced as symptomatic of wider systemic faults that, too, 
may invite radical change and upheaval or more incremental change. Jack Holland 
                                                
2 It must be stressed at this point that the extent to which the ability for private troubles to become a 
public issue via the disturbance of normal appearances is extremely contextually and historically 
dependent. We can speculate that mass unemployment that stays under 10% of the population would 
not, in the current climate disturb normal appearances since it may follow dominant norms and be 
explained away as unlucky or the result of a moral failing. High inflation of say above 10%, on the 
other hand, may be an example of such a public experience since it directly impacts upon most people 
in society in a detrimental way – but blame cannot easily be shifted onto the individual. 
3 This is not to say it was not a realistic prospect in other parts of the world. Consider, for example, 
how unusually high food prices had seen mass “food riots” in anything up to 30 developing nations 
between 2007 and 2009 – including Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Mauritania, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Uzbekistan and Yemen (Hossain 2009). As Hossain points out, 
two West African countries and Haiti saw governments toppled as a result, and violence against elites 
in 2009 Bangladesh was explained by frustrations around food inflation (2009: 330).  
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(2009) has argued that the September 11th terrorist attack on the US (‘9-11’) created 
such a void. The shocking nature of the events seemed to shatter the pre-existing 
truths of US security culture, creating an incomprehensibility that meant 9-11 could 
be narrated as a specific crisis and thus solicit specific responses (Holland 2009: 277-
8). Similarly, Colin Hay has shown how a series of seemingly disparate events – 
including newspaper headlines that Britain could no long ‘bury our dead’ and food 
shortages – were brought together into a wider narrative of (state) crisis during the 
Winter of Discontent (Hay 1996a: 266). These disparate events were linked through a 
common narrative of ‘the over-extension of the state, the holding to ransom of the 
country by the unions, the tyranny of the pickets, and so forth’ (Hay 1996a: 266). 
Both of these studies show how a ‘paradigm-shifting’ crisis was successfully 
legitimated because it resonated with a particular mood of the times – the uncertainty 
surrounding the social order following the disturbance of normal appearances4. In the 
absence of such disturbance, there may be a mood for relative political and economic 
inertia.  
While these first two aspects of public life may be adequately researched using 
secondary materials, one benefit of the focus group method used in this thesis is that it 
provides an additional relevant source of data. With this in mind, the third way to 
study how the imperatives of a crisis resonated with public life is to analyse how 
specific sub-groups of the public report on their own experiences in this regard. These 
                                                
4 One of the interesting things about these studies is how they show that a distinction between mediated 
and directly lived experiences may not make that much sense in this context of disturbing normal 
appearances. The very emotive and elaborate expressions used by members of the public as reported in 
the ethnographic accounts analysed by Holland (e.g. ‘[it] made it difficult to talk... speaking clearly 
wasn’t really happening at that point, it was very difficult’, ‘At first I wasn’t angry, because I couldn’t 
believe what was happening’, ‘I felt nothing because I couldn’t understand’) highlight how the 
experience of 9-11 for many Americans was visceral and embodied due to the sheer scale of the shock 
induced – and this was not dependent upon them actually being at the scene of the terrorist attack in 
person. 
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can be used to gauge the extent to which there has been shared experiences of events 
symptomatic of a systemic problem and to what extent private troubles have 
translated into public issues within the context of disturbed normal appearances.  
In sum, I have identified three potential ways in which the public life (as one of three 
aspects of the mood of the times) during times of recession and austerity may be ‘up’ 
sufficiently enough to disturb normal expectations to engender radical political and 
economic change. These are: first, widespread and mass public privation; second, 
mediated or directly lived critical events; third, the experiences of sub-groups as 
reported in focus group findings.  
Sense-making  
The second part of the mood of the times refers to how people make sense of the 
object that is in crisis. That is, how they draw upon a wide range of different cultural 
resources from their own lives to make sense of crises, and how they use these 
resources to, if necessary, weave their own justificatory narratives. William Gamson’s 
(1992) Talking Politics is a particular inspiration here. In the discussion of his study 
into how working people negotiate and discuss politics, Gamson urges us to think of 
each political issue ‘as a forest through which people must find their way’ with 
various cultural sources providing ‘maps indicating useful points of entry [and] 
signposts at various crossroads’ (Gamson 1992: 117). Gamson then categorises these 
‘maps’ as originating from one of three possible sources: the media, popular wisdom, 
everyday experiences. Each will be looked at in turn.  
While ‘various frames in media discourse provide maps indicating useful points of 
entry [and] provide signposts at various crossroads’ in this metaphorical sylvan and 
poetic journey, Gamson found that ‘many people do not stick to the [media] pathways 
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provided, frequently wandering off and making paths of their own’ (1992: 117). 
Gamson concludes – perhaps surprisingly for a scholar who made his name in 
analysing the power of media discourses – that the media is not necessarily the most 
important resource but is round about equal among three. Since analysing the impact 
of media narratives on preferences and attitudes is not possible through focus group 
research, this means that this cultural resource for everyday sensemaking will not be a 
significant part of the empirical analysis. Although far from ideal, it is satisfactory to 
instead assume that the media is influential without being able to pinpoint the extent 
to which it is. For what it is worth, recent research into policy narratives has shown 
that media narratives are influential in two equally frequent ways: first, ‘preach to the 
choir’ by strengthening existing opinions, and, second, they ‘convert’ by 
strengthening opinion in the opposite direction (Shanahan et al. 2011). Since this 
thesis does not have the space nor the resources to analyse both media and everyday 
narratives of crisis, the media is assumed to be an otherwise important factor in 
generating austerity acquiescence.  
The second of Gamson’s sources in everyday sense-making is popular wisdom. 
Popular wisdom refers to taken-for-granted knowledge and maxims that are often 
used to make a point in conversation and are reliant upon the assumptions that are 
shared.  Popular wisdom is very similar to Claudia Strauss’ ‘conventional discourse’ 
concept: an oft-repeated and shared schema, a conventional discourse is a formulaic 
expression that conveys a set of assumptions which is used to make sense of political 
issues and justify a particular stance (2012: 15, 60). This shared aspect is important 
since popular wisdom depends on those very basic and foundational beliefs and 
assumptions that ‘everyone’ knows. However, ‘the greater the degree of homogeneity 
of life experience among a group of people, the greater the popular wisdom available 
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to them as a resource’ (1992: 123-4). More specifically, popular wisdom is often 
utilised through (1) rules of thumb and (2) analogies to everyday life situations 
(Gamson 1992: 124). As Chapter 5 shows, an important rule of thumb in making 
sense of the fiscal deficit is the notion that ‘one must pay back what one owes’, while 
an important everyday analogy involves making sense of the state as if it were a 
normal household.  
The third of Gamson’s sources in everyday sensemaking is experiential knowledge. 
Gamson found that people frequently made points in his focus groups ‘by telling a 
story’ (Gamson 1992: 122). While these stories were sometimes from secondary 
sources such as from television or from a newspaper, the majority of the anecdotes 
were about themselves or at least someone that they know personally (Gamson 1992: 
122). More specifically, experiential knowledge is often utilised through emblematic 
anecdotes that seek to make a broader point about how the world works (Gamson 
1992: 122). Experiences in the form of anecdotes have a privileged place in 
conversation (see also Atkins and Finlayson 2013). Although experiential knowledge 
relies less on sharedness and is thus unique to the individual, it can still be important 
in collective meaning making – especially when participants sometimes offer 
corroborating stories. As Chapter 5 shows, the focus group participants sometimes 
used anecdotes from their own lives (e.g. being able to get as many credit cards as 
they liked) to make a point about how imprudent the use of credit was in the years 
leading up the economic downturn.  
Analysing this sense-making process can tell us about legitimacy by showing us how 
political change is or is not justified by shared belief. Ted Hopf (2002), who used 
focus groups to analyse the politics of post-communist transition, provides an 
illuminating distinction between whether change is ‘legitimised’ or ‘naturalised’. 
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Naturalisation occurs when a population’s acceptance of a regime and its politics is 
borne from an ‘unthinkability’ of any alternatives (Hopf 2002: 403) but legitimation 
occurs if changes can be fully justified in an open and pluralist discussion. It is thus 
assumed that if sufficient amount of justifications draw upon the same shared popular 
wisdom or similar experiences in narrating crisis, then we can make a claim about 
how that decisive intervention is conferred legitimacy.  
Legitimacy gaps  
The third part of the mood of the times invokes the notion that crisis narratives can be 
conferred legitimacy if they are seen to close so-called ‘legitimacy gaps’. A 
legitimacy gap exists ‘when there is space between claims to fairness and rightfulness 
of policy actions by those governing, and the conferral of these claims evident in the 
expressive practices of the governed’ (Seabrooke 2007a: 796). In other words, it is a 
gap between expectations and what is perceived as delivered, to the extent that it can 
be considered unjust in line with shared beliefs. If the decisive interventions solicited 
by crisis narratives are seen to close these gaps, then that intervention will be justified 
by shared beliefs by promising to make the economy fairer in line with dominant 
conventions. Since legitimacy gaps are essentially contests over how the economy 
ought to work (as related to morality and one’s place in society), sociological theories 
are useful.  
Recall how the financial reform nexus, the front stage areas that require legitimation 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2 includes tax. Since debt is the central symbol in the 
politics of austerity – with the fiscal deficit at the forefront of these disputes – tax is 
going to be relevant. Insights from fiscal sociology are especially useful here 
(O'Connor 1973, Block 1981, Campbell 1993, Cameron 2006, 2008a, Martin et al. 
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2009a, Prasad et al. 2009, Kidder and Martin 2012, Schäfer and Streeck 2013a). The 
approach allows us to denaturalise what we see as tax and appreciate the unique and 
curious situation in which taxes are a set of ‘obligations to contribute money or goods 
to the state in exchange for nothing in particular’ (Martin et al. 2009b: 2, emphasis 
added). Tax thus relies on an implicit social contract about fairness and redistribution. 
It is for these reasons that Schumpeter argued that fiscal sociology is one of the best 
starting points for an investigation into the peculiarities of social and political national 
life (Campbell 2009: 163). Of importance then, is to what extent the lived experiences 
of state spending match expectations about the correct and fair distribution of 
‘taxpayers’ money’. As I show in Chapter 6, many focus group participants were 
suspicious and sceptical about how ‘taxpayers’ money’ was being used and wasted – 
often drawing on personal experiences through anecdotes to support this view. These 
discussions provide some evidence of a legitimacy gap, in that in promising to reel 
back state spending austerity can seem as a promise to halt this unjust use of 
taxpayers’ money. But to properly understand this legitimacy gap, we will also 
require a framework to make sense of who or what ‘the taxpayer’ is, since it is often 
claimed that it is their money that is unjustly wasted.  
Kidder and Martin’s (2012) research is very useful in showing how ‘the taxpayer’ can 
be understood not merely as a citizen who contributes to state revenues, but as a 
specific group identity constituted in opposition to others. More specifically, they 
draw heavily on Blumer (1958) in claiming the taxpayer can be analysed as a ‘sense 
of group’ position within a moral abstract order. Blumer’s key insight is that ‘social 
life depends on the working-out of an abstract, but stable and shared, image of the 
world’ (2012: 125). Blumer argued that race prejudice was experienced as a sense of 
group position rather than a set of individual feelings that members may have for 
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those in another group (1958: 3). This meant recasting racism away from psychology, 
and towards understanding it as a sociological and collective process of group 
formation (1958: 3). There are two important features for our purposes. First, to 
characterise another group is, of course, to define one’s own group (1958: 4). The 
sense of group position emerges from this necessarily relational experience (1958: 4). 
These relations, however, are not intended to reflect the ‘objective relations’ between 
groups, rather ‘it stands for ‘what ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’ … it is a sense of 
where the two groups belong’ (1958: 5). Second, this order is necessarily abstract, in 
the sense that the groups are defined as an entity or whole (1958: 6). This is important, 
for it suggests that these relations take place in ‘the area of the remote and not of the 
near … it is not the experience with concrete individuals in daily association that 
gives rise to the definitions of the extended, abstract group’ (1958: 6).  
Kidder and Martin conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with white business 
owners and managers in Tampa, Florida. Unsurprisingly, they discovered hostility 
towards taxation. However, they found dominant explanations that emphasise 
ideology or interests did not reflect how tax was actually discussed in overly moral 
terms (2012: 124) – that is, the participants did not speak directly about morality of 
tax, but ‘they talked about tax in moral terms’ (2012: 126, emphasis in original). They 
use Blumer’s group position framework to show how tax was experienced through an 
abstract moral order. The interview participants typically saw themselves as an 
abstract category of person, ‘the taxpayer’: virtuous, hard-working citizens who were 
contrasted against undeserving poor who do not work hard (2012: 126). ‘Without 
exception’, Kidder and Martin explain, the participants ‘saw themselves in the former 
group, and they asserted the moral principle that those who have worked for their 
money should be rewarded and their efforts protected from idlers’ (2012: 126). Those 
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‘idlers’ were often characterized through stereotypes, such as welfare cheats and fat-
cat bankers (2012: 126). In producing this sense of group position, the participants 
portrayed tax as a threat to the moral order because they believed it would deprive the 
hard-working taxpayer while rewarding both the undeserving rich and poor (2012: 
124). If there is a widespread experience of this order being compromised, then a ‘gap’ 
will emerge. Likewise, government intervention that promises to help close that gap, 
and thus uphold the way society ought to be ordered, is likely to receive support. 
Chapter 6 details how this relates to legitimating and accepting austerity.  
Summary  
Crisis is a process of problem definition, narration and decisive intervention. In order 
to achieve legitimacy, crises should resonate to an extent with the mood of the times – 
or, in other words, they must be justifiable via shared beliefs. This section has argued 
that the mood of the times can be disaggregated into an analytical framework so to 
make it researchable. These three parts are: (1) the public life of an economic 
downturn; (2) the role of sense-making in everyday narratives of crisis; (3) legitimacy 
gaps between the experiences and expectations in the use of ‘taxpayers’ money’. This 
analytical process is necessarily artificial. Naturally, a sense of group position matters 
to the public life of crisis, just as the use of experiential knowledge in the form of 
anecdotes can illuminate legitimacy gaps in ‘taxpayer’s money’. Since all three parts 
are influenced by sociological literature, intersubjectivity is a streak that runs through 
the entire framework. It is this foundation that makes focus groups a highly 
appropriate method. The next section shows how this is so, while simultaneously 
outlining the theoretical and practical foundation for their deployment in this research.   
3.2 Focus groups 
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3.2.1 Intersubjective underpinnings  
Collective meaning making 
The conventional and founding literature on how to conduct focus groups in social 
science research is typically shaped by its history as a specific method of market 
research (and latterly as a political tool used to canvass public opinion) and the 
general predilection of social science towards an implicit neopositivist methodology 
(Parker and Tritter 2006: 23, Savigny 2007). While some of this literature can be still 
useful at times, it does require some critical vetting. Within this world, focus groups 
represent ‘a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic 
determined by the researcher’ (Morgan 1996: 130). Typically, they consist of 
‘structured discussions among 6 to 10 homogenous strangers in a formal setting’ 
(Morgan 1996: 131). While not suitable for investigating public opinion or consensus, 
focus groups are used ‘to determine the perceptions, feelings, and thinking of people 
about issues’ (Krueger and Casey 2000: 12) and uncover factors that influence 
behaviour, opinions, or motivation (Krueger and Casey 2000: 24). The purpose of 
focus groups is to understand how a particular population or group process and 
negotiate meaning around a given situation. Subsequently, the ‘rules of thumb’ for 
conducting them are distinctive (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Morgan’s four ‘rules of thumb’ for conducting focus groups. 
1. Use homogenous strangers as participants. 
2. Rely on a relatively structured interview with high moderator involvement. 
3. 6 – 10 participants per group. 
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4. 3 – 5 groups. 
(Source: Morgan 1997: 34) 
 
These rules of thumb (especially the second and third), however, do not directly 
translate into the sort of social scientific research conducted for this thesis. As Bloor 
and his co-authors explain, there is a difference between using focus groups to collect 
data on group reactions to stimuli and instead using them to ‘generate data on the 
group meanings that lie behind such collective assessments, on the group processes 
that lead to such assessments, and on the normative understandings that groups draw 
upon to reach such assessments’ (Bloor et al. 2001: 17). Despite this second wave of 
literature that emphasises the truly qualitative potential of focus group research, the 
method continues (in political science, in particular) to be viewed through the lens of 
public opinion research, i.e. aggregating individual preferences and attitudes from a 
systematically random sample in order to extrapolate about the public opinion of a 
wider population. Seen in this methodological light, focus groups will almost 
inevitably be negatively evaluated, downgraded from a primary method to one that 
must be supplementary to quantitative counterparts (e.g. Copsey 2008). Despite this, 
there are now numerous examples of focus groups as a primary method in research 
about politics (e.g. Gamson 1992, Hopf 2002, O'Toole 2003, Marsh et al. 2007, 
Hopkins 2007, Tonkiss 2012, Jarvis and Lister 2012)5. 
                                                
5 There is a second wave of political science research using focus groups that, at the time of writing, is 
yet to be published (e.g. Stoker and Hay 2012, Jackson and Hall 2013, Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 
2013). 
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It must be remembered that this thesis is not making claims about public opinion. It is 
instead making claims about the mood of the times: an intersubjective consensus for 
the legitimacy of change that transcends individual beliefs and possesses a collective 
semi-permanence (Widmaier et al. 2007: 750) – which was disaggregated into three 
operationalisable parts that seek to analyse how crises are conferred legitimacy via 
shared belief. This reflects the purpose of focus groups to understand how a particular 
sub-group processes and negotiates meaning around a given situation. In this sense, 
they are undeniably and necessarily bound up within the logics of qualitative enquiry, 
which is gaining increased acceptance in political science as a legitimate research 
methodology (e.g. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006).  
At this point we must return to and flesh out the constructivist methodology outlined 
in Chapter 2 but with more specific methods of data collection and analysis to build 
upon. One of the central points of this methodology is that since the observing-mind 
cannot be logically separated from the observed-world, scholarly knowledge should 
be adjudicated on how well it can usefully order and analyse practical experiences. 
Since this monist position rejects the fundamental separation between object and 
subject, it can translate rather seamlessly into a substantive focus on intersubjectivity. 
A neopositivist approach to focus groups as reflected in opinion poll methodology 
may envisage the individual as the central unit of analysis as reflected in an attempt to 
unearth real and objective beliefs and opinions held in the minds of participants 
(Hollander 2004: 611, Munday 2006: 95). In contrast, in a constructivist approach to 
focus groups ‘all knowledge is seen as dependent on the social context of its 
production [which] also points in the direction of actively including the social 
interaction’ rather than worrying about biases and cross-contamination of individual 
beliefs (Halkier 2010: 74). Rather than the individual, this constructivist methodology 
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envisages the intersubjective norms and meanings of specific sub-groups as the 
meaning of analysis.  
As Bobby Calder recounts in his seminal article on focus groups, intersubjectivity, as 
originally used by Alfred Schutz, ‘refers to the common-sense conceptions and 
ordinary explanations shared by a set of social actors’ (Calder 1977: 358). This is 
exactly why the focus group literature talks of ‘how people construct and reconstruct 
their stories’ (Barbour 2007: 42) or ‘the processes whereby meaning is collectively 
constructed’ (Bryman 2008: 476). The collective element goes hand-in-hand in 
intersubjectivity, and is an advantage focus groups have over individual interviews. 
As Gamson recounts, focus groups represent ‘sociable public discourse’ in which 
participants tend to act as if ‘speaking to a gallery’ as governed by the norms of 
public discourse (Gamson 1992: 20)6. The clear value added of focus groups lies in 
their ability through sustained ‘retrospective introspection’ to reveal previously taken 
for granted assumptions that underpin our rarely articulated but common sense stock 
of knowledge (Bloor et al. 2001: 5). 
But where, exactly, do these meanings come from? How are they shared? And who 
shares them? Turning back to Schutz, Calder (1977: 358) points out that a key factor 
in intersubjectivity is ‘the actor’s assumption that others see the world in the same 
way … Intersubjectivity is thus defined socially, not individually’. Intersubjectivity is 
thus closely related to common patterns of socialisation: ‘The key variable is the 
degree of personal contact and similarity of socialization, which is basic to all social 
groupings, such as those based on social class, geographic location, race, or whatever’ 
(Calder 1977: 358). These arguments have a lot in common with Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), who themselves draw extensively on Schutz (Berger and 
                                                
6 This issue of everyday talk is explored further in Appendix 7.  
  
 
115 
Luckmann 1966: 9), to describe the process in which common-sense knowledge is 
constructed. This has important implications for sampling.  
Sampling strategy 
Two points are important at this point. First, if we are to, uncontroversially it must be 
said, assume that intersubjectivity is dependent on socialisation (similar upbringing, 
similar experiences) – and that focus groups are being used to study intersubjectivity 
– then it is crucial that focus group participants have a lot in common. This is the 
reason the focus group literature consistently recommends using ‘homogenous’ 
participants (e.g. Morgan 1996: 131, 1997: 35, Krueger and Casey 2000: 10, 
Wilkinson 2004: 179, Copsey 2008: 2). Secondly, the aim is to understand 
acquiescence to austerity through interpreting the production of that very position in a 
form of sociable public discourse. Therefore it makes sense to sample ‘theoretically’ 
(sometimes also called ‘purposefully’ or ‘paradigmatically’): that is, ‘theorising – 
albeit at an early stage – about the dimensions that are likely to be relevant in terms of 
giving rise to differing perceptions or experiences’ (Barbour 2007: 58). In other words, 
pick different homogenous groups that are hypothetically likely to provide contrasting 
data. The question then becomes which and whose intersubjectivity? 
In this case, one relevant sub-group is middle-income homeowners. The British 
middle-class are sometimes identified as an important constituency in which 
politicians either strategically hail their interests to legitimise interventions (e.g. 
Watson 2009a) or genuinely target their rhetoric at (e.g. Reeves 2007, Holland 2011). 
‘Middle England’, for Jack Holland, ‘represents an approximate midpoint of social 
and political values and a comfortable but aspirant economic position and is 
geographically clustered in south-east England, parts of the Midlands and suburbia’ 
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(2011: 81). Meanwhile, in Britain, homeownership has become both politically and 
culturally salient (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008, Smith 2008, Finlayson 2009). That 
homeowners are disposed to conservative policy preferences (Watson 2008a) and 
financial self-discipline (Langley 2008: 193-9) means they are theoretically likely to 
produce the austerity acquiescence that this thesis seeks to understand. The middle-
income home-owning experience of the global financial crisis is important too. While 
there have been many repossessions, there has equally been many who have not only 
been insulated due to being asset-rich but some who may have benefitted through 
base-rate tracker mortgages. For these reasons, middle-income homeowners are the 
main target group of this research. 
A contrasting sub-group that may be hypothetically unlikely to produce austerity 
acquiescence is community volunteers in impoverished areas. Although there may be 
some examples of overlaps between the specific individuals inhabiting these sub-
groups, those involved in improving their communities are likely to share knowledge 
and experience that may align them against spending cuts. Poorer areas have suffered 
disproportionately since 2008. It is thus likely that they will have a more rounded 
awareness of the deleterious effects of the economic downturn on everyday lives. 
Additionally, those who help impoverished areas are more likely to be directly or 
indirectly involved with people who rely upon welfare benefits, one of the main areas 
targeted for retrenchment by the Coalition government. As a consequence of these 
factors it is likely that this group will be resistant to the idea of austerity, which is 
why it represents a relevant sub-group to target as a point of comparison to the main 
group7. 
                                                
7  Appendix 3 explores and justifies these decisions further, while Appendix 7 reflects on the 
advantages and disadvantages of this strategy.  
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Knowledge claims 
Although some of the specifics of the claims to knowledge have already been touched 
upon in this section, it is required to properly unpack this logic and the process. 
Specifically, I need to outline what, exactly, I plan on ‘accessing’ through these focus 
group interviews and the extent to which claims can be made beyond just the specific 
participants interviewed. The spectre of the public opinion poll or survey quantitative 
methodology, which relies on a very specific and different epistemic foundation to 
focus group research, can haunt qualitative research in the absence of sufficient 
reflexivity (Bloor et al. 2001: 28). In understanding the differences between these 
methodologies, the epistemic foundations for this thesis can be outlined.  
Kvale’s distinction between the interview as a miner or as a traveller illustrates two 
contrasting ideal-type epistemic foundations for interviewing. While the miner’s aim 
is knowledge collection, the traveller’s aim is knowledge construction (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 48). For the miner, knowledge is understood to lie in the minds of 
interview participants. It is thus akin to ‘buried metal’; something that lies in a 
potentially deep interior for the interviewer to unearth as cleanly as possible (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 48). The interviewer ‘digs nuggets of knowledge out of a 
subject’s pure experiences, unpolluted by any leading questions [which] may be 
understood as objective real data or as subjective authentic meanings’ (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 48). In public opinion research, it is therefore very important to 
have a representative sample from which claims can be extrapolated to a wider 
population: for when these nuggets are understood as beliefs or preferences in 
response to specifically worded questions, it is likely there will be significant variance 
between the beliefs and preferences in the mind of different individuals in different 
circumstances.  
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Alternatively, the traveller interviewer can be thought of as on a journey. As Kvale 
explains: 
The interviewer-traveller, in line with the original Latin meaning of 
conversation as ‘wandering together with,’ talks along with the local 
inhabitants, asking questions and encouraging them to tell their own stories of 
their lived world; some, such as the anthropologists, living for a longer time 
with their conversation partners (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 48).  
Knowledge, then, is not merely discovered in (or mined from) the minds of people 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 54). It is instead actively created through the process of 
questions and answers; the product of interviewer and interviewee (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 54). It is for these reasons that Kvale describes the interview as 
literally an inter-view: ‘an inter-change of views between two persons conversing 
about a theme of mutual interest’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 2). The notion that the 
data can be contaminated therefore no longer makes sense. For instance, leading 
questions are not disregarded on this basis but instead potentially put at the forefront 
of research design in a reflexive manner where appropriate8. Put differently, while an 
interview driven by a neopositivist methodology will seek to create a ‘pure’ interview 
that provides a ‘mirror reflection’ of an underlying social reality, an interview driven 
by a constructivist methodology is comfortable with (if not actually encouraging of) 
the use of ‘familiar narrative constructs’ in the place of seemingly genuine beliefs in 
the minds of people (Miller and Glassner 2004: 125-7). As a result, the interview can 
provide insights beyond just the individual and instead provide knowledge about the 
intersubjectivity of sub-groups too.  
Although each disaggregated part of the mood of the times requires slightly different 
modes of analysis, there is a shared logic that lies behind how this thesis specifically 
                                                
8 Leading questions could, for instance, prompt interesting and different responses that illuminate a 
particular mindset or way of thinking. 
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makes claims. As I just outlined, the focus groups are not being used to make claims 
about the beliefs of specific people, but rather to make claims about culture in line 
with the ideal-type methodology outlined in the previous chapter. Recall that we 
assume a crisis resonates with the mood of the times when its associated imperatives 
can be justified by shared belief; from this we can say that legitimacy has been 
conferred. The first aim is then to see how austerity is justified, which can be done 
both directly and indirectly through the sociable public discourse in the focus group 
discussions.  
The next step is to work out the intersubjective bases of these justifications. From the 
actor’s ‘thoughts, feelings and motivations’ (Strauss and Quinn 1997: 20) tacit 
understandings can be reconstructed from their sociable public discourse (Quinn 
2005b: 4). Since shared understandings of the world allow individuals to comprehend 
and organise experience (Quinn 2005b: 2) we can look for patterns across different 
instances of everyday talk from similar people for evidence of such shared and stable 
understandings (Quinn 2005a: 40-43)9. ‘In general’, according to Claudia Strauss, one 
should ‘take what your interviewees say and consider what else they have to assume 
for those statements to make sense’ (Strauss 2005: 208). The aim is thus to ‘peel back’ 
from the cacophony of everyday talk to what shared beliefs lie behind these 
justifications – that is the norms and assumptions that create the legitimate boundaries 
of action in the shared process of, for example, narrating a debt crisis or producing the 
                                                
9 In regards to political science, this corresponds with the idea of the bricoleur in some institutionalist 
literature. Martin Carstensen (2011) discusses this in comparison to the ‘paradigm man’, the simplified 
notion of an actor who has internalised a relatively strict and coherent paradigm that informs action. In 
contrast, the bricoleur has a toolkit, in which different resources are used in a pragmatic fashion. 
Culture, as a resource, ‘exists between and not inside the minds of actors, and the use of culture thus 
demands some creativity and critical faculty of the actor’ .  
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group position of the taxpayer. This method of peeling back is a means to an end: that 
is, to seeing what is shared, in order to make claims about the mood of the times10.  
The mood of the times is a concept designed to capture those shared beliefs and 
assumptions that are foundational and common sense enough that almost everyone 
will be at least aware if not supportive of them. Yet the point of the concept is to 
explore the relational dynamic in which politicians will want to ensure their 
interventions and policies can be justified by shared beliefs in order to ensure 
legitimacy. In this respect, it requires pointing out that not all shared beliefs are equal. 
The Coalition government – particularly the dominant Conservative party – do not 
need to convince the entire electorate of the necessity of austerity due to the quirks 
and peculiarities of the UK’s first-past-the-post system used in general elections. In 
this system it is quite possible to be elected to even a majority government by 
targeting specific sub-groups – often said to be something equated to ‘Middle 
England’ (see above). This means that the ‘mood of the times’ should not necessarily 
be equated to the mood of the nation per se, since it may incorporate the lived 
experiences of certain privileged sub-groups to the exclusion of others.  
These shared beliefs, or shared legitimate boundaries of action, are thus factors that 
make austerity acquiescence possible. Although each mode of analysis related to each 
component of the mood of the times has its own subtleties, to push the strength of 
these claims even further two additional general modes of analysis are used. First, the 
norms and assumptions that arise from the discussions can be corroborated using 
secondary literature or secondary data. For example, the focus group participants 
                                                
10 However, this does have potential political and ethical problems since it does violence to the 
subjective and idiosyncratic experiences and voices of the powerless. There is no way simple way 
round this potential pitfall – as a pre-emptive rejoinder, this is an essential part of the method that 
should be judged on the practical utility of the ends. 
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consistently discussed debt as a moral issue, a view that that has garnered much 
attention from social theory. In terms of data, surveys can be used to support claims 
about changing social and economic trends. This helps establish these insights as 
social facts. Second, these norms and assumptions can, where possible, be historicised. 
If shared beliefs, norms and assumptions help us understand certain justifications for 
austerity, then we must question the sources of these cultural factors. The source of 
these shared beliefs can be, for instance, popular wisdom that has accumulated slowly 
over many centuries, and therefore its existence cannot be explained through the 
imposition of elite rhetoric. Consequently, it can be shown how an important source 
of austerity acquiescence is, to put it broadly, the mood of the times. It is Chapter 7 
that seeks to go beyond the focus group data by theorising and historicising the 
themes that arose.  
These claims can be ‘generalised’ on the basis of two arguments. First, this thesis 
adopts a position of ‘analytical generality’. The orthodox social scientific 
understanding of generalizability is derived from statistical logic on the level of the 
individuals. For instance, a series of preferences derived from a survey needs to be 
empirically generalisable in that they can be scaled up from a representative sample to 
a wider population. As a result, claims can be made, in a statistical sense, about 
individual beliefs.  However, since this thesis is not looking at individual beliefs, a 
different model of scaling up, based on the logical generality of ideal-typical patterns, 
is required. According to Kvale, analytical generality involves ‘a reasoned judgement 
about the extent to which the findings of one study can be used as a guide to what 
might occur in another situation’ based on reasoned assertion and argument (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 263). This is similar to transferability (Guba and Lincoln 1989, 
  
 
122 
Krueger and Casey 2000: 203); the extent to which results from one group can be 
transferred to a similar group.  
Second, the literature states that it is normally after conducting between 3 and 5 
groups that ‘saturation’ point is reached (Morgan 1997: 43, Krueger and Casey 2000: 
26). At this point, doing more research for just the purposes of increasing the sample 
is a waste of resources. According to Morgan, best practice involves determining a 
target number in planning but be willing to be flexible if saturation is not required 
(Morgan 1997: 43). Saturation, however, is more than just a strategy for maximising 
resources: it is also a wager that interviewing more participants from the same sub-
group would represent diminishing analytical returns, in that one would expect the 
same justifications to arise. As a result, the analysis is analytically generalisable. 
Through saturation and analytical generality, it is possible to make claims about the 
mood of the times. Although the epistemic basis for the claims is different (and 
weaker) compared to neopositivist methodology, using this sort of methodology 
results in insights and analyses otherwise impossible.  
3.2.2 From theory to practice 
Recruitment 
I conducted six focus groups, with the number of participants in each discussion 
ranging from three to ten. Four of these groups, relatively small (the smallest being 
three, the largest six), were with middle-income homeowners, from four differing 
affluent areas from within Birmingham (known as groups A1-4). Groups A1-4 were 
mostly in employment, overwhelmingly in the public sector (although A2 was an 
exception). Two other groups, relatively larger (both groups contained ten 
participants), were with those connected to community groups in two differing poorer 
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areas from within Birmingham (known as groups B5 and B6). The B groups 
contained a mixture of people. When asked to report their occupation, many did not 
offer what many would consider a conventional occupation. Instead, the most 
frequent responses were volunteer or no answer (see Appendix). Although there was a 
mix of ethnicities, gender and age across the groups I exclude these factors from the 
analysis because they were disregarded from the sampling strategy (see above). All 
participants were offered a £20 gift voucher as an incentive to attend, as 
recommended by the literature (e.g. Morgan 1997: 38).  
The A and B groups required different recruitment strategies based on the sampling 
strategy outlined above. With groups A1-4, it was important that being a homeowner 
in a middle-income area was the most important factor shared in common among 
participants. To improve the analytical generality of the resulting argument, the 
groups were selected from different areas – two that were more affluent, two that 
were less so (see Appendix 3 for more detail and justification). A database of 
potential participants living in these areas was compiled, and each 5th household was 
phoned and screened for appropriateness and availability (see Appendix 4 for full 
breakdown of recruitment method).  
With groups B5-6, it was important that being involved in the community was the 
most important factor shared in common among participants. This meant that cold-
calling would be an ineffective recruitment method, as it would be very hard to gauge 
on the phone how involved someone is in the community. Consequently, participants 
were recruited via a gatekeeper at a community organisation. The contact put up 
posters advertising the discussions and asked people in their immediate networks (see 
Appendix 4). The disadvantage of this was a lack of control, which manifested in 
larger groups than hoped as well as one duplicate participant. However, these 
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disadvantages were worthwhile in exchange for access, which would have otherwise 
been difficult.  
Interview strategy 
The initial challenge when designing this study was a tension between two concerns. 
On the one hand, I was concerned that the focus group participants might (think that 
they) have little to say on the seemingly highbrow topic of austerity and the economy. 
This was exacerbated since quite a few potential participants I spoke to when 
recruiting on the phone required persuasion that they possessed the adequate 
knowledge to take part. After all, for someone who has no professional interest in 
political economy, ‘how the economy ought to work’ might not be at the forefronts of 
their minds. On the other hand, I was interested in collecting a certain sort of data that 
resulted from what Gamson terms ‘sociable public discourse’ (as opposed to ‘sociable 
discourse’ or ‘public discourse’) – a term that invokes the image of people talking 
relatively normally and drawing on the same skills they would in a conversation with 
colleagues or friends. This tension manifested in a concern over how best to ensure 
that participants discussed the economy in a relatively naturalistic manner. It should 
be noted that this concern is not over the contamination of data due to a potential 
misrepresentation of true beliefs, but about ensuring that what was brought into 
discussion reflected the shared experiences of the participants rather than responding 
to facilitator questioning. What participants brought to the fore when prompted to talk 
about the ambiguous and broad topic of austerity, I intuitively felt, would be 
important.  
To dissipate this tension, I designed the focus groups’ ‘questioning route’ (see 
Appendix 6 for full version) with two things at the forefront. First, following advice 
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from Krueger and Casey (2000: 42-3), I ensured that there was easy early questions to 
stimulate a fast and conversational start (‘what is it like to live in your area?’), which 
was then related to the topic (‘how has this area been affected by cuts?’) that was then 
opened up from the specific to the general (‘why is the UK enforcing spending cuts?’). 
Second, in case this strategy did not work as well as hoped, I brought along a series of 
provocative unattributed quotes about austerity and the economy by politicians for the 
participants to discuss. The questioning route was intended as just that: a route; that is 
a guide, rather than a prescriptive and structured procedure. Consistent with the 
approach to interviewing outlined above, the route acted as an ideal-type guide in 
which to negotiate the ‘journey’ of the focus group interviews. While the beginning 
always started the same (with an introduction, ‘house rules’, and questions about the 
area), the middle was left to flow naturally depending on what participants decided to 
discuss. As the moderator, I planned to use the prompts (see Appendix 6) when 
necessary to either guide the discussion away from topics that were not relevant or to 
probe a particular point (e.g. following talk about the UK being in a ‘mess’, asking 
what exactly this ‘mess’ is). I always ended the discussion with a deliberate and 
provocative leading question: ‘is austerity necessary?’.  
The focus group discussions were very successful in providing the sort of data I 
hoped for. By accident or by design, the worries about a lack of public sociable 
discourse proved to be unfounded. To the contrary, the participants seemed to very 
much enjoy the discussions – evident, I think, in the fact that most of them continued 
for at least a couple of minutes (sometimes more) after I had told them it had ended 
and switched off the dictaphone. This is not that surprising. As Kvale remarks, it is 
probably not that often one is provided with the legitimate space to discuss and reflect 
upon their experiences (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 32). The quote prompts were not 
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required and consequently went unused. One downside, however, was a tendency for 
several participants to typically dominate the discussions. These dominant characters 
may have quelled resistance to acquiescence, but it is difficult to know11.  
Ethics 
Although this study has no clear ethical objections, it is still an obligation for any 
research involving human participants to explain and justify how precautions were 
taken to minimise potential harm. Obtaining consent was done in two ways. Firstly, 
informal consent was conferred when participants agreed to participate over the phone. 
Secondly, formal consent was ensured through participants’ signature on an official 
consent form. It was made clear that participants could withdraw at any point. In 
particular, the participant information sheet also emphasised how part of the focus 
group discussions may involve elaborating upon their experiences of the global 
financial crisis. It was advised that if they found discussing such experiences 
distressful that they should withdraw from the project. In the on-the-day briefings 
prior to the groups, it was explained to participants that they could withdraw their data 
at a later date by getting in contact – and that they did not require a reason for doing 
so. Participants were given my contact information when signing for receiving their 
incentive for participating. This was in order to allow participants who may want to 
withdraw their contributions (fully or partially) to the group to do so. No participant 
took this option. These measures received full ethical clearance from the University of 
Birmingham, and all documents mentioned in this sub-section are available fully in 
Appendix 5.  
                                                
11 These issues are explored further in Appendix 7.  
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Analysis 
Following verbatim transcription without correcting for grammar, the first stage of 
analysis involved a preliminary reading of the corpus in order to identify and record 
recurring and prominent themes and (in particular) justifications for austerity in line 
with the three parts – public life, sense-making, legitimacy gaps – outlined above. 
Using NVivo, these were then formed into codes (such as public life>‘cutting back’, 
sense making>‘household metaphor’, legitimacy gap>‘undeserving poor’). It was also 
coded when participants attributed blame for various crises, or when they attempted to 
resist the debt crisis narrative. The entire corpus of transcripts was then coded on the 
basis of these themes.  
The second stage of analysis involved a form of narrative analysis12. Following the 
consensus of the qualitative methods literature, I decided to discount content analysis 
or other ‘counting’ based methods on the logic that amount of time discussing a topic 
does not automatically make it the most important (Morgan 1997: 62). Wilkinson 
(2004: 182) usefully distinguishes between content and ethnographic analysis for 
interviews. The latter of these involves making some claims from the interaction 
between people and reading the importance of topics from participants’ emotions 
(Wilkinson 2004: 182). So while it is important not to overstate the influence of this 
on the analysis, being present as the moderator at every discussion was very 
important: it provided a deep sense of meaning that could not be acquired from just 
reading the transcripts. In his famous focus group study William Gamson decided that 
formalised procedures for analysis were unnecessary for the specific aims of his 
project (Gamson 1992: 194). Instead, he presented the focus group data as if it were a 
                                                
12 Note that the mode of analysis is, in many ways, intimately connected with the content in the sub-
section ‘Knowledge claims’ above. I shall not repeat here what is already written there, but instead add 
to it. 
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play in order to best reflect the public and social aspects of the discussions, using 
exemplar passages to support the point. I use this as an inspiration.  
Narrative analysis reconstructs the stories told during interviews through working out 
the key players and a basic structure or plot (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 222). If 
these stories may not be told explicitly then a coherent narrative can be constructed 
from different elements and points made throughout the interview (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009: 222). Just like how when someone tells a story it always has a point, 
when someone discusses one topic in connection with another (even without any 
explanation for the connection) they take for granted the norms and conventions that 
link those topics (Strauss 2005: 208). We can call this the assumption of contiguity: 
‘if topic B follows topic A when a speaker is allowed to talk without interruption, 
then A and B are linked’ (Strauss 2005: 208). The shared stories and justifications 
from each focus group discussion can then themselves be ‘peeled back’ to discover 
what is held as constant.  
The aim of this analysis is then to turn the many tales told into an ideal-typical 
narrative that is ‘a richer, more condensed and coherent story than the scattered 
stories of single interviews’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 202). These narratives do 
not exist in the sense that they can be discovered. They are a form of ideal-type 
analysis. It is unlikely that one could find the dominant story of austerity written 
down anywhere. But this story is apparent in the justification and assumptions in the 
way we talk about austerity, and I argue that we can understand austerity 
acquiescence better through this stylised lens than without it. As I have already 
mentioned, this form of analysis does do violence to the individual and idiosyncratic 
narratives by imposing a utopian order and coherence upon proceedings. It is for this 
reason that, where possible, I have included discussions of alternative narratives and 
  
 
129 
sidelined stories where group support was not always offered (these issues are further 
discussed in Appendix 7).  
Concluding remarks 
Everyday IPE is typically split into two methodologies: a Foucauldian approach that 
questions how certain subject positions integral to global finance are produced; and a 
historical sociological approach that demonstrates the power of non-elites by tracing 
changes in norms that underpin the everyday economic actions important for 
maintaining state legitimacy. Although far closer to the historical sociology side, this 
chapter has outlined a methodology that fits neatly into neither category. This chapter, 
too, has extended the methodological elitism and proxies critique from Chapter 2 by 
outlining a method that firmly transcends these limits. It is this move, with the 
inclusion of focus groups, which makes it a unique framework and methodology 
within the constructivist and burgeoning Everyday IPE literatures. For it gathers 
primary data about ‘everyday politics’ – that is, the contestations of norms and 
conventions about the allocation of resources and how the economy ought to work – 
in a way that few other political economy approaches do. The second half of the 
chapter outlined and justified the epistemic and practical foundations for this focus 
group method.  
The first half of the chapter, meanwhile, continued to build the analytical framework 
started in Chapter 2. In that chapter it was suggested that rather than conceptualising 
crisis via a symptom-disease distinction, it might be equally useful to dismantle that 
divide and reconstitute crisis as an iterative and enacted process of problem definition, 
narration and intervention. When such crises are sufficiently ‘front-stage’, however, 
they require a degree of legitimation from the mass public through resonating with the 
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mood of the times. The first half of this chapter disaggregated the concept of the 
mood of the times into three parts in an ideal-type fashion. Crises, then, can achieve 
legitimacy by resonating with: (1) the public life of crisis; that is the extent to which 
expectations about normal appearances and the social order are disrupted; (2) 
everyday sense making; that is, the way in which people use popular wisdom and 
experience to make sense of the state, economy and object of crisis into a justificatory 
narrative; and (3) legitimacy gaps; that is, the extent to which the decisive 
intervention seems to make life fairer by closing a gap between divergent 
expectations and experiences of how the economy ought to work. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
largely follow these parts, respectively. Chapter 7, meanwhile, simultaneously pulls 
together these strands into an argument before pushing this argument beyond the 
focus group data by historicising its themes. I aim to demonstrate the added value of 
these three preceding conceptual and methodological chapters in these following four 
chapters as I offer an explanation for austerity acquiescence.  
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Chapter 4. Enacting the debt crisis and the 
perseverance of normal appearances 
 
 
 
[In response to an interviewer question about the general experience of crisis] 
Crisis…? What crisis…? 
Kyle [Focus group A2] 
 
For many social scientists, crises are associated with significant change. Some write 
of how crises can cause ‘paradigm shifts’ in the third order ideas that underpin 
economic policy-makers’ worldviews, such as the post-war shift from Keynesianism 
to monetarism (Hall 1993) or the post-2008 shift towards macroprudential financial 
regulation (Baker 2013). Others write of how crises, if appropriately narrated, can 
engender a structural transformation of the state (Hay 1999). Upping the ante even 
further, others have written on how if an economic crisis is not appropriately managed 
then it may accumulate, via the logic of crisis displacement, into a political-
administrative crisis or even a socio-cultural crisis of capitalism itself (Habermas 
1976). As the Introduction highlighted, many political scientists argue that there has 
not been a moment of significant or truly transformational change since 2008 – and 
the politics of spending cuts and the strategy of fiscal consolidation has only 
consolidated that sense in the UK.  
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In this chapter, I argue that the debt crisis was enacted in a context of a ‘mood’ that 
was biased towards relative political and economic inertia. There was little evidence 
from the focus group discussions that there was a mood for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the 
macroeconomic principles of policymakers, or similar that could be justified by their 
shared experiences and beliefs. There are many, many reasons for this mood for 
inertia. The lack of alternatives paradigms is one obvious factor, as is the sense that 
the ideology of the free market is so very well entrenched (e.g. Crouch 2011). This is 
ground well trodden. Given the framework constructed over the last two chapters, I 
will focus on two things in this chapter: first, on how the debt crisis was enacted; and 
second, on the ‘public life’ of the recession and austerity with a particular emphasis 
on how, with little in the way of the routine fabric of public life ‘up’, normal 
appearances have largely persevered.  
The framework outlined in the previous two chapters posited a way to analyse how 
the imperatives associated with a front-stage crisis can be conferred legitimacy 
through resonating with the mood of the times, i.e. justifiable by shared beliefs and 
experiences. This chapter applies two aspects of this framework: first, the enactment 
of the debt crisis and, second, how its imperatives could be justified in light of the 
public life of the recession and austerity (i.e. the first of three parts of the mood of the 
times, as disaggregated in Chapter 3). The first section corresponds to this first aspect. 
Here I tentatively and indicatively apply the framework for crisis outlined in Chapter 
2 – crisis as an iterative and enacted process of problem definition, narration and 
decisive intervention – to show how the debt crisis was brought into existence. The 
purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of this process since it 
is not directly required in answering the primary research question of the thesis (how 
do everyday actors make sense of austerity?). The purpose instead is to highlight how 
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the debt crisis was enacted as such in order to provide some necessary background to 
how elite actors performed the debt crisis. This prior piece of analysis is required to 
understand what the imperatives of the debt crisis were, a necessary move in seeking 
to analyse how the mood resonated with them.  
The second and third sections then explicitly start the analysis of how the imperatives 
of this debt crisis resonated with one aspect of the mood: public life. The second 
section focuses first on exploring how a large quantity and range of private troubles 
have failed to translate into public issues because there has been a lack of mass 
privation as a shared experience. It then moves on to trace two possible critical events 
during the period – the run on Northern Rock and the English 2011 riots. I argue that 
for various reasons these experiences failed to be considered as symptomatic of a 
wider system failure nor did they essentially challenge the terms of the debt crisis. 
The third section explores the potential disturbance of normal appearances as reported 
in the focus group discussions. There were numerous anecdotes about private 
suffering but these rarely translated into public issues that engender the identification 
of a genuinely alternative crisis to that of debt. Nor did ‘normal appearances’ appear 
particularly disturbed in Goffman’s term, with quite a few ‘A group’ participants (i.e. 
middle-income homeowners) specifically invoking the image of normal life 
(especially consumption) continuing as normal (sometimes invoked through the trope 
of ‘but the restaurants are full’). The ‘B group’ participants (i.e. community 
volunteers) did discuss private troubles as public issues more frequently, but not to 
the extent that normal appearances were significantly disturbed. In this sense, the debt 
crisis resonated with the mood inasmuch that its imperatives are relatively 
incremental. My counterfactual suggestion is that the genuinely radical imperatives 
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associated with a more transformative crisis narrative would not have resonated with 
the mood.  
4.1 Enacting the debt crisis 
The aim of this section is to show how the debt crisis was enacted by tentatively 
applying the framework outlined at the beginning of Chapter 2. This is important for 
two reasons. First, in applying this framework I am able to make the basic claim that a 
debt crisis existed inasmuch that it was brought into existence through its enactment. 
While this may seem like a trivial point, it should be recalled how a significant 
amount of literature on austerity is dedicated to showing how the problem of state 
debt is merely a symptom of a different underlying disease (i.e. crisis). Second, it 
provides all-important context on how the Conservative-led Coalition enacted a debt 
crisis in order to justify and indeed render necessary spending cuts in the name of 
fiscal consolidation. Although ultimately a secondary concern, this is albeit a key part 
of answering the puzzle and research questions of the thesis. In the process of tracing 
the process of problem definition, narration and enactment it is shown how the debt 
crisis was presented via a very specific meaning of debt that is far from neutral. In 
doing so, I draw primarily although not exclusively on a small corpus of speeches 
from key Conservative figures on the topic of the economy1.  
Although difficult to separate in practice, the first part of the process of crisis 
enactment – problem definition – was largely dealt with in the course of outlining the 
politicisation of the fiscal deficit in Chapter 1. To recap, the fiscal deficit became 
                                                
1 I draw upon an analysis of 66 speeches delivered by current Prime Minister David Cameron and 
current Chancellor George Osborne on the subject of the economy from September 2007 until March 
2011. I took a grounded and pragmatic approach to discourse analysis. First, I generated themes (or 
‘codes’) through an initial reading of the corpus based on justifications for austerity. Second, I coded 
the corpus based on the themes. Thirdly, I reconstructed the causal story that underpinned the 
justification for austerity. While references to quoted extracts can be found in the bibliography, a list of 
the complete corpus considered can be found in Appendix 1.  
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politicised following the ‘success’ of the state intervention in propping up the 
financial system. Along with automatic stabilisers associated with recessions, this 
helped exacerbate the UK’s already weak public finances to the point at which, with 
the financial industry recovering, the fiscal deficit became a problem. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, the enactment of crisis is iterative. In other words, defining the problem 
often involves positing a story or narrative to account for and potentially resolve the 
problem. This period of interpretive battle involves a battle to convince others that a 
particular narrative of crisis convincingly accounts for the problem at hand.  
Tracing the content of key speeches, this process is relatively clear to see. If we 
rewind back to 2007 we find that the Conservative plan is to ‘support the [Labour] 
Government’s spending plans’ (Cameron 2007). A proto-debt crisis narrative began to 
emerge with claims that Conservatives would move beyond Labour’s ‘Age of 
Irresponsibility’ (Osborne 2008d: capitalisation in original). The simply stated 
medicine to this diagnosis of irresponsibility is to be found in vague claims to 
‘balance the budget’ and to ‘put sound money first’ (Osborne 2008d). The transition 
to a more recognisable debt crisis narrative, however, came with the public rebuttal of 
the previous primary Conservative economic strategy of ‘sharing the proceeds of 
growth’ (e.g. Cameron 2008b), which coincided with the wider politicisation of the 
fiscal deficit (see Chapter 1). The primary strategy emerges as an intention to start 
‘paying down the debt’ (Cameron 2009c). 
Which debt must we pay down, however? If we rewind to 2007, it seems that the 
answer is personal debt:  
Under Labour our economic growth has been built on a mountain of debt. And 
as any family with debts knows, higher debt makes us more vulnerable to the 
unexpected. […] In terms of personal debt we now owe more than our entire 
national income (Cameron 2007). 
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Come 2008 and the politicisation of the deficit, and Osborne is now incorporating the 
government into this problem of debt: Britain ‘borrowed and borrowed as if the party 
would never end.  Banks did.  Businesses did.  Families did.  And so did this 
government’ (Osborne 2008d). Most political and electoral strategists are however 
likely to sound caution over the benefits of blaming some aspects of ‘the debt’ on 
families living beyond their means2. This is perhaps one reason why in 2008 the 
narrative took a turn by identifying and incorporating personal, corporate and 
government debt as the problem, and pinning the blame for this on the doorstep of the 
Labour government.  
Consumer and household debt became increasingly less prominent in speeches in 
contrast to government debt and/or the deficit. Instead of presenting different forms of 
debt – consumer, household, government – the message hones in around ‘Labour’s 
recession’ (Cameron 2008e). ‘Labour’s Debt Crisis’ was not only a phrase used in 
speeches, but it was a genuine political campaign accompanied with an official launch 
and press conference (see Figure 4.1). Debt is increasingly collapsed into one 
homogenous category of ‘Labour’s Debt’: 
We're in this mess because of too much debt - too much government debt; too 
much corporate debt; too much personal debt. This is Labour's Debt Crisis, 
and it becomes clearer all the time that the scale of Britain's debts puts us in a 
much weaker position than other countries (Cameron 2009b). 
This was supplemented by the all-important causal link that posited Labour’s 
indulgence in unnecessary public spending as the cause of the debt crisis in which 
spending cuts are a necessary solution.  
                                                
2 David Cameron found this out the hard way, notably when his briefed 2011 conference speech 
contained the comment that ‘the only way out of a debt crisis is to deal with your debts. That means 
households – all of us – paying off the credit card and store card bills’. After a backlash from the press 
this was quickly altered before Cameron actually delivered the speech. 
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Figure 4.1 ‘Labour’s Debt Crisis’ campaign poster3 
It is within this context that Labour ‘bankrupted our country, [and] left a legacy of 
debts and cuts’ (Cameron 2010a) and ‘everybody knows that Labour’s Debt Crisis 
means public spending cuts’ (Cameron 2009a). Indeed, for David Cameron, ‘people 
understand by now that the debt crisis is the legacy of the last government’ (Cameron 
2010b). The use of the previous Labour government is more about the past and the 
exploitation of low political capital; it is about reconceptualising the state in a way 
that limits its possibilities through the household analogy. For instance, Labour in 
effect ‘borrowed and borrowed and borrowed on our nation's credit card’ (Osborne 
2010c), but the Conservatives ‘will make sure Britain starts ‘living within our means.’ 
This is what households up and down the country do’ (Cameron 2008c)4. Similarly, 
                                                
3 Source: http://www.conservatives.com [accessed November 2011] 
4 A similar analogy that was frequently drawn on in various speeches was the idea that Gordon Brown 
did not ‘fix the roof when the sun was shining’ (e.g. Osborne 2008a, 2010b). The implication is that 
because of Brown’s insistence and sincere belief that the era of ‘boom and bust’ was over (see 
  
 
138 
fiscal stimulus is presented as ‘merely extending an overdraft’ (Cameron 2008e). This 
comparison is more than invoking an emotive ideal of a financially-sound and well 
run household: the capacities of household finances constitute a prism for 
understanding the finances of the state which renders some strategies for dealing with 
recession and a fiscal deficit as ‘common-sense’. This sort of rhetoric was a key 
justification for spending cuts, along with the imperative of ensuring Britain’s 
international credibility (especially via comparisons with Greece). The household 
analogy plays a crucial part of the analysis and arguments of this thesis, especially in 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
The debt crisis was also constituted through a number of interventions, including but 
not limited to the Coalition Agreement and the creation of the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR). The agreement signed by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties in May 2010, not only institutionalises the primacy of cutting the 
budget deficit, with both parties explicitly agreeing to ‘recognise that deficit reduction, 
and continuing to ensure economic recovery, is the most urgent issue facing Britain’ 
(Cabinet Office 2010: 15), but it also performs (in an albeit weak fashion) the 
narrative of fiscal irresponsibility. This part of the agreement ‘performs’ the story of 
the fiscal responsibility; this process of enactment constitutes further evidence of the 
‘symptoms’ of crisis, and is consequently crucial to the process of crisis – especially 
its primary and foregrounded place in the agreement. In this sense, the OBR – tasked 
with making independent assessments of the public finances and the economy, the 
public sector balance sheet and the long-term sustainability of the public finances – is 
also important. As chancellor, Gordon Brown’s Treasury team were consistently 
                                                                                                                                      
Cameron 2008b) the Labour party were willing to build up a large structural deficit funded through 
increased borrowing because a downturn would never emerge. 
  
 
139 
accused of massaging forecasting figures to fit their end (e.g. Economist 2005). By 
creating an at-distance independent body that seeks to create objective forecasts, the 
coalition can avoid similar accusations and further close down debate. Furthermore, in 
the accompanying announcement, Osborne justified its creation through claiming that 
‘last year our budget deficit was the largest it has ever been in our peacetime history 
… This is the legacy of thirteen years of fiscal irresponsibility’ (Osborne 2010a). The 
sheer act of creating a body whose aim is to ensure ‘fiscal responsibility’ is a 
powerful statement on not just resolving, but actually entrenching an existing 
definition and purported cause of crisis. 
It has been well catalogued how a discourse of financial crisis slowly gave way to a 
sovereign debt discourse throughout this time period (Burnham 2011: 493), with a 
particular emphasis on the role of the Conservative party in that shift (Blyth 2013b: 
23). However, the media also plays an important part in constituting crises (e.g. Hay 
1996a). In this case, Iain Pirie (2012) has shown how media representations of the 
crisis shifted from a crisis of global finance to a crisis of national debt. While bankers 
continued to be both scrutinised and demonised, this had, by 2010, become secondary 
to the imperatives of cutting Labour’s fiscal deficit – an imperative which was rarely 
linked to the financial crisis (2012: 343). Pirie, however, is careful to avoid claiming 
that a Labour’s Debt Crisis narrative became totally dominant within the press. As he 
rightly points out, while left-wing newspapers such as the Guardian and Mirror 
rejected the narrative, the ‘important point is not that there is agreement on fiscal 
questions within the press, but that the public finances have come to dominate 
economic debates' (2012: 343).  
Pirie reminds us that while there was little escaping the increasing acceptance of the 
deficit and/or debt as the problem within mainstream debates, there was still room for 
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alternative diagnoses of the problem and thus alternative solutions. Labour’s initial 
claims that the deficit was cyclical, not structural, and have nothing to do with fiscal 
irresponsibility have been met with the seemingly very effective counter-claims of 
‘deficit denying’ (e.g. Osborne 2010c). Ed Balls, the shadow chancellor, then moved 
on to attacking the Coalition for prioritising austerity over growth. Perhaps aiming to 
invoke the kudos given to the Brown government’s 2008 fiscal stimulus plans by 
some progressive commentators (e.g. Krugman 2008), the ‘growth vs. austerity’ 
debate was filtered through the overarching debt crisis narrative. To argue that an 
economy in recession, but also ‘drowning in debt’, should be saved by spending more 
is, as Andrew Gamble says, ‘too clever by half’ (2012: 53) 5. Indeed, it is far more 
intuitive to argue that ‘embarking on a government borrowing binge to pay for tax 
cuts or spending increases is dishonest and unfair’ (Cameron 2008b). The simplicity 
of the debt crisis narrative is a clear political strength, and, as I show, its ability to 
resonate with the mood of the times was one reason for its ‘success’ in generating 
acquiescence from the population.  
The politicisation of the fiscal deficit (i.e. problem definition) and the widespread 
propagation of the debt crisis narrative by Coalition figures and the media (i.e. 
interpretive battle) rendered certain interventions as inevitable. As this brief analysis 
has shown, the Conservative-led diagnosis of a debt crisis has been far from neutral: 
they have specifically spoken in a moralised fashion about how a profligate and 
overblown public sector has, as essentially the source that has wrecked the British 
economy, reached a tipping point in which it must be cut back decisively. Living 
                                                
5 Yet, strangely, Labour have always been in ownership of a fiscal consolidation plan. The previous 
chancellor Alistair Darling’s plan, eventually adopted by shadow chancellor Ed Balls, was to cut the 
deficit in the time of two parliaments (i.e. twice as slow, theoretically, as the coalition). Yet this 
appears relatively ignored. When intrinsically bound up as culprits in the accepted version of events, it 
is hard for one to appear credible – even if the proposed plan may in theory be better suited to the 
situation. 
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within means is after all, as the narrative goes, what we expect decent households to 
do. Although linked by a singular problem and narrative, the intervention is thus 
multi-faceted: it involves enshrining deficit reduction as the core aim of the Coalition 
government, and it involves institutionalising ‘fiscal responsibility’ via the OBR and 
other mechanisms. It also involves widespread limits to spending across Whitehall. 
And although there have been conscious attempts by the government to reduce tax 
avoidance and evasion to some modest avail, they are perhaps reserving the most 
energy in reforming welfare.  
Welfare retrenchment has been at the centre of the attempt to install fiscal 
responsibility. Most notably, the coalition has accelerated the enforcement of 
conditionality and sanctions in the provision of welfare that were started by New 
Labour. For Slater (2013: 2), this represents the ‘most punitive welfare sanctions ever 
proposed by a British government’: for instance, unemployed people who refuse a 
first job or community work will be punished by a 3 month sanction, 6 months for a 
second, and 3 years for a third. Disability benefits have also been targeted, and the 
impact of retrenchment will inevitably disproportionately impact upon women (see 
MacLeavy 2011, Taylor-Gooby 2012, Annesley 2012). Yet despite Slater’s 
impassioned claim, most of the reforms – such as using Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
instead of the Retail Price Index (RPI) for inflation indexing and the ‘total benefit 
cap’6  – are essentially piecemeal. This 'chipping away' is consistent with Paul 
Pierson's (1994, 1996) argument that incremental change is the only possible route to 
welfare retrenchment. Crucially, this intervention runs parallel, in many ways, with 
the imperatives of the social crisis outlined in the second half of Chapter 1. The 
                                                
6 No out-of-work family of working age will receive more than £500 per week in total benefit 
payments and no single adult household will receive more than £350 (Rowlingson 2013). 
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interventions made in the name of solving the debt crisis may not have been decisive 
in the way Hay originally intended – i.e. triggering a structural transformation of the 
state – but they have been decidedly political. Despite the way in which these issues 
have played out in the UK, it must be remembered that fiscal consolidation is not 
merely synonymous with spending cuts – let alone synonymous with welfare 
retrenchment.  
Summary 
In this section, my modest aim was to tentatively show how a debt crisis was enacted 
through a process of problem definition, interpretive battle and intervention. One 
benefit of viewing a crisis in this way is that it explicitly foregrounds unpacking and 
understanding a crisis rather than imposing a symptom-disease distinction that invites 
scholars to reject crisis narratives as mere representations of a different underlying 
cause. In this sense, there is no doubt in the terms I have set out that there is a debt 
crisis (as opposed to a financial crisis, or a growth crisis). The debt crisis has been 
enacted on the back of a politicisation of debt, a narrative that blames Labour 
overspending for the rise of that debt, that posits spending cuts in the name of fiscal 
consolidation as the logical resolution. I have emphasised that there is however very 
little that is neutral about this process of crisis enactment, in particular the specific 
imposition of losses on welfare benefit recipients. The question that this thesis must 
now answer, however, is how the imperatives of this crisis could be justified via 
shared belief. The remainder of this chapter explores how the debt crisis resonated 
with one particular aspect of the mood of the times: the public life of recession. 
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4.2 The public life of recession and austerity 
4.2.1 Mass privation  
There is little doubt that since the onset of the economic downturn in 2008, many 
people in Britain have suffered personal hardship of various degrees. A report by 
Rowlingson and McKay points to how the 2012 real value of workers’ wages had 
fallen back to 2003 level, and that, furthermore, one in ten workers were classified as 
‘underemployed’ (2013: 12-3) – a rarely acknowledged problem that has obvious 
implications for unemployment statistics. In 2010-11 (the most recent data available), 
12 per cent of households were finding it either very or quite difficult to manage 
financially and a further 27 per cent were ‘just about getting by’ (Rowlingson and 
McKay 2013: 16-7). Unsurprisingly, the key groups that were finding it hardest to 
manage tended to be on the lowest incomes (Rowlingson and McKay 2013: 17). The 
work of David Stuckler and his collaborators, most famously including his co-
authored book The Body Economic (2013), sheds even more light on to the negative 
consequences of declining economic conditions and spending cuts on public health. In 
an analysis of 26 EU countries between 1970 and 2007, it has been shown that a rise 
in unemployment of 1% is associated with increases in suicides and murders (but 
decreases in road traffic deaths), whereas a rise of 3% or more was associated with 
further increased suicides and an increase in alcohol-related deaths (Stuckler et al. 
2009). Using time trend analysis, it has been demonstrated that an increase in suicides 
in England 2008-10 was significantly correlated with increased unemployment – with 
an estimated 1000 excess deaths attributable to this in the period (Barr et al. 2012).  
On a more general level, Ponticelli and Voth (2011) have convincingly demonstrated 
a link between falling public expenditure and social unrest (or ‘austerity and 
anarchy’). They hypothesise that fiscal consolidation leads to ‘CHAOS’ – an indicator 
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for social unrest including the sum of demonstrations, riots, strikes, assassinations, 
and attempted revolutions in a single year in each country. They are unclear on the 
mechanisms that lead to CHAOS (although perhaps Stuckler’s work reviewed above 
could give a clue). However, since their explanatory variable is continuous falling 
public expenditure, the predictions they make do not neatly apply to this case. Recall 
Chapter 1 where it was highlighted how the Coalition government had, in effect, 
introduced just one round of very serious spending cuts (alongside some moderate tax 
rises) in 2010 with each subsequent annual budget in 2011 being far more modest.  
Since 2008, there has been an increase in financial exclusion and personal suffering, 
with families struggling to survive – financially speaking – day-to-day living, as the 
exponential rise in the use of food banks highlights7. The consequences of recession – 
notably unemployment – have incredibly harmful ripple effects, including a rise in 
suicide. While this is truly awful, these private troubles have not really filtered into 
the public issues sufficient to disturb normal appearances on a collective level. In 
arguing that the routine social fabric of public life has not been sufficiently disturbed 
to create a mood in which a more transformative crisis could have been enacted, my 
aim is not to trivialise this suffering. Instead, it is to point out, from a sociological 
perspective, the peculiar non-disturbance of normal expectations since 2008.  
In the Goffmanian terms set out in Chapter 3, relatively little was ‘up’ during the 
years of 2008 beyond. Nick Srnicek (2011) makes this same point when discussing 
the abstraction of the global financial crisis: 
One of the oddities of the ongoing economic crisis is its apparent separation 
from everyday life. Consumers still consume, luxury items are still produced. 
Starbucks is still filled with coffee drinkers, and Apple still sells its overpriced 
                                                
7 According to data from the Trussel Trust, a UK food bank charity, the use of food banks increased by 
170% in the 12 months following April 2012 (Trussell Trust 2013). 
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goods. Scanning the media, one finds its coverage devoid of lengthy soup 
lines or surges in tent cities. While most have had to cut back on their 
indebtedness, there hasn’t been a collapse on the scale of the Great Depression. 
Srnicek really gets to the heart of a key understanding of crisis: an emergency event 
associated with visceral transformations of public space and the ‘routine texture of 
social life’ (Hay 1996a: 255). In pointing out the lack of ‘any bodily experience of the 
crisis’, Srnicek is invoking not the very visceral experiences of going to the food bank 
or committing suicide but is instead invoking the lack of a shared or intersubjective 
experience of emergency or exception. The phenomenology, or lived experience, of 
crisis has been decidedly abstract in a way that seems to fail to meet our academic 
and societal expectations of what a sufficiently serious crisis should feel like.  
That normalcy ensued throughout the years of the downturn, in the sense that little 
was up that created uncertainty in social fabric and expectations, is reflected in some 
secondary literature. A report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, conducted in mid-
early 2010, ‘aimed to explore what the downturn has meant for everyday lives and 
well-being … [and] at how everyday life had changed’ (Hossain et al. 2011: 9). 
Whilst the report found that some people were struggling with food prices and that 
local businesses were particularly hit, ‘the research uncovered no evidence that social 
cohesion had been adversely affected by the recession’ (Hossain et al. 2011: 5). 
Meanwhile, a similar report by the Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC) that 
focussed on perceptions about the crisis found that ‘the majority of people in the UK 
have been relatively unaffected in terms of experiencing real economic hardship’ 
(SIRC 2009: 6).  
Although Srnicek was discussing the abstraction of the global financial crisis, we can 
apply the general thrust of his analysis to the debt crisis too. As the next chapters look 
at in more detail, the debt and/or deficit is necessarily abstract in the sense that it is an 
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aggregated statistic of overwhelming and complex proportion. Consequently, it 
should be actively expected that in making sense of an intangible £Xbn deficit, 
wisdom and experience from everyday life will be utilised to reduce the complexity of 
this necessarily abstracted problem. Indeed, the experiences that tend to accompany 
debt crises are not of the debt crisis per se, but rather of the imposition of very 
stringent measures usually forced upon nations through structural adjustment 
programmes. In this vein, recall once again how there has only really been one 
austerity budget. Many of the cuts from this 2010 budget had yet to be properly 
implemented at the time of fieldwork in mid to late 20128, while the political effects 
of welfare consolidation have been narrowed by imposing losses on the most 
vulnerable and least politically organised.  
To reiterate, the point in this section has been to briefly illustrate how despite much 
private suffering, there was by at least 2012 little suggestion that this was likely to 
translate into a set of public issues that might reasonably disturb normal appearances. 
The reasons for this particular set of experiences are undoubtedly many, but what 
matters for our purposes is not really why this was so but that it contributed to a mood 
that constrained and enabled the legitimation of certain political imperatives. This is 
important for our purposes, since the degree of uncertainty that accompanies the sense 
of something being ‘up’ in public life means that differing interventions can be 
justified by shared belief in relation to the perceived seriousness of the experiences.  
                                                
8 As mentioned in the introduction, according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies ‘only 12% of the 
planned total cuts to public service spending, and just 6% of the cuts in current public service spending, 
will have been implemented by the end of [the 2011-12 financial year]’ [Source: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2012/12chap3.pdf]. 
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4.2.2 Critical events 
In this sub-section, I look at the role of two potentially critical events – the run on 
Northern Rock, and the 2011 English riots – in disturbing normal expectations. These 
were selected as the high-profile seemingly national events that were most likely to be 
experienced as symptomatic of a wider systemic fault. Drawing on the analyses of 
Hay (Hay 1996a) and Holland (2009) reviewed in Chapter 3, I suggest that despite 
being otherwise relatively unprecedented, these events reflect the wider public 
experience in that they failed to create a significant ‘void’ in the public lived 
experiences of the citizenry in which some sort of alternative to the basic imperatives 
of the debt crisis could legitimately be posed.  
Northern Rock run 
The run on Northern Rock in September 2007 was a key public and critical event of 
the crisis9. Significantly, it was the first significant run on a UK retail bank since 1866 
(Marshall et al. 2012: 157). On 13th September 2007, Northern Rock came to the 
attention of the public and authorities when it requested financial support from the 
Bank of England that was publicly granted the following day (Shin 2009: 101, 
Marshall et al. 2012: 161). These events led to the memorable image of ‘large queues 
of Northern Rock customers waiting, in increasingly agitated fashion, to close their 
accounts and withdraw their savings from the bank’ (Watson 2009b: 42). As Shin 
points out, however, what made this bank run different to both historical precedent 
and conventional economic models was that these events occurred after the Bank of 
England has announced its intervention to provide emergency support (Shin 2009: 
                                                
9 A discussion regarding the cause of Northern Rock’s failure is not relevant here (see Shin 2009, 
Marshall et al. 2012, Nesvetailova and Palan 2013), since what matters is the ‘event’ itself. 
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101-2) 10 . Indeed, it was only once the emergency liquidity facility had been 
announced that retail banking customers became concerned for the security of their 
deposits and savings11 (Marshall et al. 2012: 161). After many months of searching 
for a potential buyer, the Chancellor finally announced in February 2008 that 
Northern Rock would be nationalized (Marshall et al. 2012: 161). 
There is no doubt that the run on Northern Rock, as a public event, had a 
demonstrable impact in shifting the political agenda. Suddenly nationalizing a large 
financial institution in the country was not only a viable policy option but a necessary 
move to shore up the wider industry (Froud et al. 2010: 28). This was certainly the 
‘first sign that this was no ordinary crisis’ (Gamble 2010: 4). It was a shock to the 
normal expectations that money deposited in a bank was safe. However, while it made 
state intervention into the finance industry both possible and legitimate, the run never 
quite became symptomatic of a wider collective experience of system failure – 
perhaps because of the effectiveness of the very intervention the bank run legitimated. 
The seemingly contagion-like nature of ‘the crisis’ is important too. This latter point 
is highlighted by Kyle [Focus group A2]. In response to a discussion about the UK 
government debt and action compared to the US, he quips that ‘with Northern Rock 
you had people queuing outside of Northern Rock, [so] we took a slightly different 
view and we sort of spent all of our money on it’. The notion that fixing a banking 
crisis led to a fiscal crisis is more than implicit in this comment. That this was the 
                                                
10 Although it should be pointed out that Chancellor Alastair Darling did not formally guarantee all 
deposits until the 17th September (Marshall et al. 2012: 161). 
11 Interestingly, while the entire fall was £24.4bn to £10.5bn, Northern Rock accounts show that 
deposits in internet/telephone and branch accounts were the most intact following the bank run, while 
postal accounts and offshore (and other accounts) were more significantly dented (Shin 2009: 109). 
Thus, for Shin, ‘the media coverage of the Northern Rock bank run, showing images of depositors 
queuing at the branch offices, was ironic’ since they were the most stable (Shin 2009: 109). 
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only mention of Northern Rock in the entire focus group discussions is telling in and 
of itself.  
English 2011 riots 
In August 2011, unprecedented riots sprung up across cities and towns in England. 
The riots began, in earnest, following an otherwise peaceful protest in Tottenham on 
August 6th against the police killing of local resident Mark Duggan two days 
previously. Two police cars, a bus and several shops were then attacked, looted and 
set ablaze in Tottenham, and the anger soon spread to nearby Wood Green – and in 
the following days across London (Slater 2011: 107). Beyond London, significant 
riots occurred in other cities and towns including, significantly for our purposes here, 
Birmingham. Over 3000 people were arrested, and 1715 people were brought before 
the courts, of which 315 were convicted and sentenced (Slater 2011: 107). The most 
salient explanation for the riots within public discourse involved emphasizing the 
morality of those involved and blaming (in the words of Kenneth Clarke) the ‘feral 
underclass’ – which Prime Minister David Cameron contributed to when he attributed 
the riots to ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Briggs 2012: 27). Academics have, 
unsurprisingly, rallied against these interpretations. These alternative explanations 
include policing (Klein 2012), the ‘broken state’ (Slater 2011), post-politics and 
consumer subjectivities (Winlow and Hall 2012), and even a deeper Habermasian 
‘legitimation crisis’ (Angel 2012). 
Despite the potential pervasiveness of these accounts, it remains that the debate 
surrounding the riots was viewed through the lens of ongoing cultural politics – and 
was rarely seen as a symptom of economic crisis. Perhaps the dominant interpretation, 
the one that underpins the Clarke feral underclass thesis, is that the UK is suffering 
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from a ‘social recession’ – or, to invoke the more populist and right-wing vision, 
‘broken Britain’ (Finlayson 2010: 4, Jensen 2012). What ties the social recession and 
broken Britain explanations together is the identification of a social crisis of selfish 
individualism (see Chapter 1) – but whether the causes of this crisis is the result of a 
liberal rights-based culture and overbearing state, or the result of a neoliberal ideology, 
remains the key distinction (Finlayson 2010). This interpretation was consistent with 
the focus group discussions, where the few mentions of the riots were often brought 
forward in a social crisis context. Eric [Focus group B1], for instance, invoked the 
riots as a symptom of how contemporary youth struggle to engage with authority. 
Cultural values towards violent political protests may also play a role in this 
interpretation. Andronikidou and Kovras (2012), for instance, argue that Greece 
(unlike most European states) has a political culture that is particularly sympathetic 
towards political violence – a possible explanation for the relative acceptance of 
social unrest seen there. To make this point, they compare the statements made by 
politicians in both the UK and Greece:  
Consider the difference between the UK and Greece. In the aftermath of the 
2011 London riots, David Cameron stressed that ‘if you are old enough to 
commit these crimes, you are old enough to face the punishment’ (Guardian 
2011). In Greece, meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior said: ‘We prefer a 
police in a defensive position that effectively protects human rights, rather 
than adopting an aggressive stance that could harm an individual or, even 
worse, lead to another death’ (2012: 721). 
The riots were undoubtedly a national event. The crucial point, however, is that the 
underlying problems were deemed moral and not economic – and certainly not 
relating to austerity. The idea of a moral crisis is explored further in Chapter 7. 
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Summary 
This section has suggested that despite significant hardship and a couple of otherwise 
unprecedented public events, the period since 2008 has seen the perseverance of 
normal appearances in public life. With little ‘up’, this particular aspect of public life 
has contributed to a mood of overall and general inertia in respect to genuinely 
transformative change. The next section continues to explore the general perseverance 
of normal appearances, but this time specifically drawing on the experiences of 
middle-income homeowners and community volunteers as reported in the focus group 
data. 
4.3 Experiences of focus group participants 
The public life during the downtown and austerity was explored in the focus group 
discussions in two ways that emphasised both private troubles and public issues. To 
invoke the latter, participants were asked ‘if you were an alien dropped to earth today, 
would you know there is an economic crisis going on?’ To invoke the former, 
participants were implored to reflect upon how the crisis has changed their own lives. 
This line of questioning does, however, come with a health warning, since the 
inherent sociality of focus groups mean they are not a particularly appropriate method 
for exploring private issues (Hollander 2004). We need to be careful, then, about 
making any sort of quantitative or qualitative argument about private suffering of 
these sub-groups from this data – and instead ensure the focus remains on the 
intersubjective formation of public issues adequate to disturb normal appearances. 
Nevertheless, as the following highlights, participants shared many anecdotes of 
suffering and reflected concerns about uncertain futures, but tended to (especially the 
A groups) paint a picture of general public placidity. The experiences of crisis were 
perhaps where the biggest differences between the groups – A and B – were most 
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apparent. Consequently, the next section (4.1.2) analyses the A groups, while the 
following (4.1.3) analyses the B groups.  
4.3.1 Public humdrum, private troubles, uncertain futures 
Within the A groups, there was a sense that neither the recession nor austerity had 
made an immediate drastic impact to their current lives but that the future, especially 
in the public sector and in inter-generational housing issues, was uncertain. This was 
despite a number of anecdotes about ‘private troubles’: son laid off; participant unable 
to get a job, even part-time, despite best efforts; a good friend made redundant [Focus 
group A1]; self-employed partner income falling [Focus group A2]; husband 
unemployed because of recession [Focus group A3]; numerous friends made 
redundant; friends struggling in low-paid jobs [Focus group A4]. So the crisis 
experience, at least privately, was far from plain sailing and positive. However, with a 
few notable exceptions, these anecdotes were rarely extrapolated to make a wider 
point about a public crisis experience. Instead, the A group intersubjective experience 
seemed to be one of general mundaneness, with hardship and cuts falling somewhere 
outside of the middle, despite worries about the future.  
One popular motif was the notion that ‘restaurants are full’. This sort of experience 
was often hailed in the middle-income groups to reinforce the sense that, despite a 
recession, normal day-to-day life has remained routine and undisrupted – and, 
consequently, call into question, albeit discreetly, the impact of the recession. For 
instance, Lucy and Rachel both make reference to how their local flagship shopping 
centre is still ‘absolutely rammed’ and ‘rarely empty’ [Focus group A3]. Sometimes, 
Rachel adds, bad weather might keep people away ‘but you would never know there 
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is a recession’ [Focus group A3]. A similar discussion in a different focus group also 
illustrates the point: 
Jerry: Sometimes you can go up to town in Christmas, and the Bullring 
[shopping mall] is full – personally I hate it! Not my thing! – but, y’know, its 
absolutely teeming and you think ‘what recession?’ 
 [Focus group A1] 
Michael: But I do have to say … I think that coming to somewhere like this, 
it’s hard to see any real concrete signs that the nation is in trouble. I don’t 
know. We’ve got a good deli. We’ve got Piquant, a very nice curry house 
that’s doing well. You’ve got Maisy … every time I go in there it seems to be 
busy, but it’s the weekend. So maybe, I think, this is something I’ve thought 
about at work, people are still happy to pay for quality rather than … in certain 
areas. And save in other areas. But people have got to like certain things from 
their lifestyle before the recession and aren’t as willing to give that up so 
maybe give something else up. Something like maybe not drive the car as 
much, and y’know. I don’t know, it’s just a thought. 
Caitlin: When Costa coffee opened in Kings Heath, I thought oh I dunno. But 
it’s always full. So… 
Michael: From the first thing in the morning I’ve been in there and it’s… 
Caitlin: Everybody seems to spend on any amount of coffee… 
 [Focus group A4] 
This response perhaps reflects the implicit expectation that crisis should represent 
some sort of state of exception that generates uncertainty about public life. This 
reflects, we can speculate, collective memories of crises past, particularly perhaps the 
Winter of Discontent.  
In the middle-income groups, participants struggled to share instances of spending 
cuts in their local areas, often instead pointing to the emergence of new projects or the 
misspending of public money (the latter of which is taken up in more detail in the 
following chapters):  
Kyle: I’ve certainly not seen any austerity things necessarily. 
Duncan: They’ve spent money on the tip, haven’t they? 
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 [Focus group A2] 
Some participants also discussed how, as homeowners, they had benefitted from the 
combination of tracker-mortgage and low interest rates.  
While negative and austere experiences of crisis might have been infrequent in the 
middle-income areas in which these participants resided (‘Very little is affecting us at 
the moment’ [Michael, Focus group A4]), there were consistent reminders that ‘we’re 
quite protected, quite insulated’ [Lucy, Focus group A3] and that hard times are 
befalling a largely unspecified other area or space: 
Damien: the austerity measures so far have been worrying, negative, bad, and 
I would agree with [Jerry], again, that I think, if you like, middle class haven’t 
been as damaged as people below that level, so to speak. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Kyle: I haven’t seen anything like we suddenly haven’t got police on the street, 
or a firetruck doesn’t turn up, or the schools are shutting. All the things you 
see on the news don’t apply to Sutton as far as I can see. 
 [Focus group A2] 
For one participant, Jerry [Focus group A1] this led to some open soul-searching in 
which he bet ‘it’s hitting [a neighbouring poorer area] bad’ – a thought that can 
sometimes lead him to ‘feel guilty if I start moaning about it, because I am still in a 
job, and y’know, this is still a nice area to live in’. Most discussion about poorer areas 
being hit hard was sympathetic. 
The A groups did report some negative experiences. Many participants discussed how 
their income was being ‘squeezed’, how the cost of living was rising, and how taxes 
were rising12. Refrains such as ‘there’s less income around’ [Kyle, Focus group A2] 
and ‘I know my bills are going up’ [Mandy, Focus group A4] were common. Also 
common was a pessimistic uncertainty about what the future holds, which came out in 
                                                
12 This notion of a ‘squeezed middle’ is something that is taken up in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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two main ways. The first is an insecurity and subsequent uncertain future regarding 
employment, especially in the public sector. In a relatively long monologue, Jerry 
[Focus group A1] discusses in vivid detail the sense of unease and uncertainty held by 
those currently working in the public sector that are keenly aware of the threats to 
their jobs. He goes on to describe how despite not being told he is under threat, he has 
started realigning his financial behaviour and consumption in order to prepare for a 
rainy day. He makes a point of saying how he is desperately trying to pay off his 
mortgage, and finishes by pointing out that he believes these are common experiences. 
Denise directly replies, echoing the sentiments about mortgage repayments and job 
insecurity.  
The second way was through worries about the employment and housing prospects 
for future generations. Linda [Focus group A2] spoke at reasonable length about how 
she felt sorry for the ‘next generation’ and for ‘my kids’ because with good jobs so 
difficult to find it is hard to envisage how they are ever going to get on the property 
ladder. She concludes by commenting that ‘I think perhaps their generation are going 
to be the ones that are feeling more than we do’. Caitlin and Michael [Focus group 
A4], meanwhile, had a very similar conversation. After Caitlin had commented on her 
worry that her children will struggle to get on the housing ladder due to a lack of good 
jobs (and, indeed, an open worry that ‘he’ll just come home and live with us’), 
Michael agrees that ‘the future is more worrying’ since ‘there are no obvious signs 
that things are going to improve’. Interestingly, Caitlin was careful to point out that 
‘I’m not sure if it’s part of the austerity cuts really’, hinting that this was perhaps a 
long-term economic trend that was not directly attributable to the recent decisions of 
elite politicians.  
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4.3.2 Neglected areas, community resilience 
In addition to being squeezed and prospects of an uncertain future, the B groups 
provided far more anecdotes about both themselves and others in their community 
suffering during the downturn. Given that recessions adversely affect those worse off, 
this should not be a surprise. The answers took a very different form – with answers 
often pointing to suffering, neglect of the area, lack of funding or cuts to services, and 
youth unemployment – both in terms of public issues and private troubles. Although 
this could be because they had objectively suffered more than the A groups one 
reason for this, it should be stated upfront, is that some individuals in these groups 
were by definition more politically oriented due to their involvement in the local 
community. A few were clearly and understandably more keen to share their own 
experiences than the A groups. This is probably because they were aware of the 
political and ethical importance of sharing their experiences with an outside 
researcher in order to raise awareness. Such concerns did not seem to impact upon the 
A groups. 
Some participants in the B groups were clearly keen to recast private troubles as 
public issues, a process that was not frequently seen in the A groups. For instance:  
Lynn: I think a lot of people have been affected, but a lot of people don’t 
realise how. People can’t afford childcare, because there’s certain [inaudible] 
They don’t realise that this is part of the process of what’s going on right now, 
d’ya know what I mean? But I would think that we’re all affected. 
 [Focus group B1] 
In particular, there was a shared feeling that, as a consequence of neglect, their 
communities were suffering: 
May: I think there is a level of unemployment.  
Mary: Yes. 
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May: Which makes it very difficult … as you mentioned, the people feel 
neglected. I think so as well. Because of the unemployment issue and it’s like 
there is no one who cares about them, and I think they feel this way. 
Mary: The public spending often seems disproportionate sometimes. 
May: Yes. 
Mary: It’s not as if the whole of the area gets equal attention from the public 
bodies. 
[…] 
Claire: It’s like what they’ve done with [another area], amazing work over 
there, with all the parks and the houses and the estates they’ve built. But here, 
they’ve done nothing, nothing at all […] this end, we’ve got nothing, we have 
nothing. 
 [Focus group B2] 
Although talking of neglect was not strictly limited to the B groups13, it was certainly 
a feature of the discussion and, more widely, of their experience of the downturn. This 
sense of neglect was used to make sense of more specific experiences during the 
downturn – such as a lack of a community centre, or unfinished community projects. 
Yet despite these troubles to some extent translating into public issues, they were 
never presented as disturbing normal appearances of public life.  
Other than those few enthusiastic and politically motivated participants, these public 
issues were discussed with a degree of resignation despite the clear sense of 
unfairness. In some ways, this reflects the polling reviewed in the Introduction, in 
which the majority of public opinion considered the cuts unfair and so on but 
simultaneously reported them as necessary.  
There was also particular concern, given the socio-economic background of the 
participants, regarding changes to the welfare benefits system. For instance, some 
                                                
13 For instance, an A group participant discussing local investment: ‘You do wonder why that is, 
because people still choose to live here … But … people aren’t, or governments and councils or 
whatever, aren’t investing, so it’s not … keeping pace’ [Kyle, Focus group A2]. 
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participants openly worried about how people who are at least partially dependent on 
benefits will cope with less money in their pocket: 
Claire: It’s like what we’re saying, food’s gone up, petrol’s gone up, this has 
gone up … and benefits haven’t. So how are people surviving? Like you said, 
they’re just pulling together and cutting back because they have to. It’s 
gradually getting better.  
 [Focus group B2] 
There was also concern about how changes to the welfare benefit system had cynical 
intentions with harmful consequences, for instance:  
Linda: so the government piloted this scheme and said let’s send out this 
application form to poor people, and let’s see how many people we get off 
benefits. Well loads of people can’t handle the forms, so about 70% of people 
just came instantly off benefit […] when it did actually come over here, the 
stress of going through it with my mum – I had social services helping me, 
and other external [acronym] helping me – my mum had a relapse, and she 
even got put into hospital. So it’s really impacted. 
 [Focus group B1] 
The extent to which participants were concerned about others in their community 
suffering during the downturn – from benefits being cut, from unemployment, and so 
on – reflected in the passage above was also particularly evident in one discussion 
about the perceived rise in suicide [Focus group B1]. For Lynn, suicides had risen in 
the area ‘because it’s [the downturn/austerity] affected so many’. Linda and Rose 
agreed, commenting respectively on how it is becoming more common within their 
wider social groups. This discussion is particularly apt at highlighting the difference 
in tone between the A and B groups in discussing their experiences of the downturn, 
as well as offering perhaps some chilling anecdotal support for the empirical work of 
Stuckler reviewed above.  
Despite these discussions about hardship during the downturn and austerity, some 
participants (mostly in the B groups) focussed on some positive outcomes – 
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particularly on how the community had showed empowerment and resilience in 
coming together during hard times14. Some participants in the group adamantly put 
forward the case for making a difference on a collective and grassroots level: 
Lynn: Because you’re not going out there and saying ‘this is what I want to 
do’. Go out and speak to all your friends and actually stand up and say ‘we 
want this to happen’ and make it happen.  
Linda: If you go back to the original question, which is how have the cuts 
affected us. If you start to look at it you get angry, and you want to do 
something about it, but you really have to think about how these things are 
affecting us.  
Jilly: And what can we do about it? 
Lynn: An awful lot, when we stick together. 
 [Focus group B1] 
It is important, however, not to confuse this community empowerment with a form of 
genuinely radical politics. At times, as the following excerpt highlights, the 
empowerment theme was discussed in regard to the Conservatives’ ‘Big Society’ 
programme:  
Linda: You can see what is happening, what are we doing about it. Because 
what’s clear to see is that this government has got one mindset and that is kind 
of like, do it for yourself. If you want it, do it. And all your local services, all 
your charities. If it’s important to you, then set it up yourself. And that, is 
helping us, but they’re allowing us, showing us that there is actually a way. 
But we’ve got to be the ones to come forward, together, and actually make it 
happen. 
 [Focus group B1] 
This resilience was interesting. Although it is hard to represent with the transcript data, 
Linda and Lynn’s interventions seemed to rub some other participants up the wrong 
way. Furthermore, on the one hand it was refreshing to hear about the potential power 
of communities to change lives – especially given the explicit apathy shown by other 
                                                
14 The importance and salience of community in the B groups was stark in comparison to the A groups. 
This could, however, be down to the nature of the specific group interviewed as opposed to a general 
disposition of the wider community.  
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participants in the group – with examples given of how a difference was made in the 
past. On the other hand, however, the increasingly prominent ‘resilience’ policy and 
academic discourse has been criticised for being the other side of the undeserving 
poor coin in which impoverished people are unrealistically expected to ‘bounce back’ 
(Harrison 2013). These discussions reflected both sides of this coin.  
In the other B group, there was less empowerment discussion, but issues of 
community resilience were still very much foregrounded.  Participants were at pains 
to paint the community in a certain way: ‘There’s quite a strong bond in the 
community … People pull together to help each other here’ [Jamie, Focus group B2]. 
Moreover:  
Mary: I think there is. I think there’s a strong pride in the area that is anchored 
by a strong wish for things in the area. And people are actually prepared to 
give their free time and effort to try and make these things happen. I think 
there’s a lot of that in the area. I encounter a lot of it anyway.  
 [Focus group B2] 
There was also a shared perception that the recession had actually made the 
community stronger as it forced people to be resilient: 
Mary: It’s almost as if the recession has caused people to pull together and 
develop coping strategies. 
Claire: Yeah, that’s right.  
Mary: I mean, people are managing by and large. I know … there some 
people that are desperate, I know that. But there are everywhere. But by and 
large people are finding ways to manage. 
Jo: Or adapting to it.  
Mary: Perhaps we’re becoming cleverer with our money, we’re not wasting 
as much as we might have done before [widespread agreement]. So maybe in 
some ways it’s a good thing, maybe we’re learning skills that will last through 
the better times as well. 
 [Focus group B2] 
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One group even went as far as to suggest that middle-income people would be worse 
off because they, unlike the ‘working class’ who have a ‘stronger mindset’, have a 
‘high height for them to fall’ because they are used to a ‘certain lifestyle’ [Shauna, 
Focus group B1]. 
Summary 
The focus group discussions highlight two divergent experiences of crisis. On the one 
hand, although the A groups shared anecdotes about private troubles and worries 
about future precariousness, they also frequently questioned the severity of the public 
life of the recession and austerity by invoking the image of ‘full restaurants’. On the 
other hand, the B groups reported on how their local areas were underfunded and 
openly worried about the prospects for many of their fellow residents, but they also 
highlighted the capacity of community spirit and the potential for resilience in hard 
times.  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter started by showing how the debt crisis that renders spending cuts 
necessary was enacted on the back of the politicisation of ‘the debt’, a particular 
narrative that pinned the blame of this on past government profligacy, and a number 
of logically inferred but highly political interventions. Although analysing the basic 
contours of this process of crisis enactment is illustrative, it is quite limited in the 
specific terms of addressing the key puzzle of austerity acquiescence and the primary 
research question (how do everyday actors make sense of austerity?) of this thesis. In 
particular, such an analysis – even if extended to a sufficient depth and breadth to 
adequately provide data to underpin an entire thesis worth of analysis – is limited in 
what it can tell us about the process of legitimation – without, that is, reproducing 
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either the issues of legitimation-by-proclamation or methodological elitism/proxies 
critiqued in Chapter 2. It is for this reason this thesis is spending considerable time 
analysing how the imperatives of the debt crisis resonated with the mood of the times. 
The second and third parts of this chapter were specifically geared to starting this 
analysis, by focussing on one of three aspects of the mood of the times. In Chapter 3, 
I made a distinction between private troubles and intersubjectively formed or socially 
constructed public issues. Mass privation, critical events, or specific sub-group 
experiences may all feed into public issues – all three of which were explored in the 
second and third sections of this chapter. The key shift is the extent to which they 
sufficiently disturb normal appearances to give a shared sense of systematic collapse 
and failure. If these experiences can be narrated as symptomatic of, in Habermas’ 
terms, a ‘social-integration’ failure then there may be a mood for radical change. 
However, I’ve argued that during and beyond the downturn of 2008 and the beginning 
of austerity in 2010, the normal appearances of public life were not sufficiently 
disturbed in this sense. In spite of much private suffering, there was not a sense that 
the basic fabric of society was being called into question as a result of the shared 
public experiences of 2008 and beyond. Consequently, this contributed to a mood of 
relative inertia that helped ensure austerity and its imperatives could be justified by 
shared belief. With the normal appearances of public life relatively undisturbed, it 
meant the mood was more receptive to spending cuts than it might have otherwise 
been.   
However, the analysis of how the imperatives of the debt crisis resonated with the 
mood of the times has only just started. The next two chapters look at the other two 
parts of this disaggregated concept, starting immediately with the next chapter that 
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analyses the extent to which the sense-making processes of the focus group 
participants ensured austerity resonated.  
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Chapter 5. ‘We’re reaping what we sowed’: Everyday 
debt crisis narratives   
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses how focus group participants narrated crisis. It analyses how 
crisis and the spending cuts are made sense of, put in narrative form, and what this 
tells us about acquiescence to austerity. This chapter continues the process, started in 
the latter half the previous chapter, of analysing how the imperatives of the debt crisis 
resonated with the mood of the times. Here, specific attention is on the second of the 
three parts of the mood: sense-making. As outlined in Chapter 3, people generally 
make sense of political issues through popular wisdom (i.e. rules of thumb and 
analogies to everyday life situations) and experiential knowledge (i.e. anecdotes from 
primary experience and secondary sources that make a wider point). From applying 
this, I show that although as academics we tend to think of the debt crisis as a 
condition that afflicts the state and larger fiscal issues, for the focus group participants 
it meant something more. While all groups did identify, when probed, debt as the 
problem or crisis facing the UK, they drew upon their own wisdom and experiences to 
support the claim. As a result, the meaning of austerity encompassed both states and 
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households, and thus went far beyond just the politics of spending cuts or the strategy 
of fiscal consolidation.  
There were two processes in which this sense making occurred. First, when debt was 
put forward as the problem most participants would have known that this was in the 
context of the state (given the information and preamble they received). Yet, most 
participants would know much more about household debt on account of their 
everyday lives, so tended to draw upon that wisdom (e.g. rules of thumb) and those 
experiences (especially of financialisation and the credit crunch) almost as if it were a 
cognitive heuristic along the lines of the much maligned household analogy. This 
sense making process tends to produce acquiescence to austerity because it renders 
spending cuts in the name of debt reduction as a straightforward and common-sense 
response to living beyond means.  
Second, the debt crisis was often seen as an ambiguous moral obligation. While the 
mechanisms of state and household finances may significantly differ, this pales into 
insignificance when we consider that it was merely wrong for the state to consistently 
live beyond its means before the crash because like an indebted household puts the 
family at (financial) risk, the indebted state puts the population at risk. Similarly, this 
means that the population must take some of the pain for the necessary asceticism 
since ‘we’ were all complicit in the boom years. It is hard to distinguish between 
these two processes, but this is merely one useful way of breaking down and 
analysing the sense making processes seen in the data.  
The chapter is split into two sections. The first focuses on how participants 
consistently identified debt as a problem. In making sense of this problem, they 
typically spoke of debt as an ambiguous moral obligation facing the UK as a whole, 
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which decidedly impacted upon how they acquiesced to the imperative of fiscal 
consolidation. The second section briefly considers the alternative crisis narratives 
produced in the focus group discussions. It looks at both alternatives to the debt crisis, 
as well as more radical alternative narratives to capitalism itself.  
5.1 Narrating austerity 
Paul: Austerity is being spun, and it is being played on our individual, almost 
puritan feelings of it if you don’t earn it you [don’t] deserve it … It’s very 
deep seated, and it’s played on all the time - You just feel really guilty. 
Jerry: I really share all your feelings of suspicion about how we’re being sold 
austerity … and yet, I think there’s a hard, hard reality for us as a country if 
every single [pound] we bring in [inaudible] that’s what a structural deficit 
means, then at some point we would have to face a choice between making 
cuts or not paying the debts […] The hard economic reality is that we 
probably do have to pay off the debt which means we probably do have to 
spend less. 
[Focus group A1] 
Living within means is the key justification for spending cuts. As Chapter 1 
highlighted, the fiscal deficit and/or debt is the central battleground and point of 
contention within the politics of austerity. However, a fiscal deficit, albeit a 
historically large example, does not arrive empty of meaning or naturally in ‘crisis’ 
demanding a specific intervention. Indeed, the debt crisis narrative managed to 
constitute the fiscal deficit within a specific causal story: the deficit was caused by 
previous governments overspending, in which the only solution is to cut back that 
systematic over-spending in the form of cuts to welfare and state provisions. This 
section explores what the everyday sense-making process can tell us about austerity 
acquiescence. How the deficit/debt is discussed is key: if discussions subscribe to the 
basic tenets of the debt crisis narrative then we can be confident that participants will 
tend to acquiesce to the necessity of spending cuts.  
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The basic aim of this section is to unpack what debt and the deficit mean to the 
participants in order to gain a fuller understanding of this justification and wider 
process of acquiescence. It is underpinned by two questions: Do participants identify 
the crisis as one of debt? And if so, what is the meaning and narrative of this debt 
crisis? As the section epigram highlights, some participants were cynical of the ‘spin’ 
but still produced similar acquiescent narratives. We start by looking at how debt was 
often put forward as both a source and symptom of crisis, followed by sections on 
debt as an ambiguous moral obligation and the notion that the UK was ‘living beyond 
its means’ in the years and decades leading up the recent crisis.  
5.1.1 Debt crisis, state as household 
Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, all focus groups identified debt as a central 
problem or crisis condition. The extent to which ‘debt’ was related to crisis was 
positioned differently. Sometimes it was positioned as a source (e.g. ‘personally I 
think that for years and years the country as a whole has borrowed too much money’ 
[Caitlin, focus group A4]), and sometimes as an unspecified condition (e.g. ‘the 
country is in debt’ [Rose, focus group B1]). Regardless, what is significant is the 
extent to which debt was placed within a causal story that justified an intervention. 
The groups, however, differed in the specific production of these narratives. The B 
groups were, in some ways, as quiescent as the A groups but without producing the 
same detailed stories and justifications. These B groups, with the exception of one or 
two individuals who did not directly contest the terms of the debt crisis per se (see 
next section), identified debt as the problem in a matter of fact manner without 
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sustained collective deliberation1. In contrast, the production of these crisis narratives, 
and thus acquiescence to ‘dealing with the deficit’, was far more explicit in the A 
groups. Although there was some limited discussion from individuals about whom the 
debt is owed to or whether businesses should contribute more, the shared conclusion 
that one should cut back because of debt was fairly consistent.  
Yet looking over the examples of how each group identified debt as the problem, it is 
striking just how ambiguous and far-reaching the understandings of debt are, even just 
in these short excerpts:  
Jerry: When you asked ‘do we need to cut back?’… I think we do. I think we 
have a structural deficit, which means we’re making less every year, so I think 
we do. I accept the argument, as much as I hate them [the government] for that. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Kyle: I don’t know how else you do it [reduce the deficit through spending 
cuts], because if you do it … the only other way is taxation. I just think if you 
tax us anymore we’re already bleeding dry. 
Nicholas: I tend to agree with that. 
Linda: Yes. 
[Focus group A2] 
Sarah: I think they [the spending cuts] are necessary. 
Rachel: I think we need to claw back somewhere … no doubt about that. 
Lucy: I think probably, yes … the deficit should be partly made up from 
elsewhere – like very profitable businesses. I think people who make a lot of 
money should be made to have a bit more of a social conscience.  
[Focus group A3] 
Caitlin: They’re [bankers] nothing fantastic. They’re one the reasons we’re in 
the mess we are. I think, y’know, I think I’d say we’d go and start fresh really. 
Interviewer: What is the mess we’re in? 
                                                
1 However, these groups, while quiescent and cynical about the potential for change at an elite-political 
level, were far more positive about the potential for grassroots community-based change – which itself 
may be a reflection of the recruitment strategy outlined above. 
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Caitlin: I think we’ve got too much debt. 
 [Focus group A4] 
Interviewer: Why now? Why have the government suddenly decided that 
they want to save so much money? 
Felix: Well, the banking issue was a big issue wasn’t it. 
Jilly: They’re saying it was the debt. 
Rose: The country is in debt. 
Felix: …misappropriation has gone somehow, they are responsible for that. 
Rose: They don’t like us being in debt, do they? The Conservatives don’t like 
the country being in debt. 
 [Focus group B1] 
Mary: An interesting question [‘what is the ‘problem’ with the UK?’]. I don’t 
think there’s a single-word answer for it.  
Jo: Everything. That’s a single-word answer.  
Laughter  
Mary: Debt is a problem.  
Jo: Yeah.  
Mary: And y’know […] whether you go from individuals, to nations, to the 
globe. Debt is a problem […] [and] essentially you cut back on spending, but 
you have to do some spending to generate more income. So it’s finding that 
balance isn’t it. 
 [Focus group B2] 
In some of these examples, it is very clearly the fiscal deficit that is the problem, and 
little else, which suggests certain imperatives. In other examples, however, it is not 
clearly this issue at stake. Rather, it is debt per se. ‘We, Caitlin says, ‘have too much 
debt’. For Mary, debt is a problem, ‘from individuals, to nations, to the globe’. In 
these examples, it is less clear that the fiscal deficit is the problem.  
This ambiguity is striking. In a sense, this reflects the ‘Labour’s Debt Crisis’ narrative 
analysed in Chapter 2, where many forms of debts were positioned by leading 
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Conservative figures as problematic. What matters at this moment is that although the 
debt crisis was ambiguous in this sense, all focus groups did speak at some point of 
the necessity of cutting public spending in order to reduce a deficit typically caused 
by profligacy (whether that is through welfare, bank bailouts, or something else 
entirely). Identifying the problem of debt is significant in and of itself. This is for the 
simple reason that if one believes that debt is a problem – in the sense that a turning 
point has emerged in which those obligations are becoming a serious burden – then 
the only imaginable solution (bar bankruptcy) is to start reducing this burden through 
making hefty repayments (e.g. Lynn: ‘there’s a lot of debt and that we need to reduce 
the deficit’ [Focus group B1]). For most people, an arbitrary rise in revenue to fund 
this is likely to be fanciful, and indeed common sense suggests that re-budgeting to 
cut spending to free up spare cash is the best method. There were some other notable 
things about this talk of a debt crisis. 
First, we might expect following the Conservative narrative that Labour would be 
blamed. To the contrary, although it did occur at times it was reasonably rare for the 
role of Labour profligacy to be directly discussed, let alone blamed. Politicians 
instead tended to be considered as one group, almost exclusively discussed in 
derogatory terms (which is briefly discussed in Chapter 6). One potential reason for 
this may be that participants were eager to avoid confrontation with supporters of a 
party they talk down. Nevertheless, when the role of Labour was discussed, 
evaluations of their fiscal policy was mixed. Unprompted on the topic of Labour’s 
legacy, Lynn [Focus group B1) argued that the debt came from bailing out bankers – 
and she was adamant that this was a good decision taken by Brown in the long-term 
interest of the country. Yet later on, Rose sarcastically encouraged the group to vote 
Labour, who ‘gave away money left, right, and centre’ to the undeserving poor (again, 
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see Chapter 6). While the A2 group discussed Liam Byrne’s infamous note (Duncan: 
‘They [Labour] spent a lot, y’know. We can’t go on like that, we just can’t’ [Focus 
group A2]), the mood was perhaps best captured here: 
Peter: But I do get annoying with the politicians blaming each other, when it 
was a global thing that started off in the States. And they say ‘Oh, it was 
Labour’s folly’. That was just part of the whole system. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Damien: I’m not usually political, but from whatever political background 
people have come from, I think, the politicians have to take a big 
responsibility for not taking … for not foreseeing the possibilities of the 
collapse. 
  [Focus group A1] 
As Chapter 6 explores further, there was a sense that an immoral elite comprising of 
politicians, regulators and bankers were to blame for the ills at hand. This 
homogenisation of politicians as a single group had other implications. Notably there 
was often contestation and cynicism towards how austerity was being presented (‘it’s 
all crap’, as Peter [Focus group A1] put it). Yet, crucially, the participants still, on the 
whole, tended to reach the same conclusions regarding the imperatives of the debt 
crisis themselves using other sources of justification. This raises the question of how 
this particular meaning of crisis was generated; or, what resources were used in the 
production of this story? In this sense, the technical differences between debt and 
deficit – let alone between structural and cyclical deficits – tended to be ignored. In 
everyday parlance, a fiscal deficit is very much a debt – an overdraft, perhaps – as 
official state debt is. This brings up the thorny issue of the ‘household analogy’.  
Something akin to this analogous reasoning was frequent in some form or another. 
This is notable, since many members of the coalition government have come under 
criticism for consistently invoking this analogous reasoning – understanding the 
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finances of the state as if it were a household – when communicating the necessity of 
fiscal consolidation. The use of this analogy has garnered attention because it 
excludes Keynesian counter-cyclical deficit-fuelled stimulus from the imagination. 
Subsequently, for those on the left the use of this analogous thinking is a disingenuous 
device that is ideological in nature. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg’s 2010 
conference speech was, for instance, partly scrutinised by both commentators and 
bloggers for containing the ‘simplistic nonsense of comparing a governmental deficit 
with household debt’ (Engel 2010). On a more general level, Paul Krugman (2012) 
argues that showing the inaccuracy of the household analogy highlights how ‘the 
austerity drive in Britain isn’t really about debt and deficits at all; it’s about using 
deficit panic as an excuse to dismantle social programs’.  
This debate is thus of paramount importance. Although the impact of this elite 
rhetoric on the views of the mass audience is presumably part of what makes the 
household analogy of both political and analytical interest, this issue of audience is 
rarely explicitly raised in these discussions. Instead, the main aim has been to rightly 
discredit the analogous reasoning, without (necessary, for this thesis) recourse to 
reflect upon how, if at all, such a view actually works in the imagination of the public. 
If the public follow the Conservative lead and indeed use the economics and 
sensibilities of household budgetary management as a prism with which they make 
sense of the state and related imperatives of the debt crisis, then spending cuts would 
seem overwhelmingly necessary.  
The excerpts below are all potential examples of the supposed household analogy in 
action: 
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Nicholas: We should have a special mention for our politicians too. Because 
they were doing the same thing, borrowing money they couldn’t afford to pay 
back. 
 [Focus group A2] 
Kyle: [on being asked why the UK is introducing spending cuts] I mean the 
way you take the current government – I think the last one was probably 
getting there – is that all of a sudden they couldn’t afford, y’know, they were 
paying out more every month than was coming in weren’t they? The cost of 
borrowing was going up and up, and they realised they couldn’t do it anymore. 
  [Focus group A2] 
Claire: National debt? 
Mary: I don’t know. You can’t tackle it in one way. Yes you cut down on 
what you spend out, but you’ve also got to spend … 
Claire: As you say, that’s hard, yes. 
Mary: I saved for my retirement. So yeah that meant maybe when I was 
working spending a little less. But I then spent what I saved to create the 
income for now. And it is a balance. If the nation – if the government [didn’t] 
put any investment into its workforce, then that workforce can’t generate the 
income to pay the taxes to give the government to reduce the debt.  
 [Focus group B2] 
Despite using some form of household analogous reasoning, all three of these 
excerpts are slightly different. The first excerpt compares the plight of households and 
states in terms of a general narrative about how both failed to live within their means 
in the lead up to the crisis (this notion was common in the discussions, and is explored 
below). The second, meanwhile, explains fiscal consolidation in a manner that is 
consistent with a household (i.e. monthly in-goings and out-goings, and the 
assumption that fiscal deficit signals that government finances are inherently 
problematic). The third, meanwhile, is slightly different. The mechanics of sense 
making are more apparent. On the one hand, this latter excerpt shows how in a 
discussion about national debt it did not take long for Mary to bring up an illustrative 
anecdote about her own financial practices to make a wider point about the state. 
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However, it also shows that the analogy or heuristic does not necessarily generate 
austerity acquiescence. For here, Mary is very carefully trying to avoid going down 
such a route, instead purposefully accentuating the role of government intervention in 
generating productivity in order to maximise revenues – something that a household, 
of course, cannot do. Nevertheless, this might be the exception that proves the rule. 
To fully understand what is at stake in this discussion, we need to start by unpacking 
the concept of debt further.  
5.1.2 Debt as an ambiguous moral obligation 
In the focus group discussions debt was loaded with meaning. This is not particularly 
noteworthy in and of itself. From the perspective I take in this thesis, virtually 
everything is saturated with meaning to be explored. What is noteworthy is the 
specific content of this meaning, which decisively underpins how the imperatives of 
the debt crisis are interpreted and contested. As I will show in this section, debt 
tended to signify, especially amongst the A groups, an ambiguous moral obligation.  
We typically associate debt, especially when we place our political economy hats on, 
with the consequences of impersonal financial instruments and sovereign bond 
markets. Many have shown, however, that there is much beyond that, since debt can 
be traced as a historically embedded moral obligation. Frederick Nietzsche argued 
that the modern Western concept of morality was founded upon extracting debt under 
the threat of violence, highlighting along the way (for our purposes here) the 
relationship between debt and guilt. In his second essay in On the Genealogy of 
Morals (2007 [1887]), Nietzsche asks about the origins of the ‘bad consciousness’ by 
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looking at the ‘long history of the origins of responsibility’ (GM II:2) 2. He argues that 
the establishment of society and peace led to the ‘internalisation of man’ in which 
animal instincts – to be barbaric, for instance – became suspended, devalued, and, 
ultimately, turned inward in a ‘painful’ matter. This was the beginning of debt as a 
moral obligation: in a society where one is deemed generally equal with others of the 
same stature, it is generally unacceptable to act barbarically towards others (thus 
contravening the animal instincts). When one hurts someone else, the perpetrator is 
then in debt to the victim. The victim has the right to retaliate or demand some form 
of compensation, while the perpetrator has an obligation to provide it in order to 
restore the equality that was betrayed by the act of violence. Since these barbaric 
instincts should be suspended due to the rise of society, this means that violence is 
considered a choice – something the perpetrator must live with when foregoing 
compensation. It is this that makes it hurt, and is what (in Nietzsche’s writing at least) 
gives rise to the feeling of guilt3 (Ridley 2005: 37).  
One of Nietzsche’s easier to grasp and less controversial contributions, however, is to 
point out how, in German, debt and guilt are essentially the same word: ‘the main 
moral concept ‘Schuld’ (‘guilt’) descends from the very material concept of 
‘Schulden’ (‘debts’)’ (GM II:4). This etymological insight is often used, justifiably so, 
to highlight the seemingly inherent morality of debt. According to David Graeber, this 
morality of debt is so common that it is banal: ‘its most obvious manifestation is that 
mostly everywhere, one finds that the majority of human beings [hold that] paying 
back money one has borrowed is a simple matter of morality’ (Graeber 2011: 8-9). 
                                                
2 This outline is based on the original text, supplemented by secondary literature (Ansell-Pearson 2007, 
Dodd 2012, Graeber 2011, Ridley 2005, Risse 2001, Smith 1975, Zamosc 2012).  
3 This, for Nietzsche, is the origin of guilt, and is also apparent in how ‘man’ becomes indebted to both 
ancestors and God. This informs Nietzsche’s account of Christianity: ‘how a sense of debt is 
transformed into an abiding sense of guilt, and guilt to self-loathing, and self-loathing to self-torture’ 
(Graeber 2011: 79). 
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Graeber’s (2011) Debt: The First 5,000 Years is indeed a dazzlingly detailed and 
exceptionally incisive history of debt. In highlighting the dangerous banality of debt 
as a moral obligation, Graeber recounts an illuminating conversation with an attorney 
on the topic of the global justice movement. When Graeber explains that one of the 
main aims of the movement was to cancel Third World debt, the sympathetic but 
inquisitive lawyer objects: ‘But they’d borrowed the money! Surely one has to pay 
one’s debts.’ For Graeber, the interesting thing about this objection was the self-
evident nature of the statement itself: ‘the very assumption that debts have to be 
repaid’ (2011: 3). He goes on:  
The reason it’s so powerful is that it’s not actually an economic statement: it’s a 
moral statement. After all, isn’t paying one’s debts what morality is supposed to be 
all about? Giving people what is due them. Accepting one’s responsibilities. 
Fulfilling one’s obligations to others, just as one would expect them to fulfil their 
obligations to you (2011: 4). 
Debt is founded on a form of precise calculation that demands equivalence and is by 
nature abstract and context-free (2011: 386). A debt is a debt. Context, or, indeed, a 
decent excuse, does not matter: ‘one pays one’s debts’. It is these foundations that 
lead to the assumption that ‘personal debt is ultimately a matter of self-indulgence, a 
sin against one’s loved ones – and therefore, that redemption must necessarily be a 
matter of purging and restoration of ascetic self-denial’ (2011: 379).  
The morality of debt was manifested in popular wisdom in the focus group 
discussions, as apparent in the ‘one pays ones’ debts’ obligation rule of thumb and the 
‘one lives within one’s means’ prudence rule of thumb. The inherent morality of debt 
was mostly an unspoken assumption in the focus group discussions, implicitly hailed 
every time someone made oblique references to the necessity of paying back debts 
and/or reducing the fiscal deficit. It was more explicitly referenced when participants 
spoke of a past prudence now lost (see next sub-section). One group, however, 
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discussed and contested this popular wisdom at length. Their resistance to the popular 
wisdom of prudence and obligation, is in many ways indicative of how engrained it is: 
Paul: I think this thing about paying the debts, it’s very interesting. Because it 
works at different levels. For me, it works on a personal level, then I rebel 
against it. On a personal level, I wanted a bike. My mum said, if you want a 
bike, mate, you save up for it, you get what you earn. And there’s a little bit 
deep down in me that says that’s the world: you get what you earn. So if 
someone says ‘We spent too much, we have to pay off the debt’ – well, oh, 
okay, we’re naughty, we shouldn’t spend so much. But there’s another part of 
me that says ‘you know what? Are they just conning us? Are they just 
protecting their assets? Bankers saying yes you suffer, because we made 
mistakes. And everyone of us is thinking ‘oh yes, we should earn more than 
we spend’ and then you think ‘I have a mortgage, and if I had to save up and 
say here’s a 100% of what this house is worth, here you are’ then you would 
never buy a house. But we live with managing our debts. I don’t get paid until 
the end of the month, so I [inaudible] they give me … that’s the way it works. 
[…] 
Paul: The way the government is selling it as ‘oh, you shouldn’t pay for things 
you haven’t earned’ – I have to step back from this and think: this worked 
when I was 7 but it doesn’t actually work now because our lives are built 
around credit. 
Denise: I was brought up to believe that you should save it up. But at the same 
time you need credit to buy a house. 
Damien: I’m also very much influenced by my upbringing … If you want 
something, you wait … We’ve moved away from this basic creed.  
[Focus group A1] 
One participant in particular, Jerry [Focus group A1], was adamant that the necessity 
of spending cuts was an economic and not moral issue:   
Jerry: ...we must pay our debts to move forward, economically, but I have no 
moral feelings about paying our debts. Because I think, who are we paying 
these debts to? Rich bankers, with tonnes of money, and shareholders. That’s 
who you’re paying the debt to. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Jerry, however, still appealed to the basic and widespread logic that the UK had to cut 
its deficit: ‘The hard economic reality is that we probably do have to pay off the debt 
which means we probably do have to spend less’. On the back of Graeber’s 
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intervention, we could contest just how economic this imperative really is – but 
perhaps what matters is the purposeful rejection of moral reasoning itself, even if the 
historical sources of that ‘economic’ logic may well be moral anyway.  
This popular wisdom of obligation and prudence, as well as the household analogy, 
was consistently drawn upon by Conservative actors in telling a causal story about the 
rise of the fiscal deficit. As David Cameron explains: 
A Conservative Government will make sure Britain starts ‘living within our means.’ 
This is what households up and down the country do. When people get a pay rise, 
they don’t go and spend it all at once and then go to the bank manager asking for 
more money. They spend some – and put some aside in the kitty. We should expect 
the same from government (Cameron 2008d). 
The popular wisdom apparent in this passage, I would suggest, is not simply an 
example of imposing a narrative upon an audience, but is instead drawing on deeply 
culturally embedded moral values. This point can be reinforced with a quick 
comparison. Other studies that have looked at the construction of economic necessity, 
such as New Labour’s hyper-globalisation discourse (e.g. Watson and Hay 2003), 
have tended to focus on communication of a new concept in particular terms. Yet, in 
this case this was unnecessary, because the meaning of debt was pre-existing in the 
form of generally accepted popular wisdom as cultural resources for elites and non-
elites alike. This history was, of course, reinforced and shaped by Thatcherism, which 
involved constant appeals to the ‘common sense’ of household management in the 
justification of its politics (Hall 1988: 47). 
To summarise thus far, these discussions had a number of notable shared 
characteristics: first, debt was often identified as a, if not the, problem that was in 
crisis; second, debt was often discussed as an ambiguous moral obligation of the 
nation as a whole. Taken together, this is a powerful story and an important part of 
austerity acquiescence: we lived beyond our means, now we must pay back what we 
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owe. However, this is not the full picture. Part of the narrative is also about why the 
UK has an ambiguous obligation to cut back, and it relates to what Damien [Focus 
group A1], a participant quoted above, referred to as the moving away from a ‘basic 
creed’ of prudence and obligation.  
5.1.3 ‘Living beyond our means’ 
The participants consistently made an implicit temporal distinction between pre-crisis 
and post-crisis experiences and expectations of finance. This distinction – evident in 
the use of tenses, examples below – was between a past in which the UK was caught 
on a ‘hamster wheel’ [Linda, focus group A2] of consuming beyond its means 
through ‘finance up to our eyeballs’ [Nicholas, focus group A2] and an austere 
present and future. The mood in the discussions suggests a shared experience that 
these otherwise increasingly easy conditions have been jolted and then halted: and 
with that, a disturbance of the prevailing expectation outlined previously and a 
reappraisal of values surrounding credit and debt. The image and experience of credit 
suddenly being withdrawn disturbed normality: it led to a reconsideration and 
reflection upon the role of credit and debt in everyday life akin to the prudence and 
obligation rules outlined previously. 
The role of the subprime borrower, and the crisis they were sometimes deemed to 
have caused was crucial, in the discussions, perhaps because no one is deemed to 
have lived beyond their means as incongruously as them. For example: 
Jerry: I mean as far as I can work out, this crisis started because American 
companies who gave out mortgages went out into the euphemistic ‘subprime’ 
– that’s the word I was trying to remember – the subprime market. So 
basically they say to a bunch of people who have a temporary job on a 
hamburger stall ‘you can have a mortgage, and you can buy a property’. And 
then, I think they’re all surprised three years later when that mortgage isn’t 
paid. And, one banker had insured one bank against another against that 
  
 
180 
[inaudible], and suddenly they discovered that bank A has insured bank B, 
who has insured bank C, bank C has been insured by bank A, and oops, we’re 
all in a big circle and we’re all about to flop together. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Some participants were even more upfront in their stereotype of the American 
subprime borrower, painting them in overtly moralised tones: 
Kyle: The answer has to be, surely, you don’t have to be an economist, we 
don’t have to be at your level to understand, that if we give money to anybody 
and everybody, y’know, some hillbilly in … Middle of America who … is 
drinking his moonshine, in a swamp, who was never going to pay a penny 
back after anything. 
 [Focus group A2] 
Sometimes, however, the subprime crisis was brought up in albeit more opaque terms, 
in which the subprime borrower was not blamed: 
Eric: Okay, so you heard about the mortgage, where people were fixing the 
mortgage things? They’ve been doing that for years. You know the mortgage 
scandal? Fix the mortgage rates, they don’t have to, they’re fixing. Some 
people lost their houses, [inaudible] for years, it hasn’t just come now. 
Imagine if you lost your house. Y’know, and that led to the crash. The whole 
market went into recession. 
 [Focus group B1] 
The subprime crisis and spectre of the subprime borrowers has two relations to the 
debt crisis narrative: first, as the starting point for the crisis, second, and perhaps more 
crucially, as symptomatic of the morally-questionable credit practices that 
characterised the pre-crisis years of profligacy (for critical discussions see 
Montgomerie 2008, Seabrooke 2010b).  
All groups discussed how either they themselves, or the UK more generally, 
problematically (morally and/or economically) relied on debt before the global 
financial crisis. The excerpts below are particularly indicative of a change in 
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expectations, which is emphasised by the use of past tense to denote an era that has 
passed: 
Nicholas: Everything was done on finance. It was finance up to your eyeballs 
… The whole thing just exploded from nothing really, we’re just reaping what 
we sowed before and everyone benefitted because they’ve all bought the 
conservatories, the car, they’ve all had a new settee … Everything just 
exploded and now we’re back to how it should have been in the first place. 
We’re back to when where we should have been ten years ago. 
Kyle: The bubble has burst. 
Nicholas: It was all false.  
[Focus group A2] 
Michael [broadcast journalist]: It was too free and easy. I was at university in 
the early 90’s and as a result of that … I walked away with a massive amount 
of debt. 
Caitlin: You could have as many [credit cards] as you like […] I don’t think 
it’s like that anymore – every day you’d get offered one […] Don’t think you 
get that like you used if you think about it. 
[Focus group A4] 
This reappraisal of the pre-2008 role of credit and debt was common, but is perhaps 
best summarised here, where it is linked back to a return to a previous prudence: 
Linda: I think we got into the most terrible situation – I think – of feeling that 
anything you wanted you could go out and buy and we all got caught on the 
hamster wheel and its much better to go back to the way I was brought up 
which was you don’t buy anything until you could afford to buy it within 
reason. 
[Focus group A2] 
The experiences of financialisation and subsequent reappraisal of economic 
dependence on credit is, for some, a return to a moralised ‘fantasy of the national 
fitness of the past’ (Jensen 2012: 2).  
Research from YouGov’s ‘DebtTracker’ 2008-10 survey, in which a nationally 
representative sample of 2000 UK adults in addition to 1000 ‘financially distressed’ 
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are queried about debt, provides further hints about some sort of reappraisal about the 
desirability of relying upon credit. The survey asks respondents for their level of 
agreement on the statement ‘Borrowing has become a way of life’. Whilst in July and 
October 2008 over 60% of respondents agreed with this statement, this fell 
dramatically come June 2010 to just 35% (YouGov 2010). The wording of the 
question is particularly interesting since it has an implicit judgemental element. The 
question does not ask if respondents rely on borrowing, but specifically whether 
indebtedness is entangled in the process of life itself. Similarly, respondents were 
asked to judge another statement: ‘Companies lending money have only themselves to 
blame if people stop repaying’. Again, although less dramatic, whilst in July 2008 
57% agreed, this fell in June 2010 to 47%. The poll also shows that ‘there has been a 
decrease in the number of people who use their overdraft facility, as well as a 
decrease in the number of people who are usually overdrawn by the time they get paid’ 
(YouGov 2010). In part this shift is due to the ‘crunch’ itself: credit became harder to 
come by (YouGov 2010), and people feel anxious about their own financial situations. 
Extrapolating from this experiential knowledge is central to the process of making 
sense of imperatives of the fiscal element of the debt crisis. The following excerpt is 
illustrative of this: 
Kyle: [Talking about the culture of relying on credit] Yeah, it’s a culture, innit. 
And the answer is to borrow, for everything. It’s one thing for borrow for 
business, it’s another thing to buy a car, it’s another thing to buy a house. But 
when you’re buying everything that way, all of a sudden governments are 
doing the same, y’know, buy a few [towns], buy a few schools… 
  [Focus group A2] 
This sort of comment, in which the pre-crisis explosion of consumer and household 
credit was seen as part of the same ‘culture’ that led to the indebted state, was 
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relatively common. Implicit within the statement above is a judgement that living 
within means is unsustainable, and one (whether that is households or states) must 
pay back their debts through necessary austerity.  
Bringing these elements together, we can see clearly the moralised and guilty element 
within the Debt Crisis narrative. As Bob Jessop has argued, there may be a 
‘widespread belief that ‘everyone’ is to blame because of generalized ‘greed’ based 
on the financialisation of everyday life in the neoliberal economies’ (Jessop 2013)4. 
This was partly reflected in some of the focus group conversations:  
Denise: We’ve been on some nice holidays, but unless we’ve got the money 
… I don’t know if we are. So yes, perhaps it [the Conservative narrative] is 
working on me. I feel guilty … Before I would have taken credit, but now I’m 
not so sure. 
 […] 
Paul: And it is a two-sided thing: I do get a bit, yes it’s our fault … […] but 
part of me is thinking no, this … this is all crap. 
[Focus group A1] 
This sense of guilt could be strengthened through the notion that populations are, in 
some sense, the recipients of public spending, and so perhaps are partly responsible 
for the over-spending. For instance, Maurizio Lazzarato has spoken about a notion 
that: 
the crisis is your fault, because you’re retiring too early, seeking too much 
medical care, aren’t sufficiently flexible, consume too much in public services. 
That is, you’re guilty of living beyond your means (Lazzarato 2012: 169-70). 
However, as Chapter 7 argues, responsibility for state indebtedness is normally 
shifted away from the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this mood that ‘we’, the 
British public, are now ‘reaping what we sowed’ [Nicholas, Focus group A2] and are 
somehow responsible for the austere politics and life we must now live through is an 
                                                
4 Note that this quote comes from an unpublished draft version of the source. Used with permission. 
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undeniable part of austerity acquiescence, broadly conceived, because it generates a 
general sense for necessary asceticism. As Chapter 6 shows in more detail, many 
believed the state was too acting in a profligate fashion, which is when acquiescence 
to the imperatives of fiscal consolidation is truly produced. It is the flexibility of debt 
and ambiguity of the crisis that makes this sweeping narrative of austerity make sense.  
Summary 
This section has made three points. First, that the problem most participants defined 
and identified as in crisis was debt, but in a way that was surprisingly ambiguous. 
Second, this ambiguity is in part a result of the flexibility of debt itself. Debt is 
experienced and judged through moralised lens. This is evident in popular wisdom 
about the use of credit, in which two rules of thumb – one should be prudent and live 
within means, and one has an obligation to pay what they owe – are prevalent. As a 
moral rather than just an economic obligation, it is possible to place both households 
and states into an analogous narrative of austerity. Third, most participants did do just 
that. By drawing on their own experiential knowledge of the pre-crisis expansion of 
credit, they could make sense of the fiscal deficit in a similar fashion, sometimes 
attributing both state and household indebtedness to a similar ‘culture’ and the need to 
return to a more moral past. This narrative generates acquiescence almost in its very 
own terms: the country has lived beyond its means, and now must reap what it sowed 
in meeting its debt obligations. One crucial point is that this popular wisdom and 
these experiences of debt existed before the Conservative narrative asserted the UK 
must live within its means – but it ‘uses’ these experiences in a partisan and political 
fashion. That crisis works for this very reason, because it resonates and speaks to 
what already exists; fiscal consolidation can be justified by shared beliefs. The debt 
crisis narrative, however, is incomplete, since it does not account for why, exactly, the 
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state became so indebted in the first place. Chapter 6 continues this narrative by 
exploring this, once we have briefly considered the alternative crisis narratives 
offered by the focus group participants.  
5.2 Alternative everyday crisis narratives 
Although the method of the thesis involves reconstructing common narratives based 
on shared wisdom and experience, it is still crucial to survey alternative crisis 
narratives – even if they are not as common. This is for two reasons. First, it is 
important as a standalone activity. The method used in this thesis can threaten to 
impose certain coherence upon the focus group discussions that would do a disservice 
to the varied and pluralistic nature of the participants’ talk. It is thus crucial in terms 
of the politics of research: to show the minority views and to give a glimpse of other 
political possibilities. Second, it is also interesting to survey alternative narratives 
because it can still inform us about the process of austerity acquiescence – even if the 
narratives may seem, at first glance, that they may logically contradict the causal story 
of the Debt Crisis narrative.  
5.2.1 Alternatives to and within the debt crisis 
Given the changing contours of public debate, the election of François Hollande in 
France, and the line previously pushed by Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls, one might 
reasonably expect the push for economic growth to constitute an alternative narrative. 
Where possible groups were asked to reflect on the ‘growth alternative’. Only one 
group mentioned growth without prior prompting. Interestingly, although one opinion 
poll result shows that when given a choice more people opt for growth over austerity 
(Barker and Marengo 2012), I found that the growth alternative was not given priority. 
When it was discussed as an alternative economic policy-making priority to fiscal 
  
 
186 
consolidation – which was relatively rare5 – responses varied from, at one end, 
logically prioritising deficit reduction to, at the other, barely concealed ridicule: 
Damien: I do think the priority has to be to pay off the debts. That is the first 
priority. And yes, I would agree that growth must come. But I would place 
those two things in that sequence: pay off the debt, debts; and … support, 
secondly, growth in the economy. I think it has be that sequence. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Interviewer: So, in France, for instance, Hollande got voted in on the basis of 
saying we needed less austerity and more economic growth… 
Kyle: Well he didn’t really did he, he just got votes….if it’s austerity then that 
means my salary might be cut, I’ll vote for the ones that will increase my 
salary. It was [inaudible] to realise that economic policy for going for growth 
was it [laugher] [inaudible] […] Nobody is going to go out there and say you 
know what, I’ll tell you what, economically we’ll go for growth. We’ll buy 
our way out. We’ll borrow some more. No one is that clever! Like in France. 
They just say, he’s saying I’m gonna have all your money off you, he’s saying 
I can have some more, I’ll vote for him. That’s public jeopardy [?] isn’t it?  
Duncan: We all just vote for the party that’s going to cut taxes. But they don’t.  
Kyle: Yeah!  
Nicholas: But they never do. 
 [Focus group A2] 
Given these responses, especially the latter, it is hard not to sympathise with the oft-
trotted out line that to argue that an economy in recession, but also ‘drowning in debt’ 
due to an overblown public sector, should be saved by spending more is, as Andrew 
Gamble says, ‘too clever by half’ (2012: 53). Indeed, it is far more intuitive to argue, 
as leading Conservatives did, that ‘embarking on a government borrowing binge to 
pay for tax cuts or spending increases is dishonest and unfair’ (Cameron 2008a). 
From this we could tentatively suggest that an alternative ‘growth crisis’ narrative 
                                                
5 Since some groups were asked, explicitly, to reflect on the ‘growth alternative’ and some were not, it 
would be foolish to draw any conclusions from this inference. However, it is perhaps noteworthy that 
only one group mentioned growth without prior prompting. One opinion poll result shows that when 
given a choice between the two, more people opt for growth over austerity (Barker and Marengo 2012). 
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would not be ‘sufficiently general and simple’ enough to ‘make sense to individuals 
… of their experiences of the crisis’ (Hay 2010: 22). 
While there is certainly some truth in this, if we are a bit more flexible with our 
understanding of what constitutes a discussion about growth then the conclusions may 
be more muddied. There was, for instance, some limited discussion about the reliance 
of the British economy on finance and the lack of manufacturing that would imply 
that growth might be the problem: 
Caitlin: But as you said earlier, we don’t make anything in this country 
anymore. I don’t see how you can make any money if you don’t make 
anything. Sitting around all day at tables talking, that doesn’t make much 
money. 
Michael: We can kind of have … I talk about this quite a lot with family 
members and stuff who have done stuff in the past, y’know, creative or built 
stuff in the past. Is there a way back? I don’t think there is. 
 [Focus group A4] 
Paul: You talk about the macro management of the economy at the 
governmental level, and you’re thinking, so these politicians and economists 
are nuts: the sensible way for the economy to go is to put so much into the 
housing market, so much into the financial sector, to the detriment of proper 
manufacturing and other sectors. This is the way we’re going to run our 
economy, and not to expect that there might be some issues down the line. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Although these discussions were limited, they do highlight the possibility for a more 
transformative crisis narrative of sorts – one that paints the problem not as debt that 
needs to be (regressively) cut back, but as instead a faltering economic growth model 
that needs to be (potentially progressively) reformed.  
These alternative narratives question the extent to which the UK is suffering from a 
debt crisis. There were also instances when discussants accepted the debt crisis but 
either questioned the specificities of the programme, or presented different methods 
for dealing with deficit reduction. For instance: 
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Lynn: And I know there’s a lot of debt and that we need to reduce the deficit, 
but Labour would have actually done it at a slower pace, so people would have 
still kept their jobs, to be paying their taxes and income taxes and everything 
else, so in the end of it we would have probably got a few years longer and we 
would have actually had a steady decrease in the deficit but what he’s trying to 
do in trying to cut it is you’ve put more people out of work, the industry has 
gone, you’ve lost jobs, more people are on benefits and are claiming more, it 
is not actually decreasing the actual deficit. It’s actually raising it! 
 [Focus group B1] 
It was noticeable (and indeed quite understandable) that when asked about local 
controversies about public spending cuts, many participants raised qualms. 
Participants told negative anecdotes about cuts to local police and community officers 
[Focus group B1], redundancies to friends as a result of austerity [Focus group A1], 
public sector salaries frozen [Focus group A4] and so on.  
Although it was rarely explicitly said – bar once [Debbie, Focus group A1] – it 
seemed the case that while austerity was a necessary abstract and national imperative, 
the concrete and localised implications of this would be thoroughly negative and 
should be avoided at all costs – in  ‘NIMBY’ style. This seeming belief in two 
logically incoherent beliefs might seem somehow inconsistent. I would caution 
against such a hasty conclusion: even if we dispel with the notion that we are 
exploring individual beliefs as I did in Chapter 2 and 3, there is still nothing logically 
contradictory about arguing for spending cuts while also wishing to avoid feeling 
them6. Again, this highlights the impact of the flexibility of debt and the ambiguity of 
the crisis.  
In regards to the latter of these two alternative narratives, some participants spoke 
about how the deficit can be reduced by increasing taxation on the rich – including 
                                                
6 This is perhaps where the politics of blame displacement comes in: hide the cuts, and attack 
vulnerable and unorganised groups (Weaver 1987, Pierson 1996). 
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targeting bankers’ bonuses, tax havens, and over-paid and unnecessary public middle 
management. For instance:  
Lucy: I think probably yes [spending cuts are necessary]. But I think that the 
deficit should be partly made up from elsewhere – from very profitable 
businesses – that’s what I was saying earlier. I think people who make a lot of 
money should be made to have a bit more a social conscience and not put all 
their money in Jersey or offshore accounts.  
 [Focus group A3] 
Lucy went on to specifically explain how taxing the ‘bigger targets’, and not ‘people 
like me’, should be the basis for reducing the deficit: 
Lucy: And I think the money should be found – tried to be found – from 
elsewhere. And I don’t think it should be found by taxing – obviously I don’t 
think it should be found by taxing people like me – but by taxing ordinary 
people there are bigger targets to aim at. 
 [Focus group A3] 
This question of taxation is taken up in more detail in the following chapter.  
5.2.2 Alternatives to and within capitalism 
Two participants in one focus group offered the most radical alternative narratives. 
Jerry [Focus group A1] was very cynical about the motives and interests of those in 
the finance industry. He was keen to point out how while paying back Britain’s debts 
may be economically important, it was not so morally, because the money would be 
going back to bankers, who ‘have moved to protect themselves and we’ve all paid for 
it’. For instance: 
Jerry: Who owns the debt? Who have they got to pay their debts to? And it is 
capital protecting itself again, isn’t it. The people who … it’s perhaps, the 
people who massively over-extended themselves and lacked judgement, gave 
money to people to, y’know, to go out and get bad mortgages and so on, I’m 
trying to think what they’re called … junk, and all this sort of thing … 
They’re the people who now, if you say we must pay the debts off, we’re 
actually protecting the people who were foolish to pay off the loans in the first 
place […] we must pay our debts to move forward, economically, but I have 
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no moral feelings about paying our debts. Because I think, who are we paying 
these debts to? Rich bankers, with tonnes of money, and shareholders. That’s 
who you’re paying the debt to. 
 […] 
I’m not sure as long as Britain, we’re the 8th largest, or 7th or something, 
biggest economy in the world, if we still want to be that sort of country, we do 
have to pay off the debts. The choice is very radical, we could tax more. We 
could say to the people we pay the debts, we know what, we’ve borrowed at 
5% interest but we’re going to give it back at 2% interest. There are things we 
could do, that I think we are being spun to about by having the party of the 
ruling class in charge at the moment – but they’re not that different from the 
other party who were in charge before. But I think the hard economic reality, 
is that we probably do have to pay the debt, and that probably means we do 
have to spend less. I think there’s lots of different ways to do it. 
 [Focus group A1] 
This narrative pinned a significant part of the blame on bankers’ lending practices, 
which in itself was blamed on the lack of pre-crisis regulation. In Jerry’s words, 
‘saying there is no alternative to capitalism isn’t an excuse for saying we shouldn’t 
regulate or manage it’. 
Another participant from the same focus group, Paul, offered the most radical of the 
alternative narratives. Similarly, like Jerry, he also challenged the seemingly perverse 
logic that the UK may be paying off its debts to support bankers: ‘Bankers saying yes 
you suffer, because we made mistakes’. However, Paul took it further by questioning 
capitalism itself. For instance, at one point he acknowledges ‘the debts’ but questions 
whether we even have to pay them back, because ‘it comes back to the fact that there 
are some sections of the global economy, or whatever, that want to protect assets, and 
to do that we have to make cutbacks because they’re shifting money about or doing 
what they do, then you have to question that’. Although he is critical of capitalism, he 
equally acknowledges that it is the system that the UK, and indeed global economy, 
currently has – and there is no alternative system: 
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Paul: Take a step beyond that, which I don’t know much about, but now 
you’re talking about economic systems, we’ve got global capitalism. I don’t 
know what replaces global capitalism, but I accept that this is how it works, 
this is how it has come about for our situation, yes we have to make those cuts 
and changes because we’re in the system. […] And they say, global capitalism 
is the best system we’ve got … it’s the worst system, but it’s the only system 
we’ve got.  
 [Focus group A1] 
Although there were differences between the alternative narratives espoused by Paul 
and Jerry, they were linked by a belief that ‘every crisis provides tremendous 
opportunities for certain people from certain sections of society who can make a 
killing’ [Paul, Focus group A1]. 
Summary 
Despite the prevalence of a common Debt Crisis narrative, focus group participants 
also offered other crisis narratives. Among these included questioning the pre-crisis 
reliance on finance for growth or by making up the deficit from taxing corporations. 
A couple of participants in one focus group even went as far as to question global 
capitalism itself. However, none of these narratives were ‘shared’ to the same extent 
as the other narratives analysed in this chapter. They were much more isolated in 
character. Consequently, none of them can be said to reflect the mood of the times in 
the intersubjective fashion I outlined previously. Interestingly, the majority of these 
alternative narratives are compatible with the main Debt Crisis narrative. As Paul 
notes above, while he can see that capitalism is but one system, within that system 
there are rules to follow so ‘yes we have to make those cuts and changes because 
we’re in the system’. Consequently, a form of austerity acquiescence was still 
sometimes produced, albeit in a form that is somewhat more begrudging than the rest.  
Concluding remarks 
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‘Not all symbols are equally potent’, William Gamson observes, ‘some metaphors 
soar, others fall flat; some visual images linger in the mind, others are quickly 
forgotten’ (1992: 141). Since crises encompass a narrative – depending on the story 
told different outcomes are made possible – Gamson’s observation should apply 
equally here. Why do some crisis narratives ‘soar’ and others fall relatively flat? 
Gamson pulls out two reasons that resonate with the analysis posed in this chapter: 
first, some narratives ‘have a natural advantage because their idea and language 
resonate with a broader political culture’ (1992: 141), meanwhile, second, ‘some 
issues are very close to people’s lives, whereas others seem remote’ (1992: 163).  
This chapter has looked at how the debt crisis has been narrated, and Gamson’s 
insights appear as relevant as ever. As the previous chapter argued, for the majority of 
participants there was little ‘public’ disruption or suffering that can be directly 
attributable to recessions or spending cuts. Instead, there were anecdotes about 
community neglect and uncertain futures, but little evidence of a mood receptive to a 
story of state failure or collapse. There was, however, as this chapter has argued, a 
shared sense that the ‘problem’ is debt. It is an abstracted and moralised debt crisis in 
which both the state and households have spent too much and must now cut back. By 
merely defining the problem as debt, participants began the process of acquiescence 
in which alternative stories are already restricted and hidden.  
Two additional processes, however, were central to the production of austerity 
acquiescence. First is the popular wisdom and experience – ‘one pays back what one 
owes’, ‘one lives within means’ – about debt that emanates from deeply held and 
well-embedded cultural values. That debt is a moral as well as economic obligation 
helped make the debt crisis ambiguous, as something that encompasses both states 
and households. There was a particular narrative that created a chronology in which 
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Britain lived beyond its means before the downturn through the overuse of credit, and 
now must live within its means – invoking a past of prudence that should be 
rediscovered.  In justifying spending cuts, these various experiences and pieces of 
popular wisdom made fiscal consolidation seem like a good idea. Second, the process 
of sense-making itself was crucial too. Extrapolating from the personal level onto the 
state level necessarily distorts how one makes sense of the state’s indebtedness. The 
result is that the imperatives of the debt crisis resonated the mood of the times.  
Stuart Hall famously argued that the ‘success’ of the Thatcherite story of state 
overload ‘does not lie in its capacity to dupe unsuspecting folk but in the way it 
addresses real problems, real and lived experiences’ (1979: 20). The ‘success’ of the 
debt crisis came not from duping the public into acquiescence, but through giving 
sense to a particular shared set of experiences and meanings that meant they were 
receptive both to the proposed causes and ‘symptoms’ of crisis, as well as the logical 
fix. However, this represents only part of the analysis of the Debt Crisis narrative. 
This chapter has covered the experiences and norms surrounding debt, but it has 
missed out an important part of the crisis narrative: why has the UK got a deficit 
and/or debt, and how does the justification of this impact upon austerity 
acquiescence? This is the topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6. State profligacy and the ‘squeezed 
middle’: Legitimacy gaps in fiscal relations 
 
 
 
 
 
As an undergraduate student, I worked for a county council during one Easter 
vacation. My job involved counting cars in car parks. I had to do this 15-minute 
activity just once an hour, leaving 45 minutes to read, walk around or just be 
generally quite idle. For a student, the pay was good, but I only worked on the project 
for 2 of the 8 weeks it ran. I was not employed directly by the council, but by an 
agency that ran the entire survey. This included sending a supervisor from the agency 
HQ – hundreds of miles away from the site of the survey – and that meant providing a 
hotel and a courtesy car. When the supervisor did not turn up on my third day, I was 
asked if any of my friends were interested in stepping into the breach. Naturally, they 
were. One day, working with a friend, we estimated that the cost of this car-counting 
project – taking into account our wages, the cost of the supervisor and expenses, and 
so on – would have been in the region of thousands of pounds. That is, thousands of 
pounds to know how many cars were parked in a car park (hint: not that many). It 
seemed obvious that this was a waste of ‘taxpayers’ money’. My attitude for months 
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after this event, especially whenever I saw ‘record levels of council tax’ style 
headlines, was of cynicism. I knew, or at least thought I knew since I had some form 
of first-hand experiential knowledge, where the money was going. In other words, it 
left me questioning, at least implicitly, the legitimacy of taxation and, to a lesser 
extent but by implication, the state. It is that sense, or mood, that I also discovered in 
many of the interview participants.  
If the previous chapter was concerned with the everyday production of a debt crisis 
narrative in which public spending cuts were deemed necessary to reduce the fiscal 
deficit, then this chapter is the next logical step. For if we assume the UK state is 
indebted, then the obvious question then becomes ‘where has the money gone?’ How 
the focus group participants made sense of this question in regard to the wider Debt 
Crisis narrative is the concern of this chapter. The argument consists of two parts. 
First, participants seemed to distrust the fairness of official resource allocation, as 
evident in the continuous swathe of anecdotes about state profligacy. Second, 
participants seemed to experience taxation through a moral abstract order that 
produces the notion of a ‘squeezed middle’ taxpayer in opposition to a morally 
undeserving rich and poor. This provided the sense that the current system of 
redistribution is unfairly skewed against the middle, making some participants 
resistant to higher tax and, to reverse the logic, acquiescence to political strategies that 
promise to lower government revenues (and especially those cuts that target the 
undeserving). Taken together, these two points point to a legitimacy gap between the 
expectations and the experience of public money – a mood of the times – that the 
Debt Crisis narrative resonated with.   
The chapter is divided into two sections, reflecting this argument. The first analyses 
how interview participants discussed and contested state spending. It is highlighted 
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how the state is presumed, for the most part, to be poorly organised – illogical, even – 
and too bureaucratic, suggesting pre-existing fiscal legitimacy gaps. The second 
section takes this analysis even further by questioning how the shared group position 
of squeezed taxpayer is experienced in opposition to the undeserving rich and poor. 
The primacy of this moral abstract order leads participants, I argue, to experience 
fiscal legitimacy gaps; the existence of which helps explain acquiescence to austerity. 
6.1 Experiencing state spending 
6.1.1 Political disengagement and fiscal morale 
It might seem strange for a thesis on fiscal consolidation to have an albeit small sub-
section on political disengagement. However, its inclusion is based on a premise of 
simple and sound logic: if citizens (are disengaged because they) believe politicians 
are incompetent or lacking the capacity to act, then it is unlikely they will be willing 
to comply with paying more taxation to fund deficit reduction. And, if it has 
something to do with the legitimacy of fiscal relations then it is surely relevant to the 
puzzle posed here.  
The literature on political disengagement is typically interested in ‘demand-side’ 
explanations. Robert Putnam’s (1995a, 1995b) ‘bowling alone’ thesis, posits that 
declining levels of social capital – linked to wider community engagement and 
citizenship – are to blame for declining levels of political disengagement. As Colin 
Hay (2007) persuasively argues, the problem with these accounts is the assumption 
that the responsibility for political disengagement lies with the citizens themselves – 
hence the ‘demand-side’ tag. Hay instead encourages us to begin analyses with the 
assumption that democratic polities get the levels of political participation they 
deserve. This ‘supply-side’ approach thus encourages us to move beyond the 
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assumption that citizens are disinterested or disengaged and instead consider whether 
it is the quality of goods on offer that might be the problem. Hay looks to processes of 
‘depoliticization’ to blame (see also Burnham 2001, Flinders and Buller 2006, Jenkins 
2011). From Thatcherism onwards, the idea of an increasing barrage of constraints to 
their policy-making autonomy (because of external economic constraints, from 
business-school globalization thesis, or due to ‘hollowing out’), as well as a 
normative commitment to decreased autonomy (because they cannot be trusted, from 
rational choice theories) was internalized and became self-fulfilling. The result of a 
self-denying depoliticized politics is, Hay argues, a disengaged electorate.  
The ‘supply’ of politics took a further major shock when, in 2009, the MPs’ expenses 
scandal that consumed British politics. Following a revelation by a major newspaper, 
detailed information from leaked documents demonstrated how some MPs had abused 
their parliamentary expenses – in particular, making personal financial gain from 
gaming the Additional Members Allowance. The scandal was seen as symbolising 
everything that is wrong with the current political system: politicians that do not care 
about the average person, just in it for their own personal gain, and so on. While the 
idea that politicians are by nature self-interested and self-serving is not especially new, 
Matthew Flinders (2012) argues it was intensified during the MPs’ expenses scandal 
which demonised politicians. Flinders convincingly demonstrates how a moral panic 
unfolded at the time, with politicians centrally positioned as the ‘folk devils’. This, 
Flinders argues, intensified the narrative that ‘all politicians are self-interested, 
corrupt and untrustworthy as part of a broader narrative that views democratic politics 
as somehow failing’ (2012: 2). Flinders is at pains to highlight that while a public 
scepticism towards the political elite is a healthy and important aspect of democracy, 
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the moral panic has slipped into full demonization and a ‘corrosive cynicism’ (2012: 
6). 
This literature provides a number of relevant insights. For starters, it suggests that 
people are not necessarily disengaged from politics due to straight apathy or 
disinterest. It instead suggests that changes over the last three decades or so have 
created a shared perception that politicians neither can nor should make a difference. 
If politics is depoliticised, then it is perhaps no wonder that people are losing interest. 
Second, it suggests that this sense has been strengthened by the recent MPs’ expenses 
scandal, in which a ‘corrosive cynicism’ towards self-serving politicians has emerged. 
Since tax politics ‘shapes and is shaped by patterns of public trust’ (Martin et al. 
2009b: 13) this is a very salient issue for our purposes. It is reasonable to expect that 
in this case one will resist tax rises if one does not trust the state to spend rightfully 
earned cash carefully.  
Political disengagement and cynicism towards politicians were rife across the board in 
the focus group discussions. The following excerpt highlights this – with Shauna’s 
later corrective included to show how it was not totally one sided:  
Rose: Can I just ask – you don’t have to answer this – but do you all vote? 
Jo: I don’t think I’ve ever voted.  
Jilly: Me neither really. [‘Why?’] To be fair, I wouldn’t really know who to 
vote for, because I can’t see any of them changing anything. I think it’s just 
going to keep going… 
Eric: The winners are already picked before the voting […] It’s picked about 
4 or 5 years before.  
[…] 
Shauna: But the reason it doesn’t change is because people like us don’t go 
out and vote! 
 [Focus group B1] 
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There was a very real sense that politicians had no capacity to change anything, and, 
as the next excerpt highlights, that they lacked common sense: 
Cailtin: We should just get rid of all the politicians, and just get a group of 
people off the street really. [Laughter] I really think that you could go into 
Moseley and get a group of people who would have a far better idea about 
what needs to be done than the politicians. It’s common sense. 
Mandy: I think sometimes they do know, but actually they haven’t the will to 
do it. The guts… 
 [Focus group A4] 
Although debates about political disengagement typically ignore fiscal issues – which 
is odd given that there are strong historical causal links between tax and 
representation (Ross 2004), and that tax is one of the main ways in which citizens 
interact with the state – they are clearly quite crucial. If one distrusts politicians, then 
one is unlikely to be interested in donating their own hard-earned money to line these 
elites’ pockets.  
6.1.2 The mundanely profligate state 
Kyle: That, as you say, it’s all the other bits. I think the public sector was 
spiraling out of control, to the point where somebody is going to say ‘you 
can’t put it off for another parliament as everyone has done for the last’…. 
 [Focus group A2] 
Jamie: They haven’t invested in the right things they should have been 
investing at the time, they invested in stupid things that have failed. 
 [Focus group B2] 
The participants I interviewed, in general terms, did not talk about the allocation and 
efficiency of public finances in particularly positive terms. It appeared at times as if 
participants were implicitly answering a question: assuming that we accept that the 
state must cut back to reduce the deficit, then we may naturally want to contemplate 
how and why the state managed to overspend so spectacularly. In this sense, this 
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section rounds off the debt crisis narrative explored in the previous chapter. It 
provides the full story, in reverse order: the UK must cut services to cut back the debt; 
the debt, itself, was a result of state overspending. Narratives of state over-extension 
or ‘overload’ are hardly unfamiliar (e.g. King 1975). Indeed, it was a central theme in 
the narratives that made Thatcherism possible (e.g. Hall 1979, Hay 1996a). Over the 
past four decades or so, the British state has been consistently attacked by the Right 
for being too big; too bureaucratic and onerous; too wasteful with ‘our money’. In this 
sense, the coalition government had a rich tapestry of well-rehearsed stories and well-
engrained values to conjure when constructing their own crisis narrative.  
Nevertheless, anecdotes were consistently hailed to complain about the misuse of 
public money. As discussed previously, anecdotes have a privileged place in 
conversation. When people use experiential knowledge to make a point about 
something, they usually do so through stories about themselves or someone that they 
know personally (Gamson 1992: 122). Analysing anecdotes, in this setting almost 
always delivered to make a wider point, is thus one of the primary ways of analysing 
experiential knowledge1.  
The theme discussed in this section should be understood as a ‘mundane profligacy’ 
because while respondents had their individual ‘big’ reasons for state indebtedness 
(the armed forces, ‘too many people in the country’, which are both briefly looked at 
below), it was the ‘little’ reasons that were consistent. The state, it seems, is 
experienced as a wasteful and inefficient body for allocating and spending public 
money. That it spends so much on unnecessary services, and is poorly organised and 
                                                
1 This experiential knowledge is, however, likely to be biased. As the behavioural economic and public 
choice literature tells us, people are likely to remember losses over gains – what is done to them rather 
than what is done for them – and then extrapolate from those experiences (Kahneman and Tversky 
1984, Weaver 1987: 373, Pierson 1996).      
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overly bureaucratic, helps explain why the state overspending tropes embedded within 
the ‘Debt Crisis’ narrative resonated so well.   
6.1.3 ‘Spending money willy-nilly’ 
There was a sense, especially in the B groups, that the state gives money away in an 
unsystematic, arbitrary, and unfair manner. The comments from Claire, below, 
highlight this: 
Claire: But you’re saying that … there are differences [between now and 
before the crisis] … it’s not so much of giving things away for free, like 
computers, and things. Laptops. For kids to use, but the adults were actually 
using them and the children were not. Taking them to shops and getting them 
chipped. All that business … there’s none of that anymore! But we’re getting 
out of the recession, and we’re not as bad as we was when we were just giving 
stuff away willy-nilly – d’ya know what I mean?   
[…]  
Mary: That’s chicken feed out of the national budget. It’s the billions they 
give away to overseas aid where it’s not necessary. 
 [Focus group B6] 
This notion of ‘giving money away’, also invoking an issue of deservingness, was 
also apparent in the other B group: 
Rose: Yeah! Vote Labour! They’re giving money away left, right and centre. 
Let’s give you some because you haven’t got a job, and let’s give you some 
because you’ve got 5 kids. And the next kid some too, because you’ve just 
arrived in the country and we feel sorry for you. You can’t just go out giving 
money to everybody. 
  [Focus group B5] 
The unfair element is key. This was particularly the case, for example, when Focus 
group B6 discussed how a neighbouring area received a form of trust fund that they 
did not.  
Similar to this was the relatively more nuanced sense that public money is being 
misspent. As opposed to ‘free money’, these discussions, which chiefly took place in 
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the A groups, were more squarely focused on the illogical banalities of state 
profligacy that are apparent in everyday life. The illogical element is key, because at 
times it appeared participants who produced this discourse felt almost personally 
offended at the banalities they described. The example below is particularly 
illustrative because it was in response to a question I asked about controversies about 
local spending cuts. The logic behind the question is that it would invite participants 
to discuss struggles in the local area, opening up space to discuss struggles on a more 
national level. That this was purposefully interpreted in this way, following some 
discussion about a library closure, is quite telling: 
Nicholas: I would be the opposite. I would say my controversy is spending 
money round here on the roads, throwing money around – and I’m thinking, 
what are they doing that? 
Duncan: On street lights…or…? 
Nicholas: Well, just on… that business down there towards Manor Road and 
towards your road, there’s a bridge. And they’ve put that, they’ve extended the 
pavement. What have they done for!? I’ve got no idea.  
Kyle: Well, I don’t know what they’re doing that for. But you’re kind of 
hoping that maybe they’re going to do some of the middle land in the ring 
roads.  
Linda: I know… 
Kyle: I think that’s the city council, they’ve gone into a huge contract for […] 
number of years with […] to do all of the … roads.  
Duncan: It’s not just the roads… 
Kyle: It’s all the infrastructure isn’t it. So they’ve got this … I don’t know 
where it’s come from or how they do it. 
Whereas this excerpt above highlights the perverse incentives and institutions that 
encourage this illogical banality, the following excerpt gives sense of a cultural sea 
change: 
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Caitlin: I still think there’s probably a lot of money wasted. I mean, at the 
moment, we’re having all new streetlights being put up on our road. And you 
look at the old ones and you think ‘Hmm, well, there’s ….’ 
Mandy: In lots of places – not in Moseley, but generally – to save money.  
Caitlin: I’m sure they’d say that these ones are energy-saving or whatever. 
But I just think if times are sort of hard then I think you probably just leave 
that for another couple of years and think they’ll last a bit longer, y’know. I 
just think that all the time there is money wasted on … dunno. I dunno. Office 
furniture, and paperclips. And …I dunno. I was bought up that you didn’t 
replace something until it broke really, and things then lasted a long time and 
now they don’t. I feel as if there’s too much replacing of stuff because 
[Michael: you can], yeah. Whereas in these sorts of time we should be 
thinking, oh, that road doesn’t need resurfacing, we could make that last 
another year. 
  [Focus group A4] 
It also needs pointing out that the ‘illogical banalities’ discourse was also, at times, 
produced in the B groups, for instance: 
Rose: But why haven’t the state got any money? Why haven’t we got any 
money? 
Interviewer: Well, that’s the question… 
Rose: We pay the highest taxes in the world. Why haven’t we got any money 
left? 
[inaudible] 
Jo: It’s because they spent so much money on trying to make the place look 
better. 
Eric: It’s not that.  
Jo: Yeah, it is! Kind of. Look at how much money we spent on the Olympic 
stadium, how many times are we going to use that? 
 [Focus group B5] 
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This is the profligate state at its most mundane, highlighting the power of everyday 
experience in sense making about the state, both in terms of the role of experiential 
anecdotes and in terms of conceiving the state as overspending2.  
6.1.4 ‘It’s really a bonkers system’ 
While the discussions above tended to tell stories about free money and experiential 
knowledge of illogical banality, there were also discussions that reflected wider views 
about the systematic nature of state profligacy. Four themes emerged – tragicomic 
incompetency, general inefficiencies, onerous bureaucracy, and the shift towards 
‘Suits’. 
In Focus group A2, in particular, the participants shared numerous anecdotes that 
painted a picture of an almost tragicomedy of state incompetence: 
Nicholas: It’s shut that has [the swimming pool]. 
Linda: They had an asbestos problem. 
Duncan: I didn’t know that. 
[inaudible] 
Linda: Ridiculous. 
Kyle: Farce. It’s just somebody is on the table, and it’s just money after, 
money after, money after – how much have they spent on it? 3 hundred and 
fifty thousand was it?  
Linda: And they knew it was there, somebody knew when they built it was 
there. 
Kyle: Well exactly. And it’s just rubbish isn’t it. What they’re doing with it. 
It’s a hell-of-a-waste of money. But it’s a great facility. 
 [Focus group A2] 
                                                
2 It should also be noted that there was also much discussion about how public money has been wasted 
on politicians’ expenses, quantitative easing and bank bailouts. However, this is a topic that is 
examined in a subsequent section, for reasons that will hopefully be obvious when we get there. 
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This tragicomedy was not, however, always apparent. Sometimes the discussions 
were far more sober, instead focussing on the general inefficiencies of the public 
sector. For instance: 
Peter: There are lots of reasons for making savings. In any savings, there will 
be inefficiencies, and it’s always good value to get rid of those inefficiencies, 
cos y’know […] Efficiency savings you can get, it just makes good sense.   
 [Focus group A1] 
In other instances, however, the focus was on onerous and unnecessary bureaucracy, 
often emphasising the one-size-fits-all nature of benefits or the impenetrability of 
official documents:   
Mandy: It’s the same with this incapacity benefit, or whatever it’s called now, 
they change it all the time. The way they have this system, and it doesn’t fit 
everybody. So you might fill in a form that doesn’t apply to you, and there’s 
so many people appealing – and I know some of these, because of my friend – 
and she won’t know until September because there’s so many appealing, even 
though she had a phone call saying she must appeal. So it’s this crazy system. 
[…] 
Michael: Yeah, it’s really a bonkers system. 
 [Focus group A3] 
Some of the most interesting anecdotes, however, came from those who worked 
within the public sector. Their position within the thick of it, as it were, provided an 
interesting take on how the institutions that make up the state have been slowly 
transforming over the last few decades: the move to ‘new public management’ 
(Dunleavy and Hood 1994), ‘modern governance’ (Finlayson 2003), and other, 
related, practices. In particular, there was discussion of, as one participant put it, ‘the 
Suits’, which referred to an abstract group of well-paid managers whose roles were, in 
some sense, unnecessary (and thus a waste of money): 
Jerry: …but sitting right in the middle of the health service and watching it go 
on and I’ve previously worked in the local authority, so I watched it happen 
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there a couple of decades ago. What kind of annoys me is when you have 
cutbacks, and they are terrible cutbacks, then they’re done very badly, 
inasmuch as they say right you’ve got to save 10%, so the people who make 
the decisions about how we do this are the people who are on 100 grand plus 
in really good director/management […] Those people sit and discuss what 
should be done and how to make efficiencies with all the people who are 
making 15-20 thousand pounds a time, and how we’ll have to cut back on 
some of them, and some of them might have to work longer hours and all that, 
and I never see any reduction in the people who are earning 100 grand, I’ve 
never seen one of them decide … made redundant. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Michael: Things that we get most jarred off about is … endless kind of 
investigations, meetings, focus groups, [laughter]. But on a scale that is … 
keeping some bloke in a suit in a job. And you think that bloke in a suit 
doesn’t actually need a job, he could just… We don’t need all this…It just 
seems a lot of ‘padding’ in various levels above those people above those 
people on the ground who do the jobs. I think … I dunno, that seems to be 
across the board. 
Cailtlin: There’s too much talking, not enough action.  
[…] 
Michael: In many ways, most of us are kind of baffled by lots of decisions 
made. But I think that’s common across any public sector working, y’know, 
the decisions that are made you just think, Christ, what’s that about? 
Mandy: It’s the faceless people further up who have no idea what’s going on. 
 [Focus group A4] 
Again, what makes this discourse distinctive is that it is not complaints about 
individual managers, but that it is abstract and implied as systematic. The Suits were 
often othered in comparison to those who did actually do work, ‘those on the ground’, 
with whom most participants implicitly identified. 
Whatever form these discussions took – tragicomic incompetency, general 
inefficiencies, onerous bureaucracy, or the shift towards Suits – the bigger picture was 
similar: the implied sources of state indebtedness. Tentatively, it could be suggested 
that there could be a link between the transformation of governing and organising 
practices – new public management, modernised governance, and so on, which has 
  
 
207 
led to a proliferation of consultancies and out-sourced contracting, as well as ‘the 
Suits’ – and the negative experiences of both users and public service employees as 
reflected in justificatory practices examined here. In other words, tax is based upon a 
relatively fragile social contract – but that social contract is going to be stretched 
when expenditures are not being directed to those who deserve it, but instead towards 
unnecessary consultants and fancy paperclips. Putting the sources of these 
experiences aside for one moment, I would suggest that on the basis of this we can 
identify a legitimacy gap in the experiences of ‘taxpayers’ money’ that the debt crisis 
speaks to. I return to this in the summary after briefly considering some of the 
alternative discourses that were apparent. 
6.1.5 Other stories 
Participants discussed other, less mundane examples of state profligacy. What 
distinguishes these from the examples above is that they were not intersubjective in 
the same way. While the examples above were often ‘confirmed’ by other participants 
by offering their own anecdotes or explicitly agreeing, these examples were more 
isolated, more knowingly individual (or even ‘subjective’). 
There were three examples in particular, which were selected on the basis that more 
than one person mentioned them, albeit in an isolated way. First, there was some 
discussion about the armed forces and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the words 
of Damien, ‘I do have a bee in my bonnet about the armed forces’ [Focus group A1], 
while Rose asked whether the reason the state has no money is because of ‘the war 
that Tony Blair got us into’ [Focus group B1]. Second, Eric and Rose questioned the 
decision of Gordon Brown to sell the ‘gold reserve’, again questioning whether this 
would have made a difference to the state finances [Focus group B1]. Third, there was 
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some discussion about the role of immigration. Caitlin argued that one source of the 
fiscal strain is that ‘there is enough people in this country … we’re full’, to which 
Michael explained how ‘it’s not a race thing at all … [but] its just that we’re pushed 
to the limit in every single way’ [Focus group A4]. 
There was also some discussion that defended the role of the state in contemporary 
political life. Defending the state typically occurred in three ways. First, when the 
bigger normative picture was invoked, which from the albeit limited discussion could 
suggest that some participants don’t ‘hate’ the state, per se, as much as they question 
the legitimacy of this state. For instance: 
Michael: I don’t know if it’s… I think we need a public sector. I think we 
need a welfare system. 
Mandy: I think it’s because it’s what I’ve always known, I can’t imagine it. 
And I remember years ago, my nan was about 86 then, and she was talking 
about, y’know she had 6 kids, and she was talking about in the 30s, because 
we had to pay 2 and 6 to go to the doctor and all this sort of stuff. Y’know, 
that we have just grown up with and has always been there. So you can’t 
imagine having to… 
Michael: You can’t imagine being a similar situation to what they have in 
America where if you get run over they turn up and ask well do you have any 
insurance details and you’re like No – and they leave you to die. 
 [Focus group A4] 
Second, there was a conscious attempt by some participants to intervene in the 
collective process of state shaming by offering counter-stories. For instance, upon 
hearing anecdotes about the efficiency of the NHS, Damien intervened and pointed 
out that, ‘from a personal point of view’, ‘the service I’ve got, I’ve always got, has 
been fantastic … I would never moan about it’ [Focus group A1]. Third, although the 
spectre of the public sector worker, especially ‘the Suit’, was usually negative, this 
often changed when the abstraction was replaced with concrete examples. For 
instance, a former community officer, whom was made redundant, was ‘so in love 
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with his job and the area ... he is still a super person, and it was tragic when that 
funding was cut’ [Mary, Focus group B2].  
Summary 
Kyle: [spending cuts] are justified … as a means to an end, that is to redress 
the balance that you [Nicholas] were talking about earlier, about the fact that 
the public sector has got so big, so wealthy, and so [inaudible]. That I don’t 
know how you stop that, it’s a runaway train as far as I can see, and it is 
painful for the private sector. 
 [Focus group A2] 
In some ways, this section provides the missing link to the Debt Crisis narrative 
outlined in the previous chapter. Sometimes, as the epigram just above, highlights, the 
link between state overspending (‘a runaway train’) is made very explicitly, but most 
of the time it is implicit – as are most of the examples given in this section. This 
section can tell us three things about how the participants made sense of austerity, and 
what this process tells us about legitimacy.  
First, it suggests that people generally perhaps do not trust this state to allocate 
resources fairly, which in turn suggests that people may look favourably to fiscal 
consolidation to lighten their burden. Second, and going further, it means that the 
crisis of debt (which must be caused by overspending) gives sense to concrete 
experiences. Experiences in which public money is deemed to have been wasted 
‘stick’ and later help make sense of, and to an extent confirm, stories of state 
indebtedness and overspending. Third, these anecdotes can be used to excuse and 
justify the potentially harmful consequences – whatever they may be – of reluctantly 
accepting spending cuts. If one makes the connection between state indebtedness (and 
thus overspending) and inefficiency and profligacy, then it gives the sense of 
something palpable and relatively harmless to be cut.  
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6.2 A fiscal sociology of ‘taxpayers’ money’  
Cailtin: I think we’ve got too much debt. And the cuts are being made in … 
for normal … normal? [‘The average?’] Yeah the average person. And 
personally, I think it always hits the middle-income families. Always. Because 
you’re either up there with your £29m bonus, or you’re down there and you do 
get help – I’m not saying everyone – but you do get a lot of benefits and help. 
But if you’re in this middle bit, you don’t quite get your child benefit, you 
don’t quite get help with your university fees, you don’t get that… 
 [Focus group A4] 
As Chapter 3 outlined, taxation can be experienced through a moral abstract order. In 
the middle of this order lies hard-working normal people, whose taxes go to support 
the undeserving poor – ‘welfare scroungers’ or ‘chavs’ – but also, in the current 
political climate, the undeserving rich – bankers and politicians, mostly (see also 
Prasad et al. 2009). This moral abstract order was consistently produced in the focus 
group discussions. As the section epigraph highlights, the production of this moral 
abstract order was often used to make wider points about the ‘squeezed middle’ and 
the unfairness of current fiscal settings. For these reasons, and as the section shows, it 
matters for the questions of austerity acquiescence at the heart of this thesis.  
Within public discourse and secondary literature there is much corroborating support 
for this notion of an abstract moral order3. As recent headlines attest to, the notion that 
Britain has become a mostly classless society is very common: ‘We’re all middle 
class now, darling’ (the Telegraph, 22/01/10), ‘Official: Everyone is middle class now’ 
(Financial Times, 10/08/10), and ‘All middle class now in this unequal land?’ (The 
Independent 20/03/11). Within academic literature, Ruth Levitas’ (1998) work on 
New Labour’s social exclusion discourse is illustrative. Levitas argues that New 
Labour moved away from a view of social exclusion as intertwined with material 
poverty, and instead towards a view that distinguishes between those who are socially 
                                                
3 Chapter 7 includes a fuller review and elaboration of the history of the undeserving poor.  
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integrated (mostly in terms of labour market attachment and employment) and those 
who are excluded as a ‘moral underclass’. This is a topic that is taken up, albeit less 
directly and in a less academically rigorous manner, in Owen Jones’ (2011) Chavs, in 
which he directly attacks the notion that we are all now (mostly) middle-class (and 
somehow equal) in contrast to a small feckless and feral underclass. In addition to this, 
recent events – in particular the global financial crisis, the bank bailouts and MPs 
expenses – have helped also forge a morally undeserving rich.  
6.2.1 Undeserving poor 
In April 2013, Mick Philpott was sentenced to life imprisonment for manslaughter 
after he killed six of his wife’s children in an arson attack. Despite this, he is perhaps 
rather worryingly more famous as being a symbol of the perpetually re-emerging 
cultural trope: the ‘welfare scrounger’. This trope engenders one question that is 
relevant for our purposes: If people are too lazy and feckless to get a job, then why 
should taxpayer money be used to subsidise their lifestyle? Key to this argument is 
the idea that the poor are morally corrupt or ‘feral’. This is at the heart of the 
‘scrounger’ trope, that those who are impoverished are choosing to live on the 
generosity of taxpayer money. There could hardly be more at stake: the reasons one 
attributes to why poor people are poor are logically related to decisions regarding how 
the problem should be dealt with. 
Given this emergence of ‘scroungers’, it is both surprising and interesting to note that 
the undeserving poor were mentioned roughly as frequently, but with less venom and 
intensity, than the undeserving rich in the focus group discussions. This could be 
partly down to the irredeemably social aspect of the method. Other participants did 
not know that much about their fellow participants and might have wanted to avoid 
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causing an embarrassment. Every group, bar A3, included someone who was not 
employed. So there is a chance that the relatively low production of this discourse was 
down to that most British of traits: a desire to be polite and to not offend others (at 
least to their face). On the other hand, everyone can join together and round on the 
morally undeserving rich, safe in the knowledge that no fellow participants were 
secretly pocketing £27 million bonuses. Indeed, discussions about the morally 
undeserving poor were often swiftly moved on to discussions about the undeserving 
rich, whom, it seemed, are still undeserving but perhaps more so due to, as we will 
see, their culpability in causing the crisis in the first place – a charge that even the 
rightest of right could not seriously impose upon ‘scroungers’.  
Nevertheless, there was some talk about the undeserving poor. This talk was often 
couched in terms of ‘fairness’, for instance: 
Duncan: What’s in the news at the moment is quite topical. With David 
Cameron talking about not paying housing benefit until they’re over 25, 
because some of the kids are moving out at 17, or thereabouts, leaving their 
families and claiming off the state, and, y’know, is that fair? Is it fair?  
Nicholas: It is difficult, isn’t it. You get different circumstances… 
 [Focus group A2] 
The subtext for all these discussions regards what we all ‘contribute’ to society, often, 
unsurprisingly, about tax: if there are people living off benefits, then ‘we’, the 
taxpayer, must be paying for it – money that is otherwise, at least abstractly, in our 
pockets to spend on securing life chances. Importantly, it is often couched in terms of 
moral judgement. The following excerpt, bringing prisoners and delinquents into the 
morally undeserving poor category, makes this explicit: 
Rose: … I bring up my kids not to do that. Why should they get away with it. 
When people are doing wrong and blaming the society, then getting away with 
it. Why do they get a hand? Why is the guilty people who get the goodies, and 
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the innocent people who get punished all the time?  And a bit more took off 
them? It’s not right. If you’re in prison, you get free education, free TV, free 
hair, free everything. You can get a degree in prison! It don’t cost you 9 
grand! And they’ll pay you while you’re in there, so you come out with a little 
bit of money.  
 [Focus group B1] 
Interestingly, on occasions, the entire public sector was brought into the morally 
undeserving poor category since they are, essentially, the recipients of tax skimmed 
from money generated in the private sector. As Nicholas put it, ‘the ones paying for it 
are in the real world’, before Kyle intervenes to agree and add that the discussion 
chimes with his understanding of ‘fairness’ [Focus group A2], a notion that is seen 
through a moralised fiscal filter.  
The moral aspect of being poor and on benefits is somewhat complicated by the 
perverse (and vague) incentives inherent in the welfare state: 
Caitlin: There isn’t much incentive for people to actually, sort of, get up and 
get on and feel that it is worthwhile for them really. 
 [Focus group A4] 
However, it becomes clear from the assumptions underpinning more detailed 
discussions that the perverse incentives of the welfare state do not excuse the 
undeserving receipt of ‘our money’: 
Rose: You’ve got to have a bit of incentive. It’s no good … it’s a shame, 
because it’s the middle people who do out go and get the work, and I’m not 
saying that people are unemployed because they want to be, but what I’m 
saying is that there is a big sector of people who are in the middle – like I was 
a single-parent once, working. I was worse off than some single parents, not 
working. So where is my incentive? And then you’ve got families where it’s 
my husband is working but I’m not at the moment. We struggle. 
 [Focus group B1] 
Michael: But you do get this stereotype, and you think well … if they can get 
more money sitting on their backsides on welfare or whatever they get, then 
you can’t blame them, but they haven’t got that inbuilt is it … pride? That you 
have to go and work for a living – do anything, rather than be on the dole… 
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 [Focus group A4] 
The subtext to comments such as this is that the incentives are an important 
contributory factor to the imagined life on benefits, but that people of the correct 
moral fibre have the personal strength, will power and dignity to avoid it.  
This discourse was, of course, contested. An alternative reading involved discussions 
regarding ‘structural’ impediments to work, such as employment, which occasionally 
led to reappraisals of the moral character of the unemployed. For instance: 
Lynn: [inaudible] There’s no work, the jobs, and especially with working with 
[inaudible] in the area, you find that … 
Rose: There’s nothing around. 
Lynn: There’s this perception of young people that they’re lazy and they 
don’t actually want to go to work so they’re on benefits, but actually, through 
my role in my job and through meeting people around you see that there are a 
lot of good kids out there who do actually want to work and there is just 
nothing out there. 
 [Focus group B1] 
Caitlin: Problem is that there is no jobs. The government are on the one hand 
saying oh we’re going to cut benefits and you’ve got to get a job, and on the 
other there are no jobs! So… 
 [Focus group A4] 
Whether these stereotypes are representative of the reality of poverty is an otherwise 
important concern. However, for purposes here it is enough to merely point out how 
this abstract order, complete with the undeserving poor, is experienced as that, and 
that is what matters analytically. Nevertheless, it was the undeserving rich – in 
particular bankers and politicians – that was most intensely discussed in the focus 
groups.  
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6.2.2 Undeserving rich 
In general, there was some limited discussion about the unfairness of the rich 
escaping taxation through using clever and expensive accountancy to exploit legal 
loopholes, again often contrasting a small mega-rich group with an average 
hardworking taxpaying 99% who do not deserve to have their money taken away to 
reduce the fiscal deficit. The following excerpt, although lengthy, is very illustrative 
of these concerns: 
Kyle: And yeah, that’s what the government suddenly thought, well, the best 
[inaudible] in the world, we already pay so much bloody tax in this country as 
a whole anyway, I don’t know how much more you can squeeze out of people 
with taxes. So you’ve got to make cuts somehow. Y’know, but you almost feel 
sorry for Jimmy Carr4, in the sense that if he was paying what he should have 
been paying then he would have had a lot more money. 
Nicholas: There’s been a couple of comments that I’ve noted that, on Jimmy 
Carr should pay for his own personal health, but he still drives down the road, 
he still uses the street lights, which everybody else is paying for. But somehow, 
these people don’t seem to think that – ‘why should I pay for that?!’ But they 
should do, shouldn’t they? They should pay their fair share. Like everyone 
else does. 
Kyle: Oh yes, I agree, they should pay their share. But I also see the other side, 
and think he earns, what is it….3 million? If he earns 3 million in a year, then 
even if he does pay say, 1% tax, 1% of 3 million is a lot more money than 
everyone else pays to drive down that road and to use those streetlights and 
that dustbin, isn’t it? So this is why I kind of think that when there’s this stuff 
about making the economy fairer, it is difficult to say what is fair – but you 
can turn around and say ‘why should Jimmy Carr pay 300,000 pounds a year 
to drive down the road, when you and me pay £10,000 a year to drive down 
the same road?’ So you can see where he’s coming from. But at the end of the 
day you can only squeeze so much money out of people. That’s the same 
across all levels, and that’s why the cuts. 
Nicholas: But it seems like it’s the middle ground that’s being squeezed. It’s 
the softest, easiest target.  
Kyle: Well yeah because the Jimmy Carr’s and the clever accountants will … 
well they’ll either vote with their feet and go else where – which is the big 
                                                
4 Jimmy Carr is a well-known comedian and entertainer who, in June 2012 (i.e. around the time of 
fieldwork), was forced to publicly apologise after using the (perfectly legal) ‘K2’ tax avoidance 
scheme.  
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danger because if you tax them too much they will do that, and when I say 
elsewhere, they won’t go far, they might just go to the Channel islands. 
 [Focus group A2] 
But there were also specific discussions about two groups of undeserving rich in 
particular – bankers and politicians – who were often mentioned together. What 
makes these two groups particularly noteworthy is what they share: they are both 
perceived as culpable for the crisis, they are both seen to be well-off and living in a 
separate world, and, most importantly, they have unjustly received taxpayers’ money. 
These three themes – crisis culpability, otherworldliness, receiving ‘our’ money – will 
now be looked at it turn.  
As briefly looked at in the last chapter, ‘politicians’, mostly as a homogenous group, 
were sometimes blamed for the crisis: 
Damien: And I think that the responsibility have still not been assigned to the 
people who caused this. But then I would go into the political area, and, I’m 
not usually political, but from whatever political background people have 
come from, I think, the politicians have to take a big responsibility for not 
taking … for not foreseeing the possibilities of the collapse. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Equally, bankers were often blamed too: 
Jerry: And now, who’s supposed to pay them back for that lack of 
judegment? Because they’ve all made big bonuses at the time by giving the 
guy with the temporary job the big mortgage? 
 [Focus group A1] 
Nicholas: That, given the way you ask the question [‘who or what is to 
blame?’], who do we blame for it […] forgive me [Duncan, who works for a 
bank], but I think the level you possibly point at is the banks. 
[…] 
Kyle: But to answer your question, [Nicholas] is probably right, the banks … 
as an industry – as a global industry, on the American side of it, as I 
understand it – lent too much money to people that they’re not really going to 
get the money back from. 
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 [Focus group A2] 
The A2 group, it should be noted, defended both the morality of bankers and their role 
in the crisis. This was most likely because one participant worked for a bank, but, as 
the excerpt above highlights, participants were still willing to blame bankers.  
Interestingly, part of the othering process was spatial, in the sense that both bankers 
and politicians were often depicted as living in a different world. The most obvious 
example of this was a discussion about a moral vacuum among elites (discussed later) 
in which Maureen [Focus group A1] agreed, adding that ‘I think they’re flying round 
the world [inaudible] … I don’t think they live in the same world as us’. However, 
most of the time this otherworldliness had specific features depending on whether 
bankers or politicians were the topic. In regards to politicians, there were well-
rehearsed utterances about the glut of career politicians and how ‘there’s just no 
connection to the electorate, at all’ [Michael, Focus group A4]. Nicholas [Focus group 
A2] mentioned seeing his local MP in a shop and ‘he was expecting everyone to just 
bound to him’. Similarly, this otherworldliness sometimes had an element of 
unfairness, with Rose [Focus group B1], for instance, claiming in regard to the 
expenses scandal, ‘It’s like one rule for them, and one rule for us. Y’know, you can’t 
cheat the benefits system but we’ll claim every benefit going and cheat it ourselves’. 
Banking, meanwhile, was perceived as otherworldly, but for different reasons. Most 
simply, the idea of earning a £27m bonus is ‘disgraceful’ [Caitlin, Focus group A4], 
but more complex were the changes to the finance industry itself. Some comments on 
the changing nature of banking: how it has ‘gone away from the community’ [Kyle, 
Focus group A2] and towards ‘being all global’ [Rachel, Focus group A3]. This is 
important: a sense of otherworldliness and unimaginability is a crucial lubricant in the 
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wheels of othering (Blumer 1958). It gave the sense that they were distant and living 
in a different world, in a ‘bubble’ perhaps [Linda, Focus group B1]. 
However, probably the most important theme is the last one: the receipt of 
redistribution public goods, which itself is deeply imbued within two central ‘events’, 
MPs’ expenses and the bank bailouts. MPs’ expenses scandal, unsurprisingly, was at 
the forefront of discussions regarding politics. Unsurprisingly, again, politicians were 
heavily criticised from a moral perspective:  
Michael: But you just think, Christ. How can these people be allowed… I 
think ever since the whole expenses scandal there’s been a massive backlash 
and there still is … Ridiculous. Imagine fleecing the people who put you in 
power.  
 [Focus group A4] 
It was often explicitly discussed in terms of tax, with Eric [Focus group B1] asking 
‘why we can’t go back and claim the money from all the MPs’ and Rose [Focus group 
B1] comparing the expenses scandals to those who cheat the benefits system – which 
really emphasises the moral abstract order. However, the experience of this event was 
often applied to other areas, such as MEPs and high profile public servants: 
Rose: … and the Euro MPs – huh! – they’re just absolute jokers, the money 
they claim – ridiculous. You wouldn’t believe it, honestly, they’re getting 
money for everything. Lightbulbs. I mean, get a grip! You’re on god-knows-
how-many grand a year and as a pay, how have you even got the nerve to 
claim off the people you’re supposed to be supporting and looking after for a 
bloody light bulb! 
 [Focus group B1] 
Sarah: I must admit I’m not … it didn’t sit very well with me, finding out that 
our … head of the council has had a pay rise, and all the officers of the council 
have had pay rises … 
Lucy: Well that seems to be what happens. It’s the big boys. 
Sarah: 20 thousand pounds it was! [inaudible] He’s on a 140 thousand odd 
pounds per year.  
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Lucy: And they get bonuses for making people redundant don’t they. 
 [Focus group A3] 
Bank bailouts are the key ‘event’ for fiscally othering bankers. The following excerpt 
highlights this, in particular how a small minority of undeserving rich people have 
benefitted from the perverse redistribution of income from the middle: 
Jerry: …nothing quite gets me as angry about thinking about just how lightly 
the sort of top 5% have actually got off so far in this, with this recession. I … 
y’know … it’s such a cliché, but you also feel like saying, it just has to be true, 
about how, y’know, bankers have moved to protect themselves and we’ve all 
paid for it. The whole financial sector, y’know, it’s terrifically … it makes me 
angry, and feel powerless as well. 
 [Focus group A1] 
Sometimes these discussions explicitly linked bank bailouts, ‘taxpayers’ money’, and 
the ‘event’ of the Debt Crisis (the discussion was preceded by questioning why the 
UK has so much debt) discussed in the previous chapter: 
Kyle: …with Northern Rock you had people queuing outside of Northern 
Rock, we took a slightly different view and we sort of spent all of our money 
on it [laughter].  
Nicholas: And they’re still doing so. 
 [Focus group A2]  
One of the unforeseen ramifications of the bank bailouts is a politicisation of the 
financial industry, including, most notably, bonuses – which can be in excess of tens 
of millions of pounds for individual employees. The bank bailouts imbued an 
otherwise private, financial matter with issues regarding public authority and 
‘taxpayers’ money’: 
Caitlin: But I think it’s banker bonuses that are the biggest… well everyone 
would say what is going on? It’s the guy at Barclays is it, who turned down his 
£29m bonus. I just cannot believe anybody is worth £29m bonus. There’s no 
one on this planet who’s worth that. 
Michael: I think that’s what has got everybody’s goat. 
  
 
220 
Caitlin: Nobody’s salary should even be that, then their bonus. But y’know, I 
don’t know what his salary is, but I think it’s absolutely disgraceful.  
Michael: Yeah. 
Caitlin: And I can’t understand why they’re allowed to do it. Allowed to get 
away with it.  
Michael: Well, as you say, why do they even need a salary that high? Why do 
you need a bonus that high? Ridiculous. 
Cailtin: So I think yeah, the government should just go in and knock ‘em on 
the head and say no – this is all finished.  
 [Focus group A4] 
The foundation for this discussion would be unthinkable (‘get away with it’, 
government should intervene), I would suggest, before the crisis. The bank bailouts, 
precisely because they use ‘our’ money, have suddenly made the financial sector, as 
an abstract whole, accountable, in some fuzzy way, to taxpayers. However, it should 
also be noted that on some occasions participants told others how they believe bank 
bailouts were a necessary move to shore up the economy [e.g. Lynn, Focus group B1].  
When these three themes – culpability, otherworldliness, ‘our’ money – are brought 
together, a certain story emerges: of a moral vacuum, where elites are failing to set an 
example: 
Damien: I think there’s a moral, sort of, vacuum at the top. As to how to 
resolve that, I don’t have an answer to that. But I do think that the politicians 
and bankers must suffer from a guilt complex of some kind, because … 
Jerry: I wish! 
[…] 
Damien: Less of a heart of this problem [inaudible] in my humble opinion, 
but bankers who are grossly overpaid, politicians who are grossly overpaid, 
many people, as you’ve indicated, at the City of Birmingham are grossly 
overpaid … They have, this has to be addressed. I think … I don’t know the 
answers, but it could make a big difference if people acted in a more moral 
fashion.  
 [Focus group A1] 
  
 
221 
6.2.3 The taxpayer 
The ‘us’ to the undeserving, non-contributing, morally questionable, tax receiving 
‘them’ is ‘the taxpayer’. To quote Rose [Focus group B1, emphasis added], ‘We pay 
the highest taxes in the world. Why haven’t we got any money left?’ This sense of 
group position – a huge mass of hard-working taxpayers, contrasted against a free-
riding super-rich and scrounger – leads to a particular tax resistant mood: The bottom 
cannot pay, the top find loopholes; the middle thus over-contributes, while seemingly 
receiving less ‘bang for their buck’, as it were: 
Kyle: But it is true though, isn’t it? You can only squeeze out Middle England 
so much, because they’re the ones who are paying it. ‘Cos the bottom don’t 
pay it, and the top… find … 
Linda: …clever ways round it. 
 [Focus group A2] 
But before exploring this fully, a quick note about the characteristics of this group 
position is required.  
Identity formation is normally constituted in opposition to an ‘other’. The sense of a 
morally undeserving rich, in this case, provides the basis for an opposition 
hardworking ‘us’: 
Michael: It’s hard, sometimes, but other times, it’s absolutely simple. They 
[politicians] just… deserve everything they get really. And I think that [MPs’ 
expenses] probably has a bigger impact upon anything we’ve seen in society 
recently. There’s a two-tier system, those that have, and those that work hard. 
Maybe. 
 [Focus group A4] 
Michael returns to this theme of ‘haves and have-nots’ in making a more explicitly 
relevant point about how the ‘middle’ are being squeezed because ‘we’ are the ones 
who are morally sound: 
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Michael: I think you hit the nail on the head – it’s the middle ground that are 
squeezed. And those people – us, maybe – fit into the middle ground. Who 
will take the time to do that, who will do what we’re told, because we respect 
authority and we think if we don’t fill these forms in something bad will 
happen. But there are people out there who don’t, and they exploit the system 
completely, and I think there’s very much this society has changed a little bit.  
 [Focus group A4] 
In both the previous and the following excerpt, it is interesting to note that when this 
abstract order was discussed, participants were keen to include the other participants 
in the ‘us’: 
Nicholas: But I think that … when people introduced themselves, and [Kyle], 
you’re self-employed, I’m self-employed, [Duncan], you obviously get up and 
go out for a living – I sell used cars. I used to sell expensive motor cars… 
 [Focus group A2] 
Nicholas then goes onto outline how through graft and craft he realigned his business 
model to changing market conditions to ensure he still made money. The point of this 
anecdote was to highlight how it was these people – ‘60 million people living in this 
country, and everyone morning they get up: They’ve got to eat; they’ve got to buy 
clothes; they go to work; and they’re all spending money’, i.e. the hardworking 
taxpayer – are the ones being ‘squeezed’. It is notable how broad this abstract group 
of people are, and also how Nicholas was keen to emphasise that all participants in 
that group were members – suggesting that it may be an insult otherwise.  
The notion of a middle mass being ‘squeezed’ in these hard times is crucial. This 
sense can only be understood relationally: the middle is not sufficiently rewarded for 
contributing to society and essentially supporting others; it is all ‘take, take, take’ 
[Caitlin, Focus group A4]:  
Caitlin: And you do get a bit resentful. I’m standing out here in the cold 
selling all this, and all my income tax is just going to someone who doesn’t 
want to work, someone who is just sitting at home and going off on a holiday 
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to Mallorca for 2 weeks. And I’ve stood out in the cold funding their holiday 
in the sun. And you do sort of get a bit… 
Michael: And they think it’s their right, rather than the… 
Caitlin: But perhaps there is no incentive for them to get up and … do … as 
you say, it’s easier to do that, and if you’re of that way then… 
 [Focus group A4] 
However, the most explicit expression of this sense of group position in an explicitly 
fiscal sense is from Kyle: 
Kyle: … and so you can’t get it [tax to finance the fiscal deficit] off these guys 
because they [inaudible] or they’ll find a way of being in the Channel islands 
or wherever it might be, and you’re not going to get if off the people at the 
bottom, because we don’t ask for it half the time but we’re certainly not going 
to get it from the bottom end, so it is Middle England who are having to pay 
more and more. And everybody, most British people, aspire to be moving up 
and up and up, the aspiration is that you get up there and then you’re back 
down here again, and you’re back up there and the next thing you know you’re 
back down. How do you do it? And we all struggle with that I think. 
 [Focus group A2] 
This sense of group position is an important aspect of austerity acquiescence and the 
perceived necessity of spending cuts. This is because alternative solutions to fiscal 
deficit reduction – i.e. increased taxation – are seen as primarily not just a further 
limit on the ability for individuals to make autonomous decisions about their finances, 
but something beyond that: it would be fundamentally unfair and morally 
questionable to continue the current experience of perverse fiscal redistribution from 
the hard-working mass to the few super-rich and scrounger rotten eggs at the expense 
of the ‘squeezed middle’. As a side note, however, the moral abstract order did not 
always directly lead to complete tax resistance. In this instance, it led to an argument 
that the deficit should be made up by taxing big corporations who do not make a fair 
fiscal contribution: 
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Lucy: And I think the money should be found – tried to be found – from 
elsewhere. And I don’t think it should be found by taxing – obviously I don’t 
think it should be found by taxing people like me – [inaudible] […] there are 
bigger targets to aim at. 
 [Focus group A3] 
However, despite this variation – ‘tax the mega-rich’ – both the group position and 
the related austerity acquiescence are both still produced.  
Summary 
Participants consistently reproduced a moral abstract order and a sense of group 
position when talking about tax5. A morally undeserving ‘them’, the rich and poor at 
either end of the spectrum who get an easy fiscal ride, was constituted against a 
hardworking taxpaying majority. This is the power of the moral abstract order: almost 
everyone, I would suggest, identifies as hardworking and taxpaying and thus with the 
99% – probably even bonus-laden bankers and ‘scroungers’. The strength of the 
group position comes from the fact that it is moral, not socioeconomic, meaning that 
most people identify as in the group and not out of it. It is vehemently inclusive. 
Indeed, there do not seem to be many people who self-identify as either ‘scroungers’ 
or as bankers whose millions are self-understood as easy to make and state subsidised 
– which is exactly the point. This moral abstract order matters for primarily two 
reasons. 
First, when this group position and abstract order are produced, people are likely to be 
far more resistant to taxation, because it suggests that they – both the individual 
person, and the wider 99% taxpayer group – will be unfairly contributing more than 
                                                
5 Alternative moral orders to the undeserving rich and poor included a distinction between public and 
private (e.g. the private sector, 50% of the country, provides all the wealth for the others) and England 
and Scotland (e.g. over the different higher education tuition fee regimes). But neither order was hailed 
as consistently to the morally undeserving mood studied in detail here.  
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others. To put it succinctly: the bottom scrounges, the top are in a different world with 
power and loopholes, while the middle actually contribute. To fund deficit reduction 
from the pockets of this abstract middle 99% would create a legitimacy gap of its 
own: it would run against how many people believe the economy both does work and 
should work. On the basis of this tax talk, I would follow Kidder and Martin (2012) 
and argue that this tax resistance is not about merely maximising wealth or about 
blindly following a right-wing ideology – but about morality and fairness.  
Second, when this group position and abstract order are produced, a legitimacy gap in 
regard to the allocation of public money exists between what is delivered and what is 
deemed fair. Simply put, if one believes that ‘taxpayers’ money’ is being used to 
support the undeserving, then one will question the legitimacy of contributing towards 
that. As this thesis has consistently argued, the politics of taxing and spending is what 
lies at the heart of the politics of austerity acquiescence. If a legitimacy gap between 
what is expected and what is perceived as being delivered (i.e. support for the morally 
underserving) can be identified, then it should perhaps come as little surprise that the 
British public, as a whole, are generally acquiescent to a state strategy that seeks to 
trim back the state and thus lessen the burden of taxation. The everyday maintenance 
of this moral abstract order – banker bashing, politician hating, scrounger slurring – is 
crucial in the production of this legitimacy gap. 
Concluding remarks 
The state is at the very least partially dependent upon funding itself through raising 
taxation from citizens. Indeed, ‘over the long run it constitutes the largest intervention 
of governments into their subjects’ private life’ (Tilly 2009: xiii). That this 
intervention, and extraction, is based not upon a direct exchange for a service, but 
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instead a rather fuzzy obligation to contribute to the state and other citizens (Martin et 
al. 2009b: 3), means that ensuring the legitimacy of this rather informal contract is 
crucial to the states’ existence, even in good times. If a debt crisis occurs at a time 
when there is a mood of questioning the fairness of the specific aspects and general 
character of this obligation, then raising taxation to fund deficit reduction will not be 
legitimate and thus not politically viable. Austerity was almost framed as a case of the 
squeezed middle striking back against the unfair distribution of ‘taxpayers’ money’, 
to restore parity. But whether this promise is to be fulfilled is unlikely, since quite a 
few participants also discussed how it is perversely this very squeezed middle that 
must take the pain. 
In this chapter, the focus has been on how people interact with the state – but 
specifically from a fiscal lens – and how a mood that emanates from these shared 
experiences is relevant to the political analysis of fiscal consolidation. The argument 
unfolds in three parts. First, there was a mood in which a specific manifestation of 
‘taxpayers’ money’ was deemed and experienced to be unfairly diverted towards 
unnecessary state profligacy and supporting the morally undeserving. Second, this 
mood highlights a gap, between expectations and experience of public finance, which 
the Debt Crisis narrative gave sense to and ‘spoke to’, as it were. Third, this gap helps 
explain austerity acquiescence. If one believes that ‘taxpayers’ money’ is supporting 
a) profligacy and b) morally undeserving groups, then one will question the 
legitimacy of contributing further ‘taxpayers’ money’ to reduce the deficit and be 
inclined towards accepting the inevitability of spending cuts in the context of an 
accepted Debt Crisis.  
This argument leads to a number of implications about austerity acquiescence. First, it 
indicates that a large, but otherwise somewhat analytically neglected, element of the 
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politics of austerity is taxation, and that slow-burning fiscal legitimacy gaps play a 
role alongside fast-burning crisis narratives in understanding acquiescence to the 
necessity of spending cuts. Second, this chapter has shown how the ‘interests’ of the 
participants, a possible explanation underpinning the first implication, were not 
merely given but interpreted in light of a sense of being a ‘taxpayer’, which is itself 
constituted in relation to an abstract picture of where they stand in a moral order. 
Third, it highlights how the Debt Crisis narrative explored in the previous chapter 
resonated with real experiences of ‘taxpayers’ money’ by speaking to existing fiscal 
legitimacy gaps. Crucially, the experience of state profligacy and the moral abstract 
order play an important part in the everyday production of the Debt Crisis narrative 
by providing a simplistic and experiential story to account for the existence of the 
state debt and/or deficit in the first place. The implications of this, as well as the 
exploration of wider analytical issues, are the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Acquiescing to austerity: The moral crisis 
and the household analogy 
 
 
 
 
 
How have the British public reluctantly accepted the necessity of fiscal consolidation? 
This was the puzzle posed at the beginning of this thesis, which was translated into a 
specific two-pronged research question: how do everyday actors make sense of 
austerity, and what do these processes tell us about the legitimation of austerity and 
the wider politics of crisis? Chapter 1 showed that crisis is perhaps the central concept 
in making sense of the politics of austerity. Speaking of crisis is a powerful incitement 
for legitimating radical political change. Chapter 2 argued that in order to answer the 
puzzle, we would need to conceptualise crisis as constituted through enactment to 
avoid an otherwise never-ending search for the true cause of the deterioration of 
public finances. Crises may then be elite-driven in a sense, but the narratives upon 
which decisive interventions are made necessary still require legitimation through 
resonating with the mood of the times. Chapter 3 outlined how the mood of the times 
can be disaggregated into a three-part ideal-typical analytical framework and argued 
that focus groups are the most appropriate method for study. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 put 
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this into practice, showing what we talk about when we talk about austerity. It was 
argued that austerity makes sense to people in regards to: the relative continuity of 
normal expectations in the public life of the downturn; the popular wisdom and 
experiences people use when making sense of the debt crisis; and the seemingly 
unfair redistribution of taxpayer money to wasted public projects and to the 
undeserving. Together, these elements meant that austerity could be justified by 
shared belief, conferring a degree of legitimacy. The debt crisis resonated with the 
mood of the times.  
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: it synthesises the argument of the thesis so far 
while simultaneously seeking to push this analysis further and beyond the focus group 
data itself. The research questions outlined in the Introduction were: how do everyday 
actors make sense of austerity, and what do these processes tell us about the 
legitimation of austerity and the wider politics of crisis? If the previous three 
empirical chapters have specifically spoken to the former of these two questions, then 
this chapter speaks to the latter. It starts by recapping how the justifications and 
narratives seen in the focus group discussions conferred a degree of legitimacy to the 
coalition economic strategy. It then suggests that the sources of these justifications lie 
in long-standing norms and conventions; so to better understand the process of 
austerity acquiescence, we must begin the inevitably incomplete and partial process of 
historicising these sources and exploring their political implications. I focus, in the 
second and third sections respectively, on two such sources: the household analogy, 
and the taxpayer as a sense of group position. The second section offers a brief history 
of how households should live within their means, highlighting how the stories of 
both state and household are intimately intertwined. The third section briefly 
historicises the fiscal relations between the taxpayer and the undeserving poor with 
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special attention on the welfare reforms of New Labour, before going on to explore 
the political implications of these relations. Ultimately, it is argued that crisis is 
indeed a central concept for understanding the politics of austerity. But rather than a 
financial, growth or fiscal crisis, the age of austerity has been primarily experienced 
and justified as a moral crisis in which a return to living within means (for both state 
and household) can help restore fairness.  
7.1 Cooling out the marks? 
In questioning why there has been such little popular mobilisation and resistance 
against neo-liberalism during the crisis, Jason Glynos and his co-authors (2012) argue 
that the perverse ‘enjoyment’ derived from scapegoating individual bankers in effect 
depoliticised the financial crisis. While there were ‘shrill expressions of public 
dismay, anger and complaint abound, especially in relation to ‘greedy bankers’ … 
[this rarely] translated into organized mass demonstrations and sustained political 
demands’ (2012: 297). They place this argument into a pithy frame: how the ‘marks’ 
– in this case UK citizens – have been pacified, taken in, or ‘cooled out’ (hence their 
title: ‘Cooling out the marks’). ‘The mark’ is a term derived from pickpockets and 
other street criminals, who would place, quite literally, a chalk mark on the shoulder 
of an unsuspecting target to suggest an easy theft for their accomplices. Consequently, 
it has now become a colloquial term for a person who is easily deceived or taken 
advantage of. As Glynos et al. put it (quoting Erving Goffman), ‘the mark is the 
sucker – the person who is taken in’ (Glynos et al. 2012: 300). The vitriol directed at 
vilifying individual bankers when anger should have more usefully directed at the 
system suggests, to borrow the parlance, that some suckers have been taken in.  
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Although I am sensitive to the clear fact that the methodology and methods chosen by 
researchers shapes the way in which the public are understood, I seek here to distance 
this thesis from such a view. This view is relatively widespread in social science, 
whereby the ‘mass citizenry appear as dolts’ (Gamson 1992: 4). The main argument 
of Gamson’s study, one he clearly felt was worth strong and central prominence, is 
that ‘people are not so passive, people are not so dumb’ (1992: 4). As he explains in 
his concluding remarks: 
I hope this book has been an antidote to the conventional wisdom that most 
political issues and events do not make much sense to most working people. 
Listening to their conversations over a period of an hour or more, one is struck 
by the deliberative quality of their construction of meaning about these 
complex issues. And they achieve considerable coherence in spite of a great 
many handicaps, some flowing from limitations in the media discourse that 
they find available and others from their own lack of experiences with that 
task (1992: 175). 
Following the focus group research upon which this thesis is built, I have found little 
reason to disagree. 
There were clear differences between the middle-income homeowners and the 
community volunteers who were interviewed for this project. The A groups knew 
more about formal elite politics, and were more aware of the official narratives – 
which they often resisted – and some even spoke of challenging capitalism. The B 
groups were less aware of official discourses, but unsurprisingly had a much better 
grasp and understanding of their local communities and the localised impact of the 
recession. Perhaps as a result of this, the A groups produced more ‘data’ to analyse 
through producing many discussions on the politics of austerity and crisis intercepted 
with extended monologues, while the B groups were more likely to discuss issues that 
were more firmly related to their communities. While there were quite a few instances 
of long monologues or sustained conversations about (for example) the nature of the 
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fiscal deficit in the A groups, the B groups may only spend two minutes discussing 
that same topic. The size of the groups also clearly had an impact, with bigger groups 
not as conducive to detailed discussion. So while both groups did produce forms of 
acquiescence to the imperatives of the debt crisis, the attempted explanation and 
historicisation of this will inevitably slightly bias the A groups since they produced 
more detailed data to analyse. 
Nevertheless, both groups drew on similar and shared resources – debt as an 
obligation, experiences of wasted public money, and so on – in justifying and 
acquiescing to austerity. To expand upon this, recall Campbell’s typology of ideas 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Campbell makes the distinction between foregrounded ‘frames’ 
(‘symbols and concepts that help policy makers to legitimise policy solutions to the 
public’) and the backgrounded ‘public sentiment’ (‘public assumptions that constrain 
the normative range of legitimate solutions available to policy makers’) (1998: 385). 
This thesis has so far, to put it in the simplest of terms, shown how the frames (or, 
narratives) of austerity resonated with the public sentiment (or, the mood of the times). 
More specifically, because the spending cuts could be justified by shared beliefs a 
degree of legitimacy was conferred onto the Coalition’s economic strategy. This 
process requires unpacking, along the lines of the disaggregated mood of the times 
framework set out in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 surveyed the public life of crisis. It argued that relatively speaking – and 
especially in comparison to the mythologies of the Great Depression and the Winter 
of Discontent – relatively little about public life was ‘up’. There was little breakdown 
in the routine and mundane fabric of social existence that could be said to be 
symptomatic of a failure of the overarching organising principles of the economy. 
More specifically, these experiences involved: an abstracted crisis in which privation 
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was considered largely a private trouble rather than a public issue; no critical events 
that were symptomatic of a breakdown in the order of things; local level contestation 
over the distribution of resources and need for further community resilience (mainly 
B group); a ‘restaurants are full’ trope that suggests despite some suffering many 
people are continuing to consume and live life as normal (mainly A group). This 
sense that normal consumption has continued is strengthened by the increasing 
vilification of those in poverty (see Chapter 6, and below). For the A groups, this 
latter sense was very strong; there was a feeling that despite some private troubles that 
normal life was uninterrupted – but that those worse off would be suffering. For the B 
groups, there was a definite sense that spending cuts are and would continue to make 
their lives worse, but that the best way to deal with that was through strategies of 
community resilience. This relatively mundane experience helped foster a mood of 
acquiescence. 
Everyday sense-making provided the focus of Chapter 5. All focus group discussions 
identified ‘debt’ (sometimes among other things) as the problem or crisis facing the 
UK. Just like the Conservative rhetoric (see Chapter 2), debt was sufficiently flexible 
a term to sometimes unambiguously incorporate both households and the state into 
this problem definition. As such, it was often argued that the state should cut back and 
live within its means. Participants often drew on popular wisdom about how one must 
pay one’s debts as an obligation, or on experiences about the pre-crisis consumer 
credit boom to make sense of the fiscal deficit. In other words, participants often 
extrapolated from everyday knowledge to make sense of the state level in a way 
consistent with how some observers might expect the household analogy to work. 
Furthermore, there was a sense that we should go back to living within our means like 
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the UK used to in an ambiguous past. Consequently, spending cuts were justified as a 
logical extension of this sense-making process. 
Chapter 6 showed how the focus group participants contested the distribution of 
public money as unfair. This came out in mainly two ways. First, participants 
consistently used anecdotes to highlight personal experiences in which the state has 
been profligate and wasted public money. The participants invoked stories of how 
parents would sell the laptops their children received for free, or how the streets were 
being unnecessarily repaved. Second, participants consistently reproduced a sense of 
group position in which a ‘striving’ taxpayer was contrasted against a ‘shirker’ rich 
and poor – both of whom had received unfair distribution of taxpayer money (through 
bank bailouts, MPs’ expenses, or through welfare benefits). Although some did – and 
we could guess that many more would – support the welfare state in principle, these 
two processes nevertheless suggested a legitimacy gap between the expectations and 
actual experiences of the ‘taxpayers’ money’. In other words, people expect that tax 
should favour the (hard-working, tax-paying) ‘squeezed middle’ instead of being 
wasted on unnecessary work or objects and being redistributed to those who do not 
deserve it. Crucially, this meant that a promise to cut back spending through 
efficiency savings and welfare retrenchment was experienced as an implicit promise 
to restore the balance in favour of the taxpayer and thus, in a sense, restore a sense of 
fairness. This meant that austerity could be justified via shared belief, thus conferring 
a degree of legitimacy.  
We can synthesise these three elements into an ideal-type everyday narrative of 
austerity: both states and households lived excessively. Households became indebted 
through being increasingly networked within global finance; ‘you could have as many 
[credit cards] as you like […] I don’t think it’s like that anymore – every day you’d 
  
 
235 
get offered one […] Don’t think you get that like you used if you think about it’ 
[Caitlin, focus group A4]. States built up debt through wasteful spending; ‘we should 
have a special mention for our politicians too. Because they were doing the same 
thing, borrowing money they couldn’t afford to pay back’ [Nicholas, focus group A2]. 
Since the experiences of crisis were relatively mundane, it represents a good time to 
restore the balance. The result is that ‘austerity’ is seen as a society-wide phenomenon, 
invoking both state and household to live within means after pre-crisis credit fuelled 
excesses. Cutting back public spending (through efficiency savings and welfare 
retrenchment) thus implicitly promises to make the life of the taxpayer fairer; ‘cutting 
back’ and living within means as a more general mindset, meanwhile, promises to 
escape the guilty excesses of the recent past by rediscovering the moral code of thrift 
and prudence.  
Crisis is central to understanding this acquiescence. As pointed out many times 
already, crisis invokes many things, including the sense that something is reaching a 
critical turning point in which an ending is nigh. Crisis, then, is a process of limbo, in 
which something seems fallible to complete and systematic collapse unless a decisive 
intervention is made. In Chapter 1, I reviewed the different crises identified by 
academics in explaining austerity. Proponents of the financial crisis thesis argue that 
through bank bailouts the buck was passed on to the state – an unlucky guarantor that 
deserved little ill fate, but which is now being blamed for debts that were accumulated 
for reasons far from being profligate. It is the tempestuous rise of finance, then, that 
has come to crisis point. The growth crisis thesis argues that the UK’s privatised 
Keynesian economic regime in which a politically sustained housing bubble drove 
growth has come to a potential end. The fiscal crisis thesis, meanwhile, argues that 
conditions of easy credit and low tax that displaced the inherent tensions in 
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democratic capitalism have reached a turning point. The capitalist crisis thesis 
identifies public debt and deficits as the latest symptom of a tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall. Finally, some have identified a social crisis in which ‘Broken Britain’ is 
fuelled by a breakdown of both societal and individual responsibility. The large fiscal 
deficit, then, is considered an excellent opportunity to restructure the state to remedy 
this. The phenomena identified in these theses may or may not be coming to an end. 
The point is that they do not necessarily reflect the implicit crisis identification 
contained within this ideal-type narrative of austerity.  
Although no one explicitly stated it as so, the everyday narrative of austerity outlined 
just above contains an element of something ending, of something at the crossroads in 
need of change to continue. They may not have directly spoken of it, but they 
nevertheless invoked the idea of a crisis. That is, a crisis of morality, which, from 
bankers who lent too much money to make money to those who used these new 
facilities to remortgage in order to finance good living, has inflicted society as a 
whole. It was a crisis that involved the state as well as individual politicians (most 
notably through the MPs’ expenses scandal). Taken together, there was a sense that 
things were too easy, with undeserved luxury a too frequent occurrence. The absence 
of hard work removes an important incentive, and as a result people can become 
corrupted and irresponsible in a manner similar to the social crisis thesis outlined in 
Chapter 1. Those who have it easy with no hard work are considered as an affront to 
the dignity of those who identify as work-hard ‘strivers’ (which, as Chapter 6 argued, 
is virtually everyone). As Nicholas [Focus group A2] put it, ‘everything was done on 
finance. It was finance up to your eyeballs … The whole thing just exploded from 
nothing really, we’re just reaping what we sowed before and everyone benefitted … It 
was all false’. This, in the experience of many, is no way for an economy to work; (to 
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invoke the beginning of Chapter 3) the economy ought to work in a different, fairer 
way.  
The age of austerity is to an extent predicated on restoring a certain level of parity in 
response to this sense of a moral crisis. Spending cuts are thus conceivably something 
that can potentially make life fairer through restoring some sort of parity – both in 
terms of the state redistribution of resources and in terms of realising life-chances. For 
if fiscal consolidation can be justified by these shared beliefs and norms, then the next 
question is to ask what the sources of these social phenomena are. Unpacking this 
requires some additional work. More specifically, we need to historicise and 
understand it. Doing so requires both expanding upon and seeking to go beyond the 
focus group data itself, to a more analytical perspective. Since there is limited space 
for this exercise, it will undoubtedly be incomplete, but still one that is worthwhile for 
the light it sheds on the problem in question. The remainder of this chapter, then, is 
dedicated to expanding upon two elements of the moral crisis narrative that are the 
most prescient. First, if the state should live within its means like a responsible 
household, then we need to ask how a responsible household ought to work. Second, I 
explore the political implications for the abstract moral order outlined in Chapter 6. 
One of the central points is that rather than the marks or suckers being ‘cooled’ 
through narratives imposed by elites, a central source of austerity acquiescence is the 
development of this moral crisis in everyday life as evident in these histories.  
7.2 Unpacking the household analogy 
As Chapter 2 and 5 covered, the household analogy is one the central justifications for 
austerity. This was taken to a logical extreme by Conservative MP Caroline Spelman 
who claimed that ‘thrift’ is an appropriate economic policy for both the state and 
  
 
238 
households: ‘let’s call it thrift then because thrift is a virtue and thrift needs to be part 
of the solution to our nation’s problems […] thrift is living within your means’ (quote 
from Jensen 2012: 22). Focus group participants made similar justifications.  
This continued invocation of the household clearly works, in part, in a cognitive 
fashion. As already discussed, the household analogy is essentially fallacious because 
it misrepresents the functions and capacities of the state to make alternatives to 
austerity seem both unfeasible and undesirable. It is almost as if the mass public has 
adopted the incorrect cognitive schemas, thus producing a naïve or folk understanding 
of economics (e.g. Caplan 2001, 2002, Rubin 2003). The use of the household 
analogy also reflects how non-experts make sense of abstract and far-away issues. For 
example, Gamson shows how people draw analogies to everyday experiences of 
conflicts (e.g. between siblings, spouses or neighbours) when making sense of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict (Gamson 1992: 158). This led to the justification of particular 
actions, such as that outsiders should remain above the battle and not take sides in a 
conflict that clearly has its own specific dynamic (Gamson 1992: 158). It is these 
ways – cognitive and sense-making – in which I too have mostly discussed the 
household analogy thus far.  
This cognitive or sense-making perspective is useful but also limited. Recall Chapter 
5, in which it was argued that debt is not merely an impersonal financial instrument 
but a social relation built upon assumptions of how one ought to properly act. And 
also recall that the household analogy is used almost exclusively when justifying an 
austere response to over-indebtedness. Indeed, when we consider debt as a social 
relation, a more coherent moral narrative begins to emerge. Reflecting the ideal-type 
narrative outlined in the previous section, this story conflates both households and the 
state in the context of the credit crunch and global financial crisis: ‘we’ all racked up 
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too much debt targeting the high-life in the boom years, but since the crisis we must 
now start living within means; this has befallen everyone in society and we must now 
reap what we sowed. The actual differences between state and household are eked out 
through the primacy of debt. The flexible power of invoking debt is premised upon its 
clear moral foundations. 
This point also brings to the fore that ‘the state should act like a responsible 
household’ is, in the final analysis, a claim that is saturated with moral meaning. 
Ultimately this invocation is rooted in a sense of what ‘good’ households ought to do, 
suggesting that morality must be at the heart of the issue. To fully understand the 
sense of moral crisis that austerity is predicated on, we must first unpack how the 
meaning of a responsible household has changed over recent history, and, second, 
understand how this meaning has come to be so. In other words, we must understand 
both what the ideal of a thrifty household is at this particular time, and how this led to 
a mood receptive to austerity.  
7.2.1 The practical past 
This history of responsible or thrifty households, however, contrasts starkly with 
existing histories of austerity. Blyth’s history, for instance, is an intellectual tour that 
encompasses political philosophy, economic theory and economic history. As Blyth 
rightly points out, there is no well worked ‘theory of austerity’, but rather a 
‘sensibility’ concerning a small state in which deficits and debts in downturns are 
frowned upon (2013a: 98-9). Blyth’s history then starts with both Smith and Hume’s 
distrust of debts and deficits, before ending by surveying Alesina’s ‘expansionary 
fiscal consolidation’. It is a history, however, that equates austerity with a distrust of 
the state (and with that, a distrust of fiscal deficits and of sovereign debt), rather than 
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a more everyday ambiguous virtue of living within means. Although Konzelmann’s 
(2014) history is slightly more expansive, both histories provide an incomplete 
understanding of the idea of austerity (in contrast to the idea of fiscal consolidation).  
In contrast, an intellectual history of thrifty households would surely begin with 
Aristotle’s oikonomia. This term referred to the wise and prudent management of the 
good, wealth and welfare of the household economy. This oikonomia or household 
economy was ‘managed not just to satisfy immediate material needs but to also 
provide the possibility of a good life distinguished by independent wealth and 
prosperity’ (Allon 2011: 144). As Rousseau explains in A Discourse on Political 
Economy: ‘the word Economy, or OEconomy … meant originally only the wise and 
legitimate government of the house for the common good of the whole family … the 
meaning of the term was then extended to the government of that great family which 
is the State’ (Rousseau 2011 [1755]: 79). The household analogy, then, has a famous 
history: it is virtually written into the history of studying and making sense of the 
economy. 
The importance of prudential and responsible ‘household management’ was 
reinforced with the advent of classical political economy. For Adam Smith, and for 
the intellectual tradition he decisively contributed to, thrift is equated with saving. It 
was Smith who wrote ‘what is prudence in the conduct of every private family can 
scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom’. While those who do not save are guilty of 
‘prodigality and misconduct’, Smith is not necessarily engaging in just moral 
proselytising (see Wealth of Nations, II.3.13-18) since saving was then regarded as 
‘rational from both the individual and collective point of view’ (Dodd 1994: 11). For 
Smith was merely observing how the economy he knew operated: in the early 1800s it 
was typically only the wealthy landlords and capitalists who both had the ability to 
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save and the requirement to put those savings to productive use as the basis for 
investment and thus economic growth (Heilbroner 1999: 264, Toporowski 2005: 136-
7).  
Society, however, soon changed. As wealth generally improved in the Western world, 
saving became a distinct possibility for increasing members of society and thus 
decreasingly directly related to investment (Heilbroner 1999: 264). Of course, Keynes 
was perhaps the most famous to note the potential paradoxical economic implications 
of these changes: a classic fallacy of composition in which the population’s attempts 
to save money in a downturn impacts upon aggregate demand, making the population 
worse off in the longer run. Keynes’ contributions coincided with yet another shift in 
norms and expectations. ‘Put simply’, Daniel Bell (1974: 44) argued, ‘where workers 
once feared losing a job, which was the common experience of the Depression, they 
now expect a job and a rising standard of living … And no government can deny that 
expectation’. Bell foresaw that this would lead to divisive contests over distribution 
that would require ‘a new ethos of restraint’ that would ‘contain the untrammelled 
passions of Western consumer culture’ (Krippner 2011: 20). Invoking oikonomia, 
Bell used the term ‘public household’ to outline his vision for a new form of social 
and political deliberation on how to guide decisions about redistribution toward public 
needs rather than private wants.  
While undoubtedly interesting and important, this preliminary intellectual history 
needs to be at least supplemented with a more ‘practical’ and contemporary history. 
For what is particularly of interest is instead how norms and conventions surrounding 
how a household should live within means have created a mood for austerity. Amin 
Samman’s (2014) distinction between ‘the historical past’ and ‘the practical past’, 
itself borrowed from Hayden White and Michael Oakeshott, is particularly 
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illuminating in this regard. Both White and Oakeshott make this distinction regarding 
how two different kinds of past perform different functions (Samman 2014: 24). The 
first of these is the historical past, which is ‘a past authenticated through the truth-
procedures of the historian’ (Samman 2014: 25). In contrast, the role of the practical 
past is to ‘enable and inform the decisions of individuals as they confront the mystery 
of an ever-changing present … This past consists in the loose or unexamined memory 
that people carry around with them’ (Samman 2014: 25). Following Bramall (2013: 
14), then, the focus here is on the ‘presence and persuasiveness of history’ in the form 
of the practical past, rather than what is absent from or incorrect about these 
resurrected histories of thrift and austerity. So, rather than discuss historical events or 
intellectual history, I seek to use the next sub-section to explore (1) how the past 
(whether accurate or not) is being used to make sense of the present and future in 
novel ways and (2) how that process is leading to changing norms and conventions 
from a historical perspective. 
7.2.2 The responsible household 
Reinforced norms and shifting conventions about thrift have made austerity, as 
broadly conceived, a desirable virtue following the credit-fuelled excesses of the pre-
crisis years. This process has relied heavily on borrowing from the past (especially 
post-war ‘Austerity Britain’), resulting in a sort of strange and kitsch nostalgia that is 
being made into something new (Bramall 2013). The meaning of thrift has subtly 
shifted from synonymous with saving, and is now ‘connecting with various practices 
geared towards reconfigured modes of consumption and lifestyles – ethical, 
conscientious or collaborative’ (Podkalicka and Potts 2013: 2). This history of how 
households should live within means is central to understanding the (moral) idea of 
austerity.   
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First, however, it is worthwhile to briefly unpack the most obvious way in which a 
household should be responsible: through the very well engrained moral and social 
obligation to maximise the life-chances of the family unit. This obligation is 
intergenerational – about elders (e.g. Silverstein et al. 2012) but especially about 
children and future generations. Homes are seen as places of responsibilities, with 
adults shouldering a moral obligation to look after daily life (May 2008: 473, 
Helavirta 2011: 434, see also Finch 1989). This is a point made in even stronger terms 
by McCarthy et al. (2000), who conducted interviews with a number of parents. They 
found that moral imperative that adults must take responsibility for children in their 
care and therefore must seek to put the needs of children first is so strong ‘that it 
seems to have been impossible for anyone to disagree with it in the accounts we heard’ 
(McCarthy et al. 2000: 789). In the interviews, parents consistently tried to uphold 
their identities by showing how they live up to this: ‘everyone subscribed to it in some 
format in at least some part of their interview’ (McCarthy et al. 2000: 790).  
Similarly, the philosopher L. A. Paul (2015) has discussed how the predominant 
cultural paradigm for deciding to have a child or not is through a personal choice in 
which responsibility is played against future expectations of life-chances, happiness 
and self-actualisation. This cultural paradigm is reinforced through the attention and 
resources that are geared towards unplanned pregnancies and family planning (Paul 
2015: 2). Family planning, and thus some of the moral issues surrounding 
responsibility, were different before the advent of contraception, whereupon choosing 
to have children was limited – and when it was chosen it was often because one 
needed an heir or more labour (Paul forthcoming: 20). Ideals about when to start a 
family are now, however, more centred upon careful deliberation about how to best 
  
 
244 
enhance the life chances of both parents and their kin. To do otherwise is deemed 
irresponsible for future generations.  
The household, as a family unit, is bound up with responsibility over intergenerational 
life chances. This is reflected in elite justifications for austerity. Comparing the state 
to a household is often linked to claims about ‘saddling’ the next generation with debt. 
For example: 
‘It is not fair to live beyond our means and leave the next generation to clear 
up the mess […] If a government recklessly increases borrowing – on and off 
the balance sheet – then it simply shifts the burden of paying for today's public 
expenditure on to the next generation. Instead, government has a responsibility 
to mend the roof when the sun is shining’ (Osborne 2008b). 
‘The confidence needed to plan for a family's future without the threat of a 
generation weighed down by national debt’ (Osborne 2008c). 
Living within means, then, can be a commitment to the life chances of the family unit. 
Being frugal and spendthrift, and avoiding unnecessary debt, is an important part of 
constantly meeting this moral obligation. As Goffman (1971: 184-7) argues, to 
‘sustain a viable image of himself [sic] in the eyes of others’ requires presenting 
oneself as meeting the codes for socially acceptable behaviour. These norms are 
accompanied by both negative and positive sanctions for refracting or complying 
(Goffman 1971: 124). ‘The significance of these rewards and penalties is not meant to 
lie in their intrinsic, substantive worth but in what they proclaim about the moral 
status of the actor’ (Goffman 1971: 124, emphasis added). Following these norms, 
then, it is important part of how one maintains their sense of social self, and a way for 
them to continually confirm the rightness of their own actions. Intergenerational 
responsibility, as a norm, is an important aspect of how an ideal household should live 
within its means. In invoking this in making sense of austerity, a tapestry of social 
history is itself being invoked. 
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It should also be noted that although it is not an integral part of accounting for 
austerity acquiescence, this practical past of household thriftiness is gendered. As 
Bramall argues, in this practical past of austerity ‘certain gendered subject positions 
are more visible, desirable, and possible than others’ (2013: 111). With the postwar 
context of the austere home front being constantly conjured, we cannot help but be 
consistently presented with the gendered nature of these times. Indeed, the practices 
implored by the new thrift – ‘of making, saving, digging, mending, and being 
resourceful’ – are activities that are ideally located in the home and in the ‘sphere of 
domesticity’ (Bramall 2013: 111). For Bramall, the ‘austerity housewife’ is a very 
visible figure: this controller of the family ration book being ‘summoned, for instance, 
via the display of austerity-appropriate products in shops, or in magazines’ (2013: 
111). This practical past helps produce a necessarily gendered subject position in 
which the austerity housewife serves as an ‘exemplar for present times’ (Bramall 
2013: 111).  
That the ideal household should act responsibly and within its means was also 
politically encouraged. Matthew Watson in particular has traced how microeconomic 
prudence and responsibility became an increasingly important and constitutive 
element of the political economy of New Labour. Watson’s (2008b) argument is that 
under fiscal pressures to simultaneously provide some form of social democratic 
support for maximising equality of opportunity while ensuring macroeconomic 
prudence to generate market credibility and appease tax resistant middle-class voters, 
New Labour were increasingly forced to pass the buck for care and assistance onto 
the individual. This involves dissipating the long-term pressures of fiscal transfers on 
government expenditure by, first, redesigning the welfare system to ensure claimants 
get ‘something for something’ (rather than ‘something for nothing’) and, second, 
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through encouraging homeownership to act as a form of asset-based welfare to 
encourage self-reliance in old age.  
What is particularly notable is how through these shifts in both policy and discourse 
the responsibility of the state and of households became visibly entangled. The 
promise of making welfare work and of instilling asset-based welfare was consistently 
premised on the basis of reducing the welfare bill and ensuring decreased expenditure 
for the future state (as well as in terms of ensuring low inflation) (Watson 2013b: 11). 
Being a responsible household that lives within its means (by, for instance, foregoing 
some degree of current consumption to invest in property for an asset-based future) is 
not just directly important to maximising the life chances of individual households 
themselves, but also indirectly important for a responsible state under its own 
budgetary pressures (Watson 2008b: 583). The imperative for responsible households 
was encouraged through a number of flagship New Labour policies, notably including 
welfare-to-work and the Child Trust Fund (on which see Finlayson 2008). These 
changes are again important for our concerns later on.  
There are also more contemporary shifts in norms and conventions about how one 
should live within means that help foster a mood conducive to austerity when 
justifying fiscal consolidation through analogising the state as a household. During 
the boom, many millions of Britons increasingly made use of unsecured credit and the 
seemingly eternally rising house prices to meet increasing expectations of living 
standards (see Chapter 1). This led to certain norms, expectations and understandings 
surrounding homeownership and owner-occupation in the UK. Despite spiralling 
household debts, there was a sense that there was a never-ending boom in which easy 
credit and a buoyant housing market played an integral part. However, the 
expectations became problematized come the inevitable downturn, with the 
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politicisation of debt as a problem leading to a rethink of the role of credit in everyday 
life. This was reflected in the focus group discussions in Chapter 5. Participants 
generally spoke in the past tense about a period of credit-fuelled profligacy that has 
now passed. More specifically, this distinction was between a past in which the UK 
was caught on a ‘hamster wheel’ of consuming beyond its means through ‘finance up 
to our eyeballs’ and an austere present and future. One participant spoke how there 
was a ‘feeling that anything you wanted you could go out and buy’, but now realises 
that it ‘much better to go back to the way I was brought up which was you don’t buy 
anything until you could afford to buy it within reason’ [Linda, focus group A2]. 
Realigning everyday practices of credit and consumption by reimagining a more 
prudent past is a trend in Britain that has been picked up by many observers as the rise 
of the ‘new thrift’. ‘Austerity chic’, as Tracey Jensen (2012) terms it, looks to 
replicate the common-sense values and kitsch-factor of historical periods, particularly 
those times surrounding war. Except that instead of a matter of survival and hardship, 
austerity chic is primarily the romanticised preserve of middle-class distinction with 
‘conspicuous non-consumption’ emerging as a new marker of cultural value (2012: 
16). Jensen cites the rise of programmes such as Superscrimpers as particularly 
exemplary of this trend1. Such programmes are primers on how to consume cleverly; 
indeed, they are essentially instructions on how to be a responsible household. Both 
Jensen (2012: 15) and Bramall (2013: 67, 139) point to a whole range of increasingly 
popular activities that tap into this mood for new thrift: retro craft activities such as 
knitting, growing vegetables, and so on. While some of these activities are undertaken 
due to financial stress and necessity, they are equally frequently undertaken via a 
                                                
1 Since each episode begins with stock footage of normal people making do and mending from post-
war Britain with the voiceover telling us we can learn from these times, Superscrimpers is a 
particularly illustrative example of the return of the past that both Jensen and Bramall discuss.  
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performance of thriftiness in order to enhance one’s cultural capital (Bramall 2013: 
23). It is for this reason that this new thrift or austerity chic should be distinguished 
from genuinely frugal behaviour2.   
This new thrift is heavily intertwined with practical pasts that act as ‘repositories of 
both kitsch appeal and common sense wisdom’ (Jensen 2012: 12). For Bramall, this 
practical past is far from just a peripheral part of this culture. Instead, the notion that 
there is a relevant analogy between this post-downturn ‘age of austerity’ and a post-
war ‘Austerity Britain’ is at the heart of this shift (Bramall 2013: 37). This analogy 
has been consistently produced through many objects that make direct reference to 
this time period. Perhaps the most high profile example of this is the recent 
proliferation, in both original form as well as custom and pastiche versions, of the 
‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ poster. Originally an unused motivational poster created 
by the British government to raise morale at the beginning of the Second World War, 
the poster combines ‘bare modernist typography with the consoling iconography of 
the crown and a similarly reassuring message’ (Hatherley 2009: 2). Owen Hatherley 
argues that the poster taps into an ‘austerity nostalgia’ that romanticises a public 
modernism associated with a stiff-upper lip and the importance of muddling through 
(2009: 2-3). For Hatherley, the poster is a clear way of committing to this new thrift 
or austerity chic, i.e. to continue consumption as normal ‘albeit with a less garish 
aesthetic than was customary during the boom’ (2009: 3). This is what makes the new 
thrift new: it pastiches the past in creating a new conspicuous austerity that is 
                                                
2 David Evans (2011), however, draws an important distinction between thrift and frugality. Thriftiness 
implies a moral commitment to ‘doing more (consumption) with less (money)’ to both maximise the 
life-chances of the household and to free up resources for extra consumption as signs of devotion 
towards significant others (Evans 2011: 511). Hunting out bargains and reduced items will certainly 
save money – but it is done with maximising consumption, rather than ‘being green’, in mind. 
Frugality, meanwhile, suggests a more concerted attempt at reducing consumption per se.  
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somewhat divorced from genuine frugality. These represent emerging norms to which 
households are increasingly expected to uphold in presenting themselves as 
responsible and affluent.  
With ‘downshifting’ and living within means seen as a route to the good life (Thomas 
2008), food has played a particularly important role in this middle-class new thrift3 
(Potter and Westall 2014). One way in which this is manifested is in the rising 
popularity of allotments, which allow people to explore a degree of self-sufficiency 
often under the historical rubric of ‘dig for victory’ (Bramall 2013: 58-83). The rising 
popularity of allotments has been so sudden that the demand now seriously outweighs 
the supply (Bramall 2013: 62). For others, the increasing ubiquity of cupcakes – ‘the 
definitive food item of 2012’  – is symptomatic of a ‘particularly bourgeois air of self-
deprecation and quasi-ironic thriftiness’4 (Potter and Westall 2014: 159, see also Ali 
2012). More generally, there has been a shift in how food is consumed towards a 
desired ideal of thrift and, to a lesser extent, frugality. Potter and Westall track these 
shifts through the Kitchen Diaries of Nigel Slater – a food writer for the Observer. 
While much of the 2005 volume is dedicated to discussing the virtues of trendy North 
London eateries, the 2012 sequel sees Slater retreat into his home to discover the 
humble benefits of thrifty cooking – making particular use of carefully selected 
special ingredients alongside leftovers (Potter and Westall 2014: 165-6). These are all 
crucial ingredients in the practice of the new thrift. 
                                                
3 This goes beyond just food, of course, and is imbricated in what cultural studies scholars call (perhaps 
erroneously) ‘anti-consumerism’ (see Binkley and Litter 2008). As Sam Binkley (2008: 59) explains, 
‘consumers today are increasingly asked to look beyond consumer capitalism's drab seriality and moral 
vacuity, to seek deeper meanings to wider life problems in a range of niche-marketed products bearing 
the stamp of rebellion, authenticity, simplicity, economic justice and ecological responsibility’. 
4 The rise of cupcakes is one of the ways in which the mood of the times surrounding austerity is 
undoubtedly gendered. The resurrected 1950’s chic alongside an ironic homage to domesticity is 
related to the ideal of austerity (Bramall 2013: 117-8). This has led to debates about whether this trend 
is productive or not for feminism (e.g. Stein 2008, Groskop 2008, Trussler 2012, Brightwell 2012). 
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Summary 
One of the central justifications for spending cuts is that the state should act more like 
a responsible household in order to solve a debt crisis caused by overspending. One 
basis of this justification is a normative claim about household thriftiness and 
responsibility. But how should a thrifty household act? The aim of this section has 
been to show how a particular norm of thrift has become increasingly prevalent since 
the onset of the 2008 economic downturn. This new thrift, a conscious effort to live 
within means following the financial and environmental excesses of the pre-crisis 
years, has reinforced existing norms about household intergenerational responsibility. 
It is this sort of living within means that is invoked in the moral imperatives within 
the Coalition government’s justifications for spending cuts. This is inextricably part 
of a narrative that draws on a practical past to create a distinction between a time of 
pre-crisis excess and an austere present. Tracing this shows how the idea of austerity 
goes beyond just a ‘Treasury view’ distrust of the state and of public indebtedness. 
The idea also incorporates a moral imperative for households to live within means, an 
idea that is particularly relevant to the mood of these times. This is also one way in 
which the household analogy works. Shifting and reinforced norms about how 
households ought to live within means ‘coincide and collude’ (Potter and Westall 
2014: 155) with the elite justifications for how the state, too, should live within its 
means.  
Unexplored thus far, however, is how the rise of the new thrift is bound up in 
experiences of class. For this romanticisation of austerity is only available to those 
with the required cultural and economic capital to choose thrift (Jensen 2012: 15). 
More specifically, the new thrift is a site of middle-class cultural distinction that is 
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reserved for those who have the capacity to perform it as such. As Solitaire Townsend 
argued in an episode of Analysis on BBC Radio 4, this involves: 
almost being embarrassed of over consumption. Sitting at a dinner party and 
people apologising to others that they’re taking their family on holiday to Bali 
and kind of bemoaning the fact that the cancellation fees are too high and that 
their children would far prefer to go to Cornwall this year. This idea of sort of 
conspicuous austerity is becoming very fashionable5. 
This new thrift, then, is a middle-class mark of distinction. This distinction is 
strengthened in opposition to another. Thrift has been ‘reinvigorated as a source of 
cultural value’ and has become ‘a site where classed Others are produced and 
symbolically shamed for not being austere enough’ (Jensen 2012: 15). By practicing a 
pastiche of austerity, people can distance themselves from the pre-crisis profligacy 
and assert their moral authority. In this sense, the rise of this new thrift dovetails with 
the individualisation of poverty, in which being impoverished or dependent upon 
welfare benefits is attributed to a series of bad choices or socially inherited ‘wrong’ 
behaviours (see Chapter 6). To fully understand how this relates to the legitimation of 
fiscal consolidation beyond the ‘collusion and collision’ with elite justifications, we 
need to unpack the political implications of the sense of taxpayer group position 
explored in Chapter 6. This is the aim of the next section.  
7.3 Punishing the undeserving poor  
While the last section sought to unpack the ideal thrifty and responsible household 
that underpins some justifications for austerity, this section seeks to explore the 
implications of the abstract moral order that many focus group participants produced 
while implicitly discussing fiscal relations. First, I return to the taxpayer as a sense of 
group position and reflect on how this is socially constructed. Second, I present a 
                                                
5 Transcript available here: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/transcripts/05_03_09.txt [Date accessed 
13/01/2014] 
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brief historical overview of the undeserving poor in order to show how these fiscal 
relations are well embedded in society rather than just merely being passed down by 
discourse. Finally, I analyse the political implications of these fiscal relations, pausing 
to reflect on how the undeserving poor have been punished severely while the 
undeserving rich have been largely unscathed.  
7.3.1 Returning to the taxpayer as group position 
When there is a legitimacy gap between lived experiences of profligacy and 
normative expectations of prudence in the redistribution of ‘taxpayers’ money’, fiscal 
consolidation may be reluctantly accepted. This was the core argument of Chapter 6. 
This legitimacy gap was in turn dependent upon the production of ‘the taxpayer’ as a 
sense of group position. Focus group participants typically produced a moral abstract 
order in which this taxpayer group was produced in opposition to an undeserving poor 
and rich. The key point of difference between the taxpayer and the undeserving was 
the sense that the ‘squeezed’ former made a net fiscal contribution that the latter 
unfairly benefited from via redistribution (such as welfare benefits or bank bailouts). 
Chapter 6 largely took this for granted, but we now have some limited space to briefly 
explore both the historical context and political implications of these relations.  
One of the oddities of the taxpayer as a group identity is that everyone in the UK does, 
of course, pay tax in some form even if it is just via value-added tax (VAT). Indeed, 
to talk of ‘taxpayers’ money’ is sometimes seemingly synonymous with ‘our money’; 
that because these revenues are taken from citizens’ incomes either directly or 
indirectly those citizens therefore possess some form of partial ownership over all 
public goods. We can identify two important sources of this sense of ownership. On 
the one hand, Laura Paler (2013) has shown that the sheer act of paying a highly 
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visible tax leads citizens to gaining a sense of ownership over the public purse. Paler 
conducted field experiments in Indonesia, and when her participants were conditioned 
with an alternative state revenue model (in this case, windfalls via natural resources), 
they were statistically significantly less likely to possess the same sense of ownership 
(2013: 721-2). On the other hand, this sense of ownership is also socially constructed. 
Take, for example, the way in which the media typically divide the cost of public 
services by each household or taxpayer; for example, that each British household is 
paying, on average, £X in interest payments on the debt. These statistics are clearly 
dubious6. Yet, they also demonstrate how the average taxpayer, as an average owner 
of a portion of all fiscal revenue and expenditure, is a meaningful and legitimate 
category. The collective sense that taxpayers to an extent own the government budget, 
both intrinsic and socially constructed, is an important element in the configuration of 
the fiscal relations examined in this section.  
I have defined these relations as fiscal (rather than just tax) for an important reason: 
that both revenue and expenditure must be analysed in relation to one another. 
Michael Ross (2004) convincingly demonstrates that there is no link between the 
absolute tax burden and political demands for reform. Rather, fiscal preferences are 
based upon the tax burden relative to the services the government provides (Ross 
2004: 234). This implies that citizens perform a cost-benefit analysis in which the 
costs of funding the government are weighed against the benefits they themselves 
receive (Ross 2004: 234). For citizens ultimately care about the relative price of 
public goods rather than their absolute cost (Ross 2004: 234). Ross proves this 
                                                
6 For one, only around 30% of the UK’s total tax revenues are sourced from income tax, and if a 
sovereign state went bust an international debt collector is very unlikely to ask each citizen to pay their 
‘share’ of the outstanding debts. 
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through comparative and historical statistical analysis, and others have supported this 
through their own research (e.g. Paler 2013).  
While Ross’ model of the price of public goods is a very helpful heuristic, it glides 
over important problems in the search for analytical parsimony: Taxpayers do not 
have perfect information about revenue and expenditure, nor the immediate cognitive 
capacities, to conduct the cost-benefit analysis required to work out whether they are 
getting a fair price for their public goods. Instead of a statistically generated definitive 
‘price’ based on aggregates of revenue and expenditure (which Ross produces), this 
‘price’ manifests not numerically but as a sense of fairness as filtered through lived 
experiences. In this case, the sense that the price of public goods is not fair is, in turn 
and in part, because in the taxpayers’ experience the fruits of their hard work is being 
redistributed in an unnecessary manner to those who do not deserve it. If the taxpayer 
deems that they are not getting a good price for their public services (as Chapter 6 
suggests the case is here), and are thus a net contributor and ‘in credit’, then spending 
cuts could appear to match their preferences for a lower relative tax burden and a 
subsequent fairer price for public goods. 
7.3.2 The undeserving poor in historical context 
The taxpayer as a sense of group position is only possible in opposition to another: the 
undeserving – especially the undeserving poor. For reasons that will become clear as 
we make our way through the remainder of this chapter, the political and historical 
significance of the undeserving poor far outweighs that of the undeserving rich in 
understanding the politics of austerity. The divide between ‘unlucky’ (and thus 
deserving) and ‘lazy’ (and thus undeserving) welfare claimants is as old as welfare 
itself (Van Oorschot 2000, Petersen et al. 2011, for the British context see 
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Himmelfarb 1984, Seabrook 2013). The effect is to stigmatise welfare benefit 
recipients: as if some recipients are lazy, thus rendering it consensual and free of 
coercion – and, importantly, the choice and fault of the claimant. One key claim 
developed in this thesis is that acquiescence to the imperatives of the debt crisis 
cannot be wholly accounted for by either the imposition of a top-down elite-driven 
narrative or through the rational calculations of taxpayers – instead, this acquiescence 
can be partially accounted for through tracing how it resonated with a mood (i.e. 
shared beliefs) that was culturally embedded prior to the age of austerity. With this in 
mind, this section will very briefly outline some of the ways in which the undeserving 
poor as an othered social group have been socially constructed and constituted, thus 
providing a cultural and experiential resource for members of the public when making 
sense of the debt crisis.  
The historical nature of the undeserving poor is important to consider, especially in 
the context of recent works that align the vilification of an ‘underclass’ as a form of 
class hatred special to neo-liberalism (e.g. Jones 2011). We can, for instance, go back 
to Edmund Burke who famously decried the notion of the ‘labouring poor’ as 
logically non-sensical, since the poor should refer to those who are ‘sick and infirm’ 
(Himmelfarb 1984: 23, Seabrook 2013: 131). It was these attitudes that underpinned 
the majority of the Poor Law reforms across the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, 
in which a separation between the deserving and undeserving was an explicit criterion 
when judging whether someone was eligible for poor relief (Himmelfarb 1984: 23-4, 
Van Oorschot 2000: 35, Seabrook 2013: 45-98).  
These sorts of distinctions have been well institutionalised into British culture via a 
periodic reinforcement. It was these sorts of ‘Victorian values’ that Thatcherism itself 
appealed to during the attempted state retrenchment during the 1980s (Hall 1988: 85). 
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As Stuart Hall argues, this retrenchment was backed by a discourse of self-reliance 
and personal responsibility, in which over-taxed individuals were being cheated out of 
their income by ‘the emotive image of the 'scrounger': the new folk-devil' (1988: 47). 
Indeed, academic research has found evidence that people tend to view welfare 
recipients through a spectrum of deservingness: the public tend to favour fiscal 
transfers to old people, followed by the sick and disabled, then for families, with those 
on forms of social security the least (Van Oorschot 2000: 35). Recent experimental 
political science, meanwhile, suggests that the ‘undeserving heuristic’ is not merely 
cultural, but also has deep psychological roots developed during human evolution 
(Petersen 2012). Taken together, this is important. It suggests that the view that 
welfare recipients are undeserving is deeply woven into the culture and customs of the 
country – or, if recent research is to be believed, even part of human biology. The 
point is this: by invoking ‘responsible families’ and other tropes in the context of 
welfare reform and fiscal consolidation, there is an entire tapestry of history to appeal 
to.  
In a more recent context, the deserving/undeserving distinction has been to a degree 
inscribed into both the welfare policy and discourses of New Labour. Most simply, 
this is visible in the rise of mean-tested benefits, which can institutionalise a 
deserving/undeserving distinction through creating a policy and discourse in which 
people are forced to abstractly judge whether claimants fulfil a criterion and thus 
deserve benefits (Petersen 2012: 2). But the distinction goes beyond just the 
proliferation of mean-tested benefits since it underpins to an extent the very logic and 
justification for New Labour’s welfare reforms which helped signal a change in the 
very meaning of what it is to be poor.  
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New Labour’s earlier welfare strategy focussed upon tackling a perceived culture of 
irresponsibility around those who depended on welfare benefits. There was an 
emphasis upon ensuring that welfare no longer encouraged ‘something for nothing’ 
but instead ensured that those in need received ‘something for something’ (Watson 
2013b: 11). In particular, New Labour’s ‘welfare-to-work’ strategy was based upon a 
rejection of traditional redistribution to ensure equality of outcome since this risked 
institutionalising a culture of irresponsibility (which in turn poses a risk in regards to 
long-term fiscal pressures). An alternative justificatory framework was produced to 
signal this shift, in which welfare policy was increasingly geared towards delivering 
equality of opportunity by tackling social exclusion through investing in human 
capital (Lister 2003). In effect, this reconfiguration of poverty as exclusion entailed 
treating unemployment as a cultural and/or behavioural problem rather than an 
economic one. If poverty is the result of a culture of worklessness that arises from 
losing contact with the labour market, then the logical solution is to provide people 
with ‘the personal wherewithal to improve their own lots’ (Watson 2013b: 10). By 
realigning poverty with social exclusion and a culture of passivity, the poor were 
essentially divided into those who earned their relief through active behavioural 
change and those who were deemed undeserving for foregoing such activities.  
This undeserving poor are, it should be remembered, constituted against ‘the taxpayer’ 
via a set of fiscal relations. According to Watson, policy documents that aimed to 
justify the welfare-to-work strategy in particular typically suggested that benefit 
claimants had ‘a primary duty to society as a whole to end their lives of passivity and 
therefore to reduce their reliance on others’ contribution to social assistance’ (Watson 
2013b: 14). Thus these relations almost take on the appearance of debtor-creditor 
relations, in which welfare benefit recipients are obliged to appease the taxpayer. 
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Indeed, restoring parity is ideally made through returning to the labour market in a 
productive manner, but until that point welfare recipients are under an obligation to 
make themselves as employable as possible (even safe in the knowledge that there are 
not enough employment opportunities for all). It is ‘the debtor’s constant efforts to 
maximize his [sic] employability, to take a proactive role in the integration into the 
work or social environment, to be available and flexible on the job market’ that is 
emphasised (Lazzarato 2012: 135). This punishment is justified not just on the basis 
of what they owe to society and the taxpayer, but for the fault and guilt of essentially 
being seen to have chosen to enter the set of relations in the first place.  
New Labour’s welfare reforms have dovetailed with important shifts in how British 
society generally understands and defines the nature of impoverishment. While it was 
previously associated with material and economic conditions, there is evidence that it 
is becoming increasingly individualised and stigmatised. Shildrick and McDonald’s 
(2013) fascinating research into sixty men and women in north-east England caught 
up in the ‘low-pay, no-pay cycle’ discussed poverty in respect of themselves and 
others. Paradoxically, they found that interviewees typically denied their own poverty 
despite living in material hardship. Others, however, were identified as poor – 
although this poverty was not linked to material hardship but were judged for their 
irresponsible consumption and their failure to resiliently manage the situation they 
had been dealt (2013: 296). This process was, for Shildrick and McDonald, a process 
of identity formation: 
In presenting themselves as largely unremarkable, in rejecting the label of 
poverty, in stressing pride in coping with hardship, research participants 
constructed a self-identity in contrast to a (usually) nameless mass of ‘Others’ 
who were believed, variously, to be work-shy, to claim benefits illegitimately 
and to be unable to ‘manage’ and to engage in blameworthy consumption 
habits (2013: 291). 
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The meaning of being poor has shifted away from hardship via material conditions 
towards the absence of an attitude towards ‘bettering oneself’; another obligation 
welfare benefit recipients must fufil to prove their deservingness of taxpayer 
redistribution and then placate the de facto terms of their informal debt. It essentially 
supports the moral abstract order explored above and elsewhere.  
It again should be reiterated how this moral abstract order is constituted in a process 
of distinction. Recall the previous section, in which shifting norms surrounding the 
ideally responsible household were surveyed. Signaling one’s responsibility and 
adherence to thrift through engaging in austerity chic is, I would tentatively suggest, 
in part a reaction to the changes about what it means to be poor and fiscally indebted 
chronicled here. As I argued previously – drawing on Goffman in the process – 
engaging in this particular form of ‘new thrift’ is a way of presenting oneself so as to 
meet the codes for socially acceptable behaviour, and in turn reassuring both 
themselves and others that they meet requirements for moral standards. To distinguish 
oneself from this should, in principle, take the form of truly living within one’s means 
– presumably as a private activity of saving. But given the necessarily social aspect of 
life (that is wonderfully afforded by Goffman’s frameworks), the process of 
distinction instead results in the almost-strange and pastiched form of ‘new thrift’ 
surveyed earlier. Growing vegetables in your garden for your own consumption is an 
example of this distinction yet it is only the reserve for those who have the time, space 
and (most ironically) money to do so. The sense of group position so central to this 
thesis has thus come full circle. The next section will briefly examine how these 
relations have come to impact upon the politics of spending cuts.  
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7.3.3 The politics of divide and conquer 
In Chapter 1, I touched upon the politics of blame displacement: how governments 
will engage in a number of strategies to avoid blame for, or depoliticise, potentially 
unpopular policies. One such strategy is to ‘divide and conquer’ (Pierson 1994: 22-3). 
This strategy involves targeting cutbacks on particular subgroups within the 
population of potential welfare claimants so as to avoid potential opposition (Pierson 
1994: 22-3). The Coalition government will almost certainly draw on this sort of 
strategy in displacing blame for their controversial welfare reforms. The reticence in 
retrenching benefits to pensioners – who are fortunate in that they are seen as both a 
‘deserving’ and as an electorally salient subgroup – would be one example of this, and 
it is most likely that an in-depth analysis would find many more instances. Yet, 
because by 2012 many of the welfare reforms had yet to be fully implemented and 
therefore felt on the ground, it is perhaps necessary to instead think of a prior moment 
of dividing and conquering whereby what is at stake is not so much the allocation of 
specific cuts but broader societal contests about how redistribution ought to be 
organised.  
At this point it is important to point out that the politicisation of the fiscal deficit via 
the imperatives of the debt crisis also politicises the price of public goods. The 
discourse of the debt crisis generates a sense of understandable scarcity around public 
goods, which logically leads to taxpayers questioning who or what was getting a free 
ride – because the ‘squeezed’ and hardworking middle could not possibly be fiscally 
‘indebted’ given the lived experiences of many. Rather than a cost-benefit analysis 
that results in automatically-telegraphed interests, then, the price of public goods is 
rather a sense of fairness; a sense of how the economy ought to work (see Chapter 3). 
The taxpayers’ sense that the price they are getting for public goods is unfair is 
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dependent upon the moral abstract order outlined in Chapter 6, which generates a 
sense of group position. As a result, those who identify with the taxpayer consider 
themselves in credit due to their revenue being redistributed to the morally 
undeserving. By promising to reward ‘hardworking families’ by tackling 
‘irresponsibility’ and so on, the coalition government are not so much offering a fairer 
‘price’ inasmuch as they are offering a sense of a fairer ‘price’ to taxpayers for their 
public goods – and as a result, they can produce a degree of acquiescence to austerity 
from key electoral sub-groups.  
The fragile legitimation of punishing the undeserving poor is one important political 
implication of these relations. Although many of the changes are essentially 
piecemeal in nature, the Coalition government’s welfare retrenchment programme 
will make the lives of Britain’s poorest worse (Taylor-Gooby 2012: 64). Changes to 
the Working Tax Credit will impact disproportionately upon women by privileging a 
traditional single earner model in middle-income families (MacLeavy 2011: 356), 
meanwhile the proposed ‘bedroom tax’ will disproportionately impact upon those 
who are disabled (Guardian 2013, Meers 2014). While there are further examples of 
how the spending cuts are being filtered into welfare retrenchment for the vulnerable 
or non-powerful (e.g. Jacobs and Manzi 2013, Bales 2013), much of the ire over the 
policy strategy has been over the stigmatisation or ‘punishment’ of the poor – 
particularly in the onerous and disproportionate demands being placed upon benefit 
claimants. While we do not have to necessarily go as far as John Rodger (2012: 416) 
in claiming that ‘the criminalizing tendency in contemporary social policy gets to the 
very heart of how contemporary welfare systems work today’, one does not need to 
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look far to find examples of this particularly in terms of welfare sanctions7. For 
instance, The Guardian have reported how ‘personal improvement plans’ (in effect, 
sanctions) have not just increased in frequency but have been pushed by Job Centre 
employees in order to meet centrally set targets (Wintour 2013). Just like the New 
Labour reforms, the notion of the undeserving poor is implicit: that benefit recipients 
are almost deviant and in need of disciplining8. 
The inequity of this is exacerbated further by briefly recalling that the moral abstract 
order outlined in Chapter 6 consisted of solidifying the taxpayer in opposition to both 
the undeserving poor and rich. Why not punish the undeserving rich too? Given the 
argument, anger and punishment could and should be channelled as much into 
tackling welfare scroungers as it should on bankers’ bonuses, MPs’ expenses and tax 
avoidance. These would, given the evidence and argument throughout this thesis, be 
legitimate moves that would resonate with the mood: everyone should pay their fair 
share of revenues, including the rich. But we must recall that at the heart of the moral 
order alongside making fair contributions to state revenues is the virtue of working 
hard and ‘bettering oneself’. In this sense the undeserving rich typically have an 
advantage. While some of these rich could be cast as lazy rentiers, it is harder to 
render them as fiscal debtors especially since they are unlikely to be dependent upon 
seemingly direct redistribution. After all, finance has been made ‘productive’ to the 
economy (Christophers 2011); this and other forms of structural power (Lindblom 
1977) are something welfare claimants can not claim. Yet, with the recent 
                                                
7 For anecdotal examples of these sanctions see http://stupidsanctions.tumblr.com 
8 These dynamics of punishment were also apparent and reinforced in the reaction to the 2011 English 
riots surveyed in Chapter 4. Individual offenders were not only punitively sentences in formal courts 
but many were also provided welfare sanctions including the eviction of families from social housing 
(Hancock et al. 2012: 356).   
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politicisation of wealth inequality thanks to Thomas Piketty’s (2014) timely 
intervention a way of tapping into this moral abstract order for potentially rather more 
progressive ends might be possible.  
Summary 
This section has expanded the argument, outlined in Chapter 6, that a moral abstract 
order between the hard-working taxpayer and the undeserving has created a 
legitimacy gap that fiscal consolidation can (perhaps paradoxically) seem to close. By 
intervening to halt redistribution to those who do not deserve it, the state can be seen 
as restoring a sense of fairness. It is these relations that can make the punishment of 
the poor and the redistribution of taxpayers’ money away from them as essentially 
increasing fairness.  
Concluding remarks 
Crisis is central to understanding the age of austerity, for it creates the space for a 
decisive intervention that might otherwise be unjustifiable. One way in which crisis is 
used is to invoke the notion that something cannot continue. A crisis is the process in 
which this something seems fallible to complete and systematic collapse unless a 
decisive intervention is made. In this sense it is also an opportunity to rewrite what 
went before, to institutionalise a different way of doing things. For political economy 
scholars that something has been identified as finance, growth, the fiscal state, 
capitalist production, or even society itself. However, I argued in Chapter 1 that there 
is no need for assuming the singularity of crisis. Different crises are enacted and 
performed. For some, the age of austerity has been experienced as an intervention into 
a crisis of morality. Fiscal consolidation and welfare retrenchment are predicated on a 
crisis of morality and of responsibility, and this strategy can restore a form of parity 
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by intervening on behalf of the taxpayer to improve their lot. Fiscal consolidation is 
therefore considered as something that can potentially make life fairer. Austerity 
more generally, meanwhile, is premised on a promise to reverse a moral decline (see 
also Konings 2012: 612). It is primarily for this reason that austerity, to invoke the 
Introduction, is a powerful and successful idea, because it resonates with the mood of 
the times – an ideal-typical set of culturally embedded popular wisdoms and 
experiential knowledge. 
The mood of the times was receptive towards the reluctant acceptance of austerity. In 
other words, the debt crisis narrative resonated with, and could be justified via, shared 
beliefs, norms and conventions of the mass public – many of which are intensely 
moral and historically embedded within the culture of the country, such as the 
importance of the responsible and thrifty household. This is, in part, how the spending 
cuts were conferred legitimacy. Spending cuts could be justified in terms of the public 
life of crisis, everyday sense making processes, and gaps between the experiences and 
expectations of taxpayers’ money. This mood and the three stylised parts that 
constitute it are historically embedded as social norms. In other words, they existed 
well before the specific elite articulation of the debt crisis narrative. Acquiescence to 
the idea of austerity is therefore not adequately explained by the top-down imposition 
of a legitimating narrative; for the participants I interviewed tended to use resources 
from everyday life to justify it in different ways. Although the process of austerity and 
the debt crisis it is predicated upon were essentially elite driven processes, 
acquiescence cannot be reduced to this since the narrative worked not through pure 
subterfuge but because it resonated with and gave to sense the lived experiences of 
the public. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Argument and contribution  
This thesis has argued that austerity is a powerful and successful idea – in 
underpinning the legitimation of the post-downturn strategy of fiscal consolidation in 
the UK – because it resonates with the mood of the times. This argument is itself 
premised upon a puzzle: fiscal consolidation should be an unpopular policy because it 
threatens to impose losses on large sections of the electorate, yet the public have 
reluctantly accepted the necessity of it. Why? I have developed a method, which 
involves the interpretation and historicisation of focus group data, to produce a novel 
case-specific analytical narrative about austerity acquiescence and the legitimation of 
fiscal consolidation. I have argued that the idea of austerity invokes a sense of moral 
crisis: the UK immorally lived beyond its means through easy credit and 
redistribution to the undeserving. Austerity can seemingly reverse this, restoring a 
sense of fairness within fiscal relations in the process.  
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Existing scholarly accounts of austerity acquiescence typically fall into two camps. 
Either they pin the causal mechanism as the taxpayers’ interest based on cost-benefit 
analysis of spending cuts, or they analyse the top-down interpellation of certain 
quiescent subject positions. Conventional wisdom in political science and welfare 
studies, meanwhile, suggest that austerity and welfare retrenchment are inherently 
unpopular, and thus require necessary obfuscation to generate acquiescence. While 
there is a great deal of explanatory value in these two perspectives, the constructivist 
methodology offered here has produced a more concrete analysis of everyday politics 
about the downturn, debt and tax in explaining austerity acquiescence.  
Fiscal consolidation is, on one fundamental level, about the financing of the state. 
More specifically in this case, it is about a scarcity of public funds, as invoked by the 
particular meaning of the fiscal deficit. In a democracy such as the UK, with 
relatively high levels of taxation, this means the life-chances of the general population 
are at stake: most significantly in regards to the fairness of the tax, but also in regards 
to those who rely on the state either through employment or welfare benefits. In these 
moments of scarcity, everyday politics over how the economy ought to work come to 
the fore. Contestation and propagation of intersubjective norms and conventions that 
refer directly or indirectly to revenue, redistribution and spending are, whether 
conscious or not, a part of this. If policy reforms or state interventions correspond 
with shared views about how the economy ought to work, then those changes are 
likely to be conferred legitimacy. This was the central insight of Beetham (1991), 
when he succinctly demonstrated that legitimacy can be conferred via justification by 
shared beliefs. If we can show that an idea is legitimate via justification by shared 
beliefs, then we can say that idea resonates with the mood of the times.  
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This thesis has shown how in this sense austerity is a powerful and successful idea 
because it resonates with the mood. In particular, there were two key ways in which 
the debt crisis narrative that underpinned the public justification of austerity reflected 
norms about how the economy ought to work. First, while people do not necessarily 
think that the state should act like a household, making sense of such an inextricably 
complex phenomenon requires heuristics. The process of extrapolating popular 
wisdom and experience about what it means to be a thrifty household render, of 
course, spending cuts in the name of deficit reduction as a logical and necessary move. 
Ultimately, however, that debt is an ambiguous moral obligation is what makes this 
comparison make sense. Second, through the group position of the taxpayer in 
opposition to the undeserving, there is a sense that the economy ought to favour those 
who work hard. By cutting spending and retrenching welfare, austerity can thus 
promise to restore fairness to a core constituency of self-identifying hardworking 
‘taxpayers’. More than that, because the debt crisis narrative itself invokes a larger 
moral crisis narrative: we were all irresponsible and spendthrift, and now we must all 
pay the price. Debt is the great equaliser; able to make the remortgaging of a house to 
finance a conservatory seemingly as part of the same process as when the council 
repaves an otherwise decent road when public goods are scarce and the deficit 
widening. In this sense, austerity is to an extent premised on a promise – that is hard 
to refuse if the terms it is based on are accepted – to reverse a moral decline. This is, 
in part, what austerity means.  
On the basis of this argument, this thesis contributes three things to the discipline of 
political economy: first, an empirical account of austerity acquiescence that taps into 
analytical debates about the nature of post-2008 political and economic change; 
second, some required definitional clarity in the different meanings of austerity, fiscal 
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consolidation and spending cuts; third, a constructivist methodological framework 
that uses focus groups to study how ideas and crises are ‘successful’.  
The first of these contributions is a novel analytical narrative that explains austerity 
acquiescence. As explained in Chapter 3, it was always assumed that such an 
explanation would be partial, but that it would help illuminate how austerity 
acquiescence is ‘historically so and not otherwise’ (Weber 1949: 72). The 
implications of this analytical contribution can be unpacked further. For one, this 
thesis has helped us understand one of the central political economy intrigues of the 
crisis: how and why did an economic downturn attributed to either of or in finance 
(Brassett et al. 2009: 379) end up as a crisis of state debt? Many political economists 
have suggested that the agency of elites was integral to this process. Mark Blyth, for 
instance, describes the way in which politicians constructed a crisis of public 
spending as the ‘greatest bait and switch in history’ (Blyth 2013a: 73). In no way am I 
suggesting that elites did not matter to this process of discursive construction, but this 
thesis does help us understand how the legitimation of this strategy resonated with a 
culturally embedded and pre-existing mood of the times, which suggests the ‘success’ 
of the idea can not merely be reduced to the top-down imposition of an idea on an 
unsuspecting public.  
Furthermore, there is an emerging academic view that the UK’s perilous fiscal 
position can be traced back to New Labour’s end years, which the bank bailouts 
significantly exacerbated (Thompson 2013, Watson 2013c). This suggests Blyth’s 
‘greatest bait and switch’ claim may, in the instance of the UK especially, be 
somewhat overstated in the sense that there were clearly long-term imbalances in the 
UK’s fiscal dynamics. There may be some strange ironies at play here. New Labour’s 
interventions were, in a sense, extremely successful. While they did not make the 
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downturn plain sailing in terms of private and localised privation and hardship, they 
did help ensure that public normality ensued. House prices did not crash. Banks did 
not collapse. Rubbish did not accumulate on the streets on a national scale. The dead 
were buried. Normal expectations were unaffected. Some of these, particularly the 
former two examples, were clearly due to the success of their interventions. In another 
more narrow sense, however, their interventions were a miserable failure. New 
Labour were responsible for the macroeconomic and redistributive reliance on asset-
prices, the stabilisation of which served as a central justification for the bank bailouts 
(Watson 2013b). Since these interventions significantly worsened the UK’s fiscal 
conditions, New Labour essentially helped obliterate their economic governing 
credibility. Worse still, they provided a basis (via bank bailouts) for the moral crisis 
(i.e. redistribution to the undeserving) that helped ensure that fiscal consolidation 
made sense as a wider 'age of austerity'. The choices and pathologies of New Labour, 
both before and during the crisis, helped create the space and conditions for the 
deeply moralised debt crisis that justifies austerity. New Labour may have aimed to 
take one for the team, but they have ended up gifting the opposition a goal.  
A second contribution of this thesis is some basic definitional clarity for making sense 
of the complexity when analysing spending cuts, fiscal consolidation and austerity. I 
suggest that political economists should be careful to make a distinction between each 
of these three words since they mean different things (see also Bramall 2013: 2). First, 
the politics of fiscal consolidation encompasses more than just spending cuts. 
Spending cuts, largely as a technocratic game of blame avoidance in the name of 
obfuscation, cannot be made sense of without a wider understanding of fiscal relations. 
In a way, this invokes Ross’ argument outlined in Chapter 7 that we cannot fully 
appreciate the politics of tax without looking at the relation of both revenue and 
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expenditure. The same logic applies here: we cannot appreciate the politics of 
spending cuts without looking at the relation of both (cutting) expenditure and 
(dwindling) revenues. This might sound like a very obvious argument, yet the high 
profile literature suggests it is a point worth making. Blyth’s book, for instance, 
barely mentions tax or fiscal relations outside the context of post-2008 interventions. 
While Blyth does convincingly demonstrate that fiscal consolidation is a dangerous 
idea, it might appear less so if the long-term fiscal crises of Western states were also 
taken into account (see Schäfer and Streeck 2013b, Lodge 2013). To analyse fiscal 
consolidation without also analysing the problem of revenue is to only analyse one 
side of the coin.  
Furthermore, if fiscal consolidation encompasses more than just spending cuts, then 
the politics of austerity encompasses more than just fiscal consolidation. When 
compared to these other two words, we can begin to appreciate the complex meaning 
of ‘austerity’. When David Cameron warned the country of an ‘age of austerity’ it did 
not mean the ‘age of spending cuts’ or the ‘age of fiscal consolidation’, but some have 
treated it as if they are all in and of the same thing. Austerity invokes a whole range of 
wider issues about morality and fairness – some of which this thesis has sought to 
analyse. On the basis of this thesis, I would suggest that austerity, as something 
distinct from spending cuts and fiscal consolidation, should be understood as the 
moral imperative to live within one’s means.  
Few political economists have yet recognized this distinction, even implicitly, and the 
subsequent analyses of spending cuts, fiscal consolidation and austerity are the 
weaker for it. For instance, when analysing these strategies political economists have 
seemingly assumed that moral and public justifications are used to obfuscate the true 
economic source or logic of the idea. This is apparent in Blyth’s demolition of the 
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political economic logic of fiscal consolidation, whereby he treats ‘morality plays’ as 
superfluous to the economic theory and history of shrinking the state. This was also 
reflected in Lysandrou’s (2013) analysis whereby he successfully critiqued the 
economic theories that underpin fiscal consolidation. While admirable, this strategy 
can imply that the content of an economic idea is to be found by disregarding its 
obfuscating public justification to reveal its underlying economic logic and theory. 
However, I would suggest that they both are, to an extent, missing the target. There 
are good reasons in this specific case to possibly even reverse that logic and instead 
claim that if anything the economic justifications for austerity have been obfuscating 
the underlying moral content. From such a perspective, the idea of austerity is the 
moral imperative to live within means. Consequently, there is no coherent economic 
strategy of ‘austerity’, or any consensus on evidence that supports it. Just cut back and 
be responsible, like a household. This is why attempts at discrediting the ‘theory’ of 
austerity have not and will not work, because it has not really got one in the sense that 
Blyth and Lysandrou expect. In other words, fighting moral justifications with 
economic logic is not a guaranteed strategy for winning hearts and minds1.  
Table 8.1      Suggested definitional distinction 
 Sphere Justification Logic Discipline 
Spending cuts  Government Efficiency savings 
and welfare 
retrenchment 
Bureaucratic Political science / 
public 
administration 
                                                
1 As Stuart Hall puts it, albeit using a different conceptual apparatus, ‘ideology does not obey the logic 
of rational discourse’ (1988: 10). 
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Fiscal 
consolidation 
State Long term 
pressures on fiscal 
balance 
Technocratic Historical 
institutionalism / 
economics 
Austerity State and society Living within 
means 
Moral Sociology / 
anthropology 
 
This thesis has focussed in on austerity rather than fiscal consolidation or spending 
cuts because it is the least explored in the political economy literature. Although this 
thesis has at points examined the interconnections between these three areas, a fully 
interdisciplinary political economy will surely see its task to explore all three aspects 
equally in order to fully understand the politics of this period. Crucially, in doing so 
we can reduce the ambiguity over what austerity exactly is as surveyed in the 
Introduction chapter. Finally in regard to this second contribution, it needs to be noted 
just how contextually dependent this definitional distinction is. Although more 
research will need to be done in order to be conclusively sure one way or the other, 
instinctively I would suggest that this distinction is not only specific to the UK, but 
specific to the UK in this particular historical juncture – whereby (for instance) 
certain austere practical pasts have come to the fore (see Chapter 7). Thus, the 
contribution is not merely in the definitional distinction itself, but in showing how an 
alternative history of austerity (as opposed to fiscal consolidation) might be done.  
The third contribution is methodological. Although the question of how and why 
ideas ‘work’ is almost certainly ultimately unanswerable in the whole, this thesis has 
presented a framework based on the mood of the times and legitimacy that offers a 
partial and one-sided analytical framework for exploring such dynamics. 
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Constructivism, in IPE and beyond, often makes conceptual claims that ideas must 
resonate with the mood of the times to be legitimate, but offers no clear method for 
analysing how this might be so. Everyday IPE, meanwhile, presents part of the means 
for achieving this by reconceptualising legitimacy as a ‘two-way street’. To fully 
bypass methodological elitism, I adapted a novel focus group method, which is 
underused in political economy scholarship. The focus group data made it possible to 
both accomplish this analysis and to generate many of the specific claims and 
arguments. This was incorporated into a method for researching the everyday politics 
of crisis, in which the mood of the times was disaggregated into a practical and 
applicable framework for analysis.  
There is one further secondary and indirect contribution in addition to these three. In 
Legitimation Crisis, Habermas (1976) starts by arguing that a properly ‘scientifically 
useful’ concept of crisis must include both ‘system integration’ (i.e. objective) and 
‘social integration’ (i.e. subjective) elements. Although an object-subject distinction 
does not fit the constructivist methodology I outlined, there is nonetheless some truth 
to Habermas’ claim. From his perspective I have clearly foregrounded the ‘subjective’ 
side of crisis over the ‘objective’, and thus reduced the analytical value of the concept 
and related framework. For this reason, the framework I have outlined for analysing 
crises might not be that directly useful for political economists. It may, however, be 
indirectly useful in providing the form of a ‘subjective’ over-correction to the 
tendency to distinguish between crisis disease and symptoms, and thus treat the latter 
as representational narratives rather than as constitutive of crises themselves. 
Although I admire Habermas’ aim to build a ‘scientifically useful’ concept of crisis, I 
fear that once analysis moves beyond abstract theorising and into empirical analysis 
the necessarily one-sided nature of explanation comes to the fore, thus rendering a 
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true integration of the objective and subjective sides only possible in principle and not 
in practice. In this thesis, crisis has been explicitly conceptualised as a means to an 
end rather than an attempt to theorise crisis per se. Consequently, there are no claims 
being made that this is the best way, in principle, to understand crisis, or that other 
political economists should adopt this framework because it is intrinsically superior.  
Nevertheless, there is a small wealth of literature that shares a commitment to 
understanding the discursive and political nature of crises (Baker 2013, Blyth 2002, 
2013b, Brassett and Clarke 2012, Carstensen 2013, Hay 1996a, 2001, Jessop 2013, 
Langley 2010, Watson 2014, Widmaier 2004, 2010, Widmaier et al. 2007). By 
showing how crises can be understood as a threefold process of enactment, this thesis 
has made an indirect contribution to these frameworks. 
Limitations and possibilities   
Focus groups were well suited to – and crucial for – the arguments and contributions 
of this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 3, part of the method involved building a sense 
of group identity by asking questions about the local area before moving on to the 
more relevant and interesting topics of austerity and the crisis. Although the 
participants knew that the aim of the research was to discuss austerity due to ethical 
requirements, the breadth and depth of the topics and themes covered was genuinely 
surprising to me. The limited facilitation approach was important in creating a ‘what 
we talk about when we talk about austerity’ feel. The participants’ talk subsequently 
drove the empirical parts of this thesis that led to an analysis that would have taken a 
very different form if methodological proxies were instead taken as a data source for 
accessing shared beliefs. Following the analysis of the elite enactment of crisis in 
Chapter 4, I envisaged that most talk would focus on contesting and disputing the role 
of Labour and Conservative parties as the ultimate villains. These categories were not 
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that meaningful to the participants. Indeed, there was not that much open and explicit 
dispute generally. This may have been a symptom of a method that encourages 
consensus, as participants may have been reluctant to go against the mood of the 
group discussion. This weakness is, however, also a strength for a project that has 
from the very beginning emphasised the importance of intersubjectivity over 
subjective experience and beliefs. This intersubjective underpinning is the main 
benefit of this method, and it is what made focus groups a very suitable method for 
this research.  
While they have always been seen as a logical method for researching political 
disengagement (e.g. Marsh et al. 2007) and some other areas (e.g. Hopf 2002), focus 
groups are becoming increasingly popular in political science (especially critical 
security studies) from a broadly constructivist perspective (e.g. Jarvis and Lister 2012, 
Jackson and Hall 2013, Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2013). This thesis forms a 
part of this wider move; political economy ethnographies, especially those that focus 
on everyday conceptions of how the economy (or polity) ought to work, are the next 
logical step. Yet, in the other direction, focus groups can also be used more 
conventionally as a precursor to quantitative research. By discovering the ways in 
which people believe the economy ought to work, experimental surveys could be 
designed in order to tease out potentially counter-intuitive and important findings 
about fiscal relations, redistribution and the normative order (e.g. Paler 2013). This 
would also help ensure that the potential pitfalls associated with qualitative analytical 
generality can be replaced with the more conventional quantitative statistical 
generalisation.  
Another weakness is the exclusion of the media as a source of everyday sense-making. 
Gamson (1992), who has influenced the approach to everyday sense-making taken in 
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this thesis irredeemably, identifies the media, popular wisdom and everyday 
experience as the three most important sources in making sense of politics. 
Unfortunately, the limited resources and space of this thesis could not extend to 
include the media as a factor. Following this, it has been merely assumed that the 
media is influential. One limitation, however, of this compromise is that this thesis is 
unable to pinpoint in any meaningful fashion to what extent it is a potent source in 
sense-making. This is potentially problematic, since the right-wing tabloid press 
clearly plays a role in (amongst other issues) propagating the scapegoating of the 
undeserving poor as the unfair and immoral recipients of ‘taxpayers’ money’. 
Although excluding the media is far from ideal, it should be remembered that it is a 
well-documented fact that citizens taking umbrage at seemingly undeserving 
recipients of public money have existed for precisely as long as that form of 
redistribution has itself existed (Himmelfarb 1984, Seabrook 2013). The media is 
clearly responsible in some way for the intensification of these views in this particular 
juncture, but it is travelling down a road well travelled in British history.  It would 
nevertheless be important in future to explore the role of the media in providing a 
cultural resource in everyday sense-making.  
One unintended consequence of the puzzle posed in this thesis and the subsequent 
route taken is that it backgrounded what could be considered as the conventional 
political economy of fiscal consolidation or spending cuts. In regards to the former, 
since the UK received relatively little market pressure and has full monetary 
autonomy, fiscal consolidation had to be justified and legitimated through different 
means. Fiscal consolidation has followed a strange path in which one budget in 2010 
– immediately following the election – made significantly more cuts and inflicted 
more pain than any of the others. Global financial markets play a role here, through 
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demanding consolidation not because of the potential economic impact (which will 
inevitably be negative) but as evidence of ‘credibility’ (Konzelmann 2014: 29). One 
harsh budget followed by mere tweaks fits this, as the imperative is not to solve the 
debt crisis per se but to instead perform a form of credibility. This credibility does not 
emanate from actual spending cuts, but from a sometimes-vague promise to ensure 
the books are balanced in the future. As long as this austere future appears credible, so 
too does the UK’s credibility with global capital and the Conservative party’s 
credibility with the electorate. This fiscal policy strategy seems to mirror changes in 
how monetary policy is enacted (see Holmes 2009). Future research would benefit 
from examining how this politics compares with the unfolding of austerity across the 
Eurozone, especially in cases in which spending cuts have been seemingly imposed in 
an undemocratic fashion. In terms of the politics of spending cuts, future research 
could involve updating and applying Pierson’s classic framework for understanding 
welfare retrenchment to the recent spending cuts. Future research may also look at the 
unequal distribution of spending cuts along gendered, ethnic and other lines.  
Another limitation of the research has been the single-case research design. This 
research was driven by a desire to understand the dynamics of austerity specifically in 
the British case, but future research should build a comparative project based on some 
of the insights of this thesis in order to gain a more general perspective on the politics 
of austerity. One way in which this might be done is to build on some of the ideas 
discussed towards the end of Chapter 7, by analysing how redistributive or taxpayer 
‘conflict’ (Polillo 2013) shapes the governance of fiscal consolidation across Europe. 
With the politicisation of deficits creating a scarcity surrounding public goods, social 
conflicts over the deservingness of different social groups as recipients of 
redistribution is increasingly scrutinised. In particular, existing social tensions about 
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‘undeserving’ others (such as immigrants, welfare recipients, or regions and 
populations) come to the fore, as taxpayers attempt to identify those groups they 
believe to be an unfair drain on public finances and thus the sources of state 
indebtedness. This contributes to a situation in which spending cuts, especially those 
geared at the undeserving, can receive relatively high support from populations when 
otherwise we might expect resistance. In addition to the UK, this future research 
could use a historical sociological method to trace how these conflicts in different 
fiscal spaces – such as the Eurozone and periphery-bailouts, and Denmark and 
immigration in addition to the UK – solicit the punishment of the poor in the name of 
living within means. These fiscal battles are crucial to making sense of the legitimacy 
and wider political economy of austerity in Europe. 
Future research could also focus on enhancing our understanding of how the 
household analogy works in both the history of economic thought and in everyday 
sense-making. In regard to the former, orthodox economic thought has perhaps 
underpinned austerity through two prevalent myths. The first of these myths is that 
money and credit is generated through recycling the deposits of hard-working savers 
– which is part of the reason for which being indebted is seen as a moral fault. The 
recent Bank of England report on money creation (McLeay et al. 2014)2 shows how 
this might be challenged (Graeber 2014). The second myth underpinning ‘sound 
finance’, less embedded in orthodox economic thought, is the notion that tax must 
collected before the state can spend; thus suggesting that fiscal deficits are an 
intrinsically dangerous thing. The point is that the household analogy is more than 
just a crude and obfuscatory justification; it is also a constitutive part of the history of 
                                                
2 ‘Money creation in practice differs from some popular misconceptions — banks do not act simply as 
intermediaries, lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply up’ central 
bank money to create new loans and deposits’ (McLeay et al., 2014: 14).  
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economic thought itself. In regard to the latter, it is important to test the household 
analogy as a cognitive heuristic. Political psychologists have recently argued that 
human cognitive heuristics developed to help negotiate prehistoric small-scale 
exchanges are used today in order to make sense of large-scale politics (Petersen 
2012). It would be interesting to use psychological experimental methods to test 
whether the household analogy is another case of a small-to-big scale heuristic, in 
which an evolutionary heuristic to live frugally and within means is translated and 
extrapolated to the state level in which spending cuts may seem like a desirable 
response to a fiscal deficit. This research could be very important, as it could indicate 
or reject a de facto economic conservative bias in human sense making.  
Final thought 
David Cameron has received much ire for explaining that, to him, ‘we’re all in this 
together’ when it comes to taking the pain from spending cuts. On the Left, this has 
understandably been read as a disingenuous attempt to claim that fiscal consolidation 
will be equally borne by all those in society, in order to mask the disproportionate 
level of cuts that have impacted upon the relatively powerless and poor. An 
alternative reading of ‘we’re all in this together’, however, is possible given the 
argument here. While it is true that it does specifically invoke a societal image, it is 
perhaps not just a comment about taking the pain of the cuts, but instead also invokes 
a wider story: that we were all fallible and responsible, in different ways, for the pre-
crisis excesses and now we must live within our means. This moral crisis of twenty-
first century Britain is of households, of politicians, of welfare redistribution, of 
bankers, and of probably many more. Fiscal relations run through the veins of these 
disputes, which are politicised by the peculiar dynamics of debt relations invoked by 
the fiscal deficit. Whether taxes and redistribution reflect how many think the 
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economy ought to work is important when undertaking fiscal reform (including fiscal 
consolidation). Contesting and accepting norms relating to this, and, especially, how 
the resources from citizens should be collected and distributed is, in many ways, 
inseparable from moral questions about what ought to be done. These disputes and 
battles – and the interventions they legitimate – are what we mean by the everyday 
politics of the age of austerity.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. List of speeches analysed  
Note:  
• Not all of these speeches are referred to directly in the thesis. Those speeches 
that are cited are also included in the bibliography.  
• All of these speeches were downloaded from the Conservative party website, 
and were filed under the topic of “the economy” by either George Osborne or 
David Cameron. As was revealed in late 2013, many of these speeches had 
been not only removed from the Conservative website, but their cache version 
had also been blocked.  
1.  ‘The State of Gordon Brown’s Economy’ 
David Cameron, Monday, September 17 2007 
Speech at KPMG 
2. ‘It’s Time for Aspiration’ 
George Osborne, Monday, October 1 2007 
Speech to the Conservative Party Conference 
3. ‘Working day and night for British industry’ 
David Cameron, Thursday, November 15 2007 
Speech to the North East Economic Forum 
4. CBI Conference 
David Cameron, Tuesday, November 27 2007 
Speech to the CBI conference 
5. ‘Brown has failed to prepare Britain for tough times’ 
George Osborne, Friday, January 11 2008 
Speech to the London School of Economics 
6. Speech to Business leaders in Davos 
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David Cameron, Thursday, January 24 2008 
Speech to the Barclays Capital Dinner at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos  
7. ‘The Principles of Tax Reform’ 
George Osborne, Friday, February 15 2008 
Speech at Policy Exchange 
8. ‘There is a dependency culture’ 
George Osborne, Thursday, February 28 2008 
 Speech 
9. ‘On Fairness’ 
George Osborne, Thursday, August 21 2008 
Speech to Demos 
10. ‘Response to the Chancellor’s Budget speech’ 
David Cameron, Wednesday, March 12 2008  
Response to the Chancellor’s Budget speech  
11. ‘A Conservative Economic Strategy’ 
David Cameron, Friday, March 28 2008  
Speech at a breakfast for senior city figures hosted by The City of London 
12. ‘Lessons from the credit crunch’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, April 8 2008 
Speech to Harvard University 
13. ‘An Alternative Vision for the Economy’ 
  George Osborne, Monday, April 14 2008 
Speech at Policy Exchange 
14. ‘Speech to BCC Annual Conference’ 
George Osborne, Monday, April 28 2008 
Speech to annual conference of the British Chambers of Commerce in 
Liverpool 
15. ‘Britain needs a new economic dynamism’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, May 6 2008 
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Monthly Press Briefing 
16. ‘Speech to the British Bankers Association’ 
George Osborne, Friday, June 13 2008 
Speech to BBA at Mansion House 
17. ‘Speech to the CBI’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, July 15 2008 
Speech to the CBI 
18. ‘The PM has had his boom and his reputation is now bust’ 
David Cameron, Sunday, September 28 2008 
Speech to Conservative party conference in Birmingham 
19. ‘We have work to do and a future to build’ 
  George Osborne, Monday, September 29 2008 
Speech to Conservative party conference in Birmingham 
20. ‘Together we will find a way through’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, September 30 2008 
Speech to Conservative party conference in Birmingham 
21. ‘Conference Speech 2008’ 
David Cameron, Wednesday, October 1 2008 
Speech to Conservative party conference in Birmingham 
22. ‘UK taxpayer footing bill for boom that turned to bust’ 
George Osborne, Monday, October 13 2008 
Response to statement from the Chancellor 
23. ‘The Conservative plan for a responsible economy’ 
David Cameron, Friday, October 17 2008  
Speech to Bloomberg  
24. ‘Recovery through fiscal responsibility’ 
George Osborne, Friday, October 31 2008 
Speech at the London School of Economics 
25. ‘We need economic change’ 
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David Cameron, Friday, November 7 2008 
Speech 
26. ‘Keep Britain Working’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, November 11 2008 
Press conference 
27. ‘The choice on borrowing’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, November 18 2008 
Speech 
28. ‘The Conservative approach to the recession’ 
David Cameron, Monday, November 24 2008 
Speech to the CBI 
29. ‘Tackling the credit crisis’ 
David Cameron, Friday, November 28 2008 
Speech 
30. ‘Fiscal responsibility and the recession’ 
David Cameron, Tuesday, December 9 2008 
Speech at the LSE 
31. ‘A day of reckoning’ 
David Cameron, Monday, December 15 2008 
Speech to Thomson Reuters 
32. ‘Queen's Speech Economy Debate’ 
George Osborne, Monday, December 15 2008 
Speech to Parliament 
33. ‘Britain's Economic Future’ 
David Cameron, Monday, January 5 2009 
Speech 
34. ‘Labour's Debt Crisis campaign launch’ 
David Cameron, Monday, January 12 2009 
Speech at campaign launch in London 
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35. ‘Creating a new culture of financial discipline’ 
George Osborne, Monday, January 26 2009 
Speech to Institute of Chartered Accountants  
37. ‘We need popular capitalism’ 
David Cameron, Friday, January 30 2009 
Speech at World Economic Forum in Davos 
37. ‘A new banking settlement’ 
George Osborne, Monday, February 2 2009 
Speech at Reform and the London Stock Exchange conference 
38. ‘Taxpayers pick up the bill for Labour's irresponsibility’ 
George Osborne, Thursday, February 26 2009 
 Speech to Parliament 
39. ‘A different vision for the economy’ 
George Osborne, Friday, March 6 2009 
Speech in Birmingham 
40. ‘We will make the hard long-term decisions’ 
David Cameron, Friday, March 13 2009 
Speech in Birmingham 
41. ‘Fiscal Responsibility with a Social Conscience’ 
David Cameron, Thursday, March 19 2009 
Speech  
42. ‘Policy making after the crash’ 
George Osborne, Wednesday, April 8 2009 
Speech at the RSA 
43. ‘Britain cannot afford another five years of Labour’ 
David Cameron, Wednesday, April 22 2009 
Response to the Budget 
44. ‘The age of austerity’ 
David Cameron, Sunday, April 26 2009 
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Speech to Conservative party spring conference in Cheltenham 
45. ‘A New British Economic Model’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, June 9 2009 
Speech to the ABI annual conference 
46. ‘Economic priorities of a Conservative Government’ 
David Cameron, Monday, July 20 2009 
Speech 
47. ‘Progressive reform in an age of austerity’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, August 11 2009 
Speech at World Economic Forum, Davos 
48. ‘The Conservative Strategy for the recovery’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, September 15 2009 
Speech to the Spectator's 'Paths Back to Recovery' conference 
49. ‘Labour are trying to rewrite economic history’ 
David Cameron, Wednesday, September 16 2009 
Speech 
50. ‘We will lead the economy out of crisis’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, October 6 2009 
Speech to Conservative party conference 
51. ‘Tackling the deficit is not an alternative to economic growth’ 
David Cameron, Monday, November 23 2009 
Speech to the CBI  
52. ‘Labour have failed to deal with the deficit’ 
George Osborne, Wednesday, December 9 2009 
Speech to Parliament 
53. ‘Restoring Britain's economic reputation’ 
David Cameron, Friday, January 29 2010 
Speech to World Economic Forum in Davos 
54. ‘A New Economic Model’ 
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George Osborne, Tuesday, February 2 2010 
Speech to journalists 
55. ‘Mais Lecture - A New Economic Model’ 
George Osborne, Wednesday, February 24 2010 
Annual Mais lecture  
56. ‘We need change in the economy’ 
George Osborne, Tuesday, March 2 2010 
Reuters.com Q&A session 
57. ‘Small business can't afford another five years of Gordon Brown’ 
George Osborne, Friday, March 19 2010 
Speech 
58. ‘An empty budget’ 
George Osborne, Thursday, March 25 2010 
Response to the Budget  
59. ‘Tackling Britain's record deficit’ 
George Osborne, Monday, May 24 2010 
Speech to the CBI annual dinner 
60. ‘Transforming the British economy’ 
David Cameron, Friday, May 28 2010 
Speech in Shipley, West Yorkshire 
61. ‘We must tackle Britain's massive deficit and growing debt’ 
David Cameron, Monday, June 7 2010 
Speech in Milton Keynes 
62. ‘Our tough but fair approach to welfare’ 
George Osborne, Monday, October 4 2010 
Speech to Conservative party conference 
63. ‘Together in the National Interest’ 
David Cameron, Wednesday, October 6 2010 
Speech to Conservative party conference 
  
 
288 
64. ‘We're building a better future for Britain’  
George Osborne, Saturday, March 5 2011 
Speech to Conservative party spring conference 
65. ‘Building a better future’ 
David Cameron, Sunday, March 6 2011 
Speech to Conservative party conference 
66. ‘We have put fuel into the tank of the British economy’ 
George Osborne, Wednesday, March 23 2011 
Budget speech 
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Appendix 2. Focus group participants 
Figure A2.1   Description of focus group participants 
Focus group A1. Kings Heath, Birmingham, May 2012. 
Name1  Age  Occupation 
Paul  51  Agricultural researcher 
Damien  47  English tutor 
Denise  52  Teaching assistant 
Maureen  52  Unemployed 
Waheed  52  Unknown 
Jerry  50  NHS manager 
Focus group A2. Sutton Coldfield, Birmingham, June 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Duncan  46  Banker 
Kyle  50  Driving instructor 
Linda  56  Housewife 
Nicholas  51  Car trader 
Focus group A3. Solihull, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Sarah  52  Child-minder 
Lucy  50  Part time sixth form lecturer / carer 
Rachel  51  IT support at local college 
                                                
1 Names have been changed to ensure anonymity.  
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Focus group A4. Moseley, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Caitlin  48  Part time researcher and craftsperson 
Mandy  60  Retired teacher 
Michael  38  
Broadcast journalist 
 
Focus group B5. Aston, Birmingham, September 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Lynn  46  Community organiser 
Felix  36  Unemployed / volunteer 
Jo  20  Volunteer 
Rose  42  Volunteer 
Linda  N/A  Unknown 
Shauna  40  Events / community work 
Eric  58  Unknown 
Poonam  N/A  Retired 
Beemal  34  Unknown 
Jill  27  Mother 
Focus group B6. Shard End, Birmingham, October 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Joanna  N/A  Unknown 
Louise  37  Unknown 
May  46  Care worker 
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Jamie  18  College student 
Yangun  18  Retail assistant 
Jilly  30  Unknown 
Jo2  20  Volunteer 
Clare  N/A  Volunteer 
Mary  77  Retired 
Nicola  18  Student 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
2 This participant appeared in two focus groups. 
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Appendix 3. Focus group area rationale and description 
Figure A3.1   Focus group breakdown 
Name Date No. of 
participants 
Location, all in West 
Midlands (with postcode) 
Average 
property value3 
A1 May 2012 6 Kings Heath (B14) £147,147 
A2 June 2012 4 Sutton Coldfield (B72) £241,081 
A3 July 2012 3 Solihull (B90) £226,423 
A4 July 2012 3 Moseley (B13) £210,109 
B5 September 2012 10 Aston (B6) £89,433  
B6 October 2012 10 Shard End (B33) £109,315 
 
The locations for the A groups were selected in two clusters that are representative of 
different sorts of middle-income homeowners. I selected Sutton Coldfield and 
Solihull, areas outside the direct vicinity of Birmingham, because they have 
reputations as affluent and conservative suburban areas for commuters. For instance, 
Rachel (Focus group A3) described Solihull by telling the group how ‘my parents 
would come visit and always say what a beautiful place Solihull is, and leafy and 
green and looks quite affluent, y’know’. Interestingly, the Sutton Coldfield 
participants generally acknowledged the wealth within the area, but also pointed out 
how the area had slightly declined in comparison with other areas: ‘I always says 
Sutton used to be on a par with Solihull… And now it’s not. We’ve slipped … away, 
                                                
3 Source: Zoopla Zed-Index. Based on first half of postcode of location of focus group discussion. Date 
of data: 1st February 2013. Only used for rough indication. 
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off the mark, I think’ (Linda, Focus group A2). Moseley and Kings Heath, meanwhile, 
are neighbouring areas firmly within the city limits that also have reputations as 
affluent, but are also known for being more ‘quirky’ and less conservative. This was 
reflected too in the focus group discussions, where a few of the participants from 
these areas identified favourably with this reputation. The B groups, meanwhile, were 
selected primarily on the basis of access and their reputations as deprived 
neighbourhoods. Both Aston and Shard End are firmly within the city limits. The 
relative affluence of each area is reflected in the indicative average property values in 
Figure A3.1.  
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Appendix 4. Participant recruitment 
Recruitment method for A groups 
Getting random people into a room at the same time for up to two hours at once for 
the purposes of research is no easy task. In addition to offering incentives in the form 
of retail vouchers, this practical concern gave further weight (in addition to the 
assumption of intersubjectivity) to base the recruitment of the A groups by location. 
People might be more persuadable if they were content in the knowledge that to 
participate only involved a maximum 15-minute walk to a location they knew well. It 
is partly for this reason the A sub-groups were selected on the basis of different 
neighbourhoods that took place at community centres or similar. 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 3, a database of potential participants living in these 
areas was compiled. This was done through using a combination of Google Maps and 
the Post Office to build a list of postcodes within roughly one mile of the location of 
the focus group (although it did ultimately depend on the area). Once a sufficient 
number of postcodes had been collated (with the sufficiency based on prior trial and 
error), I searched for each one on the electoral roll. Not everyone is publicly listed on 
the electoral roll, and not all of those that are make their address and telephone 
number public. Nevertheless, I compiled a spreadsheet of typically around a hundred 
of those that did list all this information. If I recognised the person or family listed, I 
did not include them.  
I then phoned each 5th person of this list – done in this manner to avoid participants 
clustering around a particular postcode. This was an arduous process, and it took 
perhaps 20 telephone conversations (and numerous failed or unanswered calls) before 
I secured my first participant. Although I tried to avoid using a telephone script, the 
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general thrust of my pitch can be seen below. Participants were screened for 
suitability (e.g. whether they considered themselves a homeowner). I made sure I 
recruited at least five participants, but some people inevitably withdrew without 
providing any notice – hence some of the slightly smaller groups. Participants were 
then sent a follow up letter to confirm their attendance.  
A4.1 Telephone script 
Hi! My name is Liam, I’m a PhD student from University of Birmingham, would you 
mind if I borrowed just a couple of minutes to ask you about my research? 
I’m doing some research into about what the public think about the austerity cuts to 
public services – and their experiences of this.  
We’re offering £20 gift vouchers to come along and discuss these issues as part of a 
focus group. 
It would be with about 3 – 6 other people from the community and we would just ask 
you to reflect on what its like to live in [area] during times of recession and your 
opinions on the economy. For a £20 gift voucher. 
I was just wondering if that might be something that interests you at all? 
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A4.2 Follow up letter 
 
Liam Stanley 
POLSIS 
Muirhead Tower 
University of Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
[Name] 
[Address] 
[City] 
[Postcode] 
 
[Date] 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Thank you for accepting my invitation to come along and discuss your views on politics, austerity 
measures and the state of the economy. The focus group is part of a doctoral research project, which is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, to investigate how members of the public 
discuss these issues. It doesn’t matter if you do not consider yourself an expert on politics or the 
economy. I want to hear from everyone, including those who think they have an interest in the topic 
and those who do not.  For these reasons your participation is vital, so thank you. 
 
The group will be held at: 
  
 [e.g. Sutton Coldfield community hub] 
 
[e.g. On Monday 25th June, from 7pm] 
 
It will be a small group discussion, with around 5 other participants. We will provide refreshments and 
have a £20 Amazon.co.uk gift voucher for you at the end. [Sutton Coldfield community hub] is located 
right in the heart of the area on [Farthing Lane]. 
 
If for some reason you are unable to join us, please let me know as soon as possible so we can find a 
replacement. If you have any questions feel free to get in contact via email (lxs635@bham.ac.uk) or 
phone (07595038018).  
 
With this letter you will find an information sheet, with some background about the research, and 
consent form.  If you could please have a read of the information sheet and form and, if you’re happy 
with the terms and conditions, sign the consent form to please bring along to the discussion on the day. 
 
I look forward to seeing you on the [8th].  
 
Best regards, 
 
[signature]  
 
Liam Stanley 
 
Doctoral researcher 
Department of Political Science and International Studies 
University of Birmingham 
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A4.3 Recruitment for B groups poster example 
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Appendix 5. Participant documents 
A5.1 Participant information sheet 
Participant Information sheet  
Research title: The everyday politics of the global financial crisis 
Thank you agreeing to take part in this research study. However, for ethical reasons, it is 
important that you formally consent to take part. Subsequently, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it involves so you can make an informed 
decision. Please take time to read the following information carefully, and if you agree to 
consent please sign the attached form and bring it along to the group discussion. 
The main researcher for this project is Liam Stanley. He is your first port of call for any 
questions or enquiries. His details are listed below. Liam is being supervised by Dr. Stephen 
Bates, whose details are also listed below. 
The purpose of the study is to investigate how members of the public discuss austerity 
measures, politics, and economics. Politicians are said to increasingly target ‘Middle 
England’ as a core constituency, so it is of academic interest how economic policies may have 
resonated with voters. It was decided that the best way to study this would be to conduct an 
initial series of 4 focus groups with homeowners from Birmingham. You have been selected, 
via the electoral register, as a potential participant because you fit these criteria. If you require 
any further explanation about the purpose of the research or the process of the interview prior 
to participating please seek further clarification from the researcher. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to still take part. You are free to withdraw at any time 
from the research without giving a prior reason. Part of the focus group discussion will 
involve participants elaborating upon their experiences of the global financial crisis. If you 
find discussing such experiences particularly distressing it is advisable to withdraw from the 
project.  
The discussion will last approximately 90 minutes. The discussion will be recorded via a 
voice recorder. The researcher may also take notes. Once the research is complete, all 
participants will be sent a short summary of the research. In return for participating in this 
study you will receive a £20 gift voucher in return. If you decide to withdraw at any point 
prior to the discussion, you will be ineligible for the gift.   
If you feel like withdrawing your data after the discussion has taken place then get in contact 
with the researcher Liam Stanley as soon as possible to arrange the redacting of your 
contributions. The deadline to do this will be two months after the discussion has taken place. 
After this date, it is likely that the data will have already been processed. Withdrawing your 
data at this point will not affect your gift.  
All data will be treated as confidential. All names will be completely changed and no 
information that could identify you as a participant will be kept on record or published. This 
means that comments you’ve said may be used in publications. The data collected will be 
used primarily in the PhD thesis described above, but may also be used in related publications 
in academic journals based on the thesis research. Data may also be used in future research 
projects. Data will be stored digitally for ten years following the University’s code of practice 
for research and will be password protected. Personal data will be processed for the purposes 
detailed above, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (for more information, see 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents).   
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The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
After the discussion, the researcher can be contacted on: 
Liam Stanley 
POLSIS 
University of Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
lxs635@bham.ac.uk 
07595038018 
Supervisor contact details: 
Stephen Bates 
POLSIS 
University of Birmingham  
B15 2TT 
s.r.bates@bham.ac.uk 
 
Thank you. 
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A5.2 Consent form 
 
 
Consent form 
Title of Project: The everyday politics of the global financial crisis 
 
Researcher: Liam Stanley – University of Birmingham, lxs635@bham.ac.uk. 
 
 Please tick box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time prior to or during the focus group, or up to two 
months after the discussion, without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
  
 Please tick box 
 
     Yes              No 
4. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being audio 
recorded 
   
5.      I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it 
has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used 
for future research. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
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A5.3 Incentive receipt form 
 
Research participant gift receipt 
Title of Project: The everyday politics of the global financial crisis 
 
Researcher: Liam Stanley – University of Birmingham, lxs635@bham.ac.uk. 
 
Participant name (please print): ______________________ 
I hereby certify that I received a £20 gift voucher in return for participation in the above 
research project. 
 
Signature: _____________________________   Date: 30/10/2012 
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Appendix 6. Questioning route 
Opening gambit: 
Good evening and welcome. Thank you for all taking the time to join me for this 
discussion about the recent austerity measures. My name is Liam, and I’m from the 
University of Birmingham. I’m conducting research into what members of the 
electorate think about austerity, politics and the economy – which is why you were 
asked to attend.  
As we know, the Conservative-led coalition government have announced the biggest 
cuts in state spending since World War II, which have been justified on the basis that 
the state spends too much. One of things I’m interested in how austerity has been 
justified.  
What I’m really interested in is what you think, and your experiences. As normal in 
politics, there are no right or wrong answers, and I expect that there will some 
different views. Please feel free to share your view even if it means you disagree. As I 
said, I’m interested in a wide spectrum of views.  
So, if you want to follow up on something that someone has said, you want to agree, 
disagree, or give examples, then please feel free to do that. Disagreeing is absolutely 
fine, and friendly debate is more than encouraged. You don’t have to answer every 
question. Having said that, I would like to hear from everyone at some point, so if 
someone is talking a lot I may ask for others’ opinions. 
We’re taping the session to make sure we capture all the comments. In the research, 
no real names will be used, and I can guarantee anonymity. My role is to mainly listen 
– but also to prompt and guide the discussion. I’m interested in hearing from 
everybody in the group. OK great. So let’s begin.  
If you could please give me your name, what you do, and how long you have lived in 
the area for. 
Prompts4: 
What’s it like living in [the area]? [Introductory questions] 
• Is it a good place to live? 
• Would you recommend it to others? 
• Does it have a particular sense of community? 
• How do you think other people perceive it? 
Will the austerity cuts make a difference to [the area]? [Transition questions] 
                                                
4 Note: This was edited after the focus group discussions to reflect the sorts of questions actually asked. 
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• Will it make it a better or worse area? 
• Are there any controversies about cuts to public services? 
• Do you think anyone has benefitted from the global financial crisis? How have 
you been affected by austerity? 
Do you think austerity cuts will make a difference to the UK as a whole? [Key 
questions] 
• Will it make it a better or worse country? 
• [Following discussion about ‘the mess’ the UK is in] What is ‘the mess’ we’re 
in? 
• If you were an alien on Earth, would you guess that there has been a large 
recession and now a period of spending cuts? 
• Some people argue that the government should focus on growth over austerity. 
What are your thoughts? 
What’s the point in austerity measures? [Key questions] 
• What do you think the majority of people would say the reason for austerity 
is? 
• [Following discussion about the problem being debt] If the UK has lots of debt, 
then why? And who or what is to blame? 
Is austerity necessary? [Ending ‘all-things-considered’ question] 
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Appendix 7. Reflecting upon the research process 
Looking back at research proposals produced towards the beginning of this study, it is 
clear how much the content of this research ended up deviating from how it was 
originally envisaged. Following the discourse analysis of Conservative speeches seen 
outlined in Chapter 4, I speculated internally that most focus group discussion would 
focus on contesting and disputing the role of the Labour and Conservative parties in 
the debt crisis. I never expected to have significant sections about the moral 
underpinnings of debt or about the deservingness of welfare claimants. In the end, the 
relative roles played by political parties in causing the conditions for spending cuts 
did not seem especially relevant to the focus group participants. This is anecdotal 
evidence, I think, of the clear benefits of the focus group method deployed – as a 
means to an end, as well as the benefit of merely being forced to look at political and 
economic change in a different way and seeing connections that were not as visible 
previously.  
Like any method, focus groups also have limitations – both in general, and for 
answering the puzzle of this thesis. The method as employed with the analytical 
framework had a bias towards the middle-class (the A groups) over the more socially 
excluded (the B groups). The A groups were comparatively well-versed in the topics 
at hand, they were more familiar with the potentially strange setting of a focus group, 
and they felt comfortable in the presence of a university researcher. As Chapter 7 
commented upon, this was reflected in the quantity and quality of data from the A 
groups. To overcome this I attempted to use data from B groups wherever possible, 
mostly as a way of supporting the claims made about the A groups. Most strikingly, 
the B groups also identified ‘the mess’ as a debt crisis, although they did not elucidate 
or problematise this in the same way. This bias is inevitably reflected in the analysis, 
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and the specific claims about the mood of the times – which have a middle-class tint 
to them, which is partly reflected in the specifics of the concept itself especially in 
regards to the first-past-the-post electoral system used in British general elections (see 
Chapter 3).  
Another downside of the specific focus group method used in this thesis is the lack of 
analysis on the variegated experiences of gender and ethnicity in a time of austerity. 
This is problematic for the simple reflexive reason that in largely excluding questions 
of gender and ethnicity this research is, in principle, complicit in reinforcing 
undesirable power relations and the continued ostracism of marginalised experiences. 
This is regrettably in large part down to the specifics of the methodology and research 
design, and in particular the focus upon the sub-group as a unit of analysis. Recall 
how intersubjectivity represents one of the key assumptions in the research design: 
instead of accessing individual beliefs I am purporting to analyse collective norms 
from specific sub-groups. So while those sub-groups did of course include women 
and ethnic minorities as members both abstractly and specifically within the sub-
groups, we cannot treat these experiences as representative of wider populations (of, 
say, women). Indeed, it would logically contradict the methodology outlined if claims 
were made about gender or ethnicity based on these focus group discussions. To 
remedy this, one would need to conduct separate focus groups with a specific sub-
group of, say, middle-income Asians or female community volunteers. Since neither 
of these sub-groups reflected the research puzzle or question, and since resources did 
not stretch far enough to include them, these concerns were backgrounded in the 
research design.  
Related to this issue of marginalised experiences is the equally important problem of 
how a certain coherence was imposed in the analysis. While I do not think I can go as 
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far as to say these focus groups presented a consensus of views on the topic at hand – 
something that is apparently relatively rare (Parker and Tritter 2006: 31) – there was 
nevertheless a lack of outright conflict and hostility. As evidenced by the lengths I 
went to in mentally preparing to calm down heated arguments that never emerged, 
this surprised me. Although I never instructed the participants to reach a consensus 
and (as the ‘opening gambit’ in the interview route shows) I actively encouraged 
discouragement, this should perhaps not be that surprising in hindsight. After all, this 
was a semi-public encounter between mostly strangers on the sensitive topic of 
political and economic values. It is a shame that potentially dissident voices may have 
been dampened, but this is at least consistent with the theoretical focus on 
intersubjectivity. The open rejection of the morality of debt was one counter example 
to this potential trend, but it cannot be denied that a level of coherence has been 
imposed upon the proceedings here in the name of analytical clarity.  
The power relations inherent in academic interviewing situations and focus groups 
(Bloor et al. 2001: 7) were particularly asymmetric in the B groups. The A groups 
were mostly middle-class, mostly white, and mostly male (thus matching some of my 
characteristics) and seemingly at home with a University researcher using the sort of 
logics that are cognate with focus group research from their personal and professional 
lives. The B groups, in contrast, did not match these attributes. Consequently, I felt 
like more of an outsider looking in. While some recommend co-opting an alternative 
insider moderator (Smithson 2000: 110), this was never an option given my limited 
resources and understandable reluctance to place the data collection of my own thesis 
outside of my own hands. This power asymmetry was most apparent in the time after 
I had completed the B2 group. While continuing to talk after the official focus group 
had stopped, a couple of participants took the time to quiz me in a friendly manner 
  
 
307 
about where I came from, what I actually do, and where I live. Power asymmetries 
notwithstanding, this arrangement may have actually been beneficial for data 
collection. While it did mean that the focus groups were probably not the same form 
of sociable public discourse as the A groups, it did mean they possessed a form of 
confessionary quality in which the qualities and pitfalls of these communities could 
be communicated and shared with someone in an institutional position of knowledge 
dissemination.  
One further subsequent moment cemented my position as outsider in my mind. 
Following the B group, a couple of participants stayed around once everyone had left 
with the intention of speaking to me. They hinted that they were upset that I had only 
offered incentives to those actually attending the focus group discussions themselves, 
since some participants had themselves had to rely upon the in effect unpaid labour of 
friends for childcare just so that they could attend. Since I had not directly recruited 
the focus group participants myself, I was worryingly oblivious to this. In response, I 
made arrangements with the organiser to send a £20 voucher to the four people who 
had offered informal childcare. Although it robbed me of the chance to conduct an 
additional focus group – my research budget only ran to £1000 – it was clearly the 
right thing to do. The episode demonstrates the care required to avoid harming 
participants when conducting this sort of research.  
Another key issue I grappled with throughout the research was the extent to which 
focus group discussions could be characterised as a form of everyday talk. To name 
something as everyday talk is, like most forms of characterisation, far from neutral. 
For it implies that the researcher will be accessing the sort of discussions that may 
happen in bars, at office water coolers, or over the family dinner table. Although I 
was originally keen to emphasise the everyday nature of the discussions, I soon came 
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to appreciate how there are a number of implicit but nonetheless important 
methodological implications of this. For one, viewing focus group discussions as 
everyday talk downplays the role of the moderator (which was in this case myself) in 
directing the course of discussions. Furthermore, it is, quite simply, not a very 
common form of everyday conversation in which people are paid to talk to (mostly) 
strangers about a specific topic for a long period of time (Myers 1998: 87). For these 
reasons, focus groups cannot truly be a form of everyday talk.  
While this may well be the case, the flipside of this must involve questioning whether 
‘everyday talk’, as a completely natural non-contaminated sociable conversation, is 
even a viable aim itself. Following Goffman (1990 [1959]), as I have at many points 
throughout this research, it is useful to introduce the difference between ‘backstage’ 
and ‘frontstage’ performances, in which there is no simple opposition between 
authentic and artificial social situations. While Goffman’s point is sometimes 
interpreted in the opposite way – that is, we have an artificial frontstage persona but a 
‘real’ background personality we share with a very few close family or friends – one 
particularly persuasive interpretation is that people are constantly negotiating their 
identity in social interaction: they are performing their self-narratives and no one of 
these narratives is necessarily more or less authentic since they are context-dependent 
(Halkier 2010: 78). In this sense, the quest for uncontaminated and totally natural talk 
may be an impossible task, since upon a moment’s reflection we can perhaps realise 
that talking at the bar, over the water cooler or indeed the dinner table are not 
necessarily free of interactional and contextual constraints – it is just that those 
constraints differ from those found in focus group discussions (Hollander 2004: 605). 
For this reason, focus groups should not be characterized as a form of everyday talk, 
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but should instead be seen as ‘a social event that includes performances by all 
concerned’ that occur in ‘a specific, controlled setting’ (Smithson 2000: 105). 
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